

REPORT BY THE  
AUDITOR GENERAL  
OF CALIFORNIA

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**A REPORT ON AN AUDIT  
OF SECURITY MEASURES  
AT TWO CALIFORNIA PRISONS**

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March 14, 1986

Mr. Thomas W. Hayes  
Auditor General  
660 J Street, Suite 300  
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Mr. Hayes:

Arthur Young & Company is pleased to submit this report on our Audit of Security Measures at Folsom State Prison and two units of the California Institute for Men (CIM) -- CIM-Reception Center Central and CIM-East. This report is organized as follows.

- An Executive Summary suitable for quick review by legislative and top management officials
- Sector I, which contains introductory comments on the project objectives, scope, and approach
- Section II, which describes the current operations at Folsom State Prison, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East.
- Section III presents the results of our analysis of prison security incidents at each institution, plus a more general analysis of incidents, staffing, overcrowding, and related information for all eleven CDC prisons
- Section IV documents the results of our audit and evaluation of security and procedures at the prisons
- Section V describes the current security staffing and any recommendations we developed for changes. Recommendations presented here are based on current conditions insofar as equipment and facilities are concerned

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- Section VI contains all findings and recommendations related to security measures. This material is organized into five major subsections that discuss:
  - Our methodology
  - Findings and recommendations pertinent to all three facilities we studied and/or pertinent to the California Department of Corrections generally (i.e., not institution-specific)
  - Findings and recommendations specific to FSP, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East (three subsections)
  - A summary of all recommendations, first sequentially as presented in this report, then in groups of four priority categories.

Where we were able to develop them, rough estimates are provided of first-year costs to implement recommendations.

Throughout this study, management and operating level staff at the prisons have been cooperative and helpful. In fact, many of the changes suggested in this report emanated from institutional personnel.

We have appreciated the opportunity to assist the Auditor General and the California Legislature by performing this study. If questions arise during subsequent consideration of the report contents, please direct them to Joseph F. Hill at (916) 443-6756 in Sacramento.

Very truly yours,

*Arthur Young & Company*

**State of California  
Office of the Auditor General**

**A Report  
on an Audit of  
Security Measures  
at Two California  
Prisons**

**March 14, 1986**



**Arthur Young**

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Office of the Auditor General issued a Request for Proposal for an audit of security measures and staffing at two prisons operated by the California Department of Corrections (CDC). Arthur Young & Company was selected to perform the audit at Folsom State Prison (FSP) and at two of the four institutions that make up the California Institution for Men (CIM) at Chino-- Reception Center Central CIM-RCC) and the East Facility (CIM-East).

This report presents most of the contents of a confidential report on the study that was submitted to the Auditor General on March 3, 1986. The confidential report contained various covenants and sketches that, in the opinion of the Auditor General, CDC officials, and Arthur Young consultants, would jeopardize prison security if released for public distribution. Examples of information in the confidential report that we were concerned about are as follows:

- Site plans for each institution showing the location of facilities, security gates, perimeter controls, etc.
- Discussions of perimeter security weaknesses and specific "blind" spots
- Post-by-post listings of where every correctional officer is stationed, by time of day
- Descriptions of how security methods or equipment (including metal detectors and locking devices) can be compromised
- Suggestions concerning the days and hours when increased cell search activity might be more beneficial.

Because information such as noted above is potentially useful to inmates and members of the public who would work in concert with inmates, it was decided that another report should

be prepared for general distribution. This document serves that purpose. It presents the results of our study, including non-confidential findings and recommendations related to security practices, equipment, and staffing, and facility issues affecting security.

#### A. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The overall goal of this study was to evaluate security at the institutions identified previously, and to recommend improvements as appropriate. Within this goal, several specific objectives were identified:

- To analyze the characteristics and causes of security incidents
- To develop criteria for evaluating security procedures, equipment, and staffing
- To evaluate security procedures, equipment, and staffing at FSP and CIM in terms of their effectiveness in meeting the defined criteria
- To assess the costs and benefits of alternatives for improving security
- To develop recommendations for improvements in security at the two designated institutions, and for security staffing
- To produce a confidential report for selected distribution, and a summary report suitable for public review.

Our scope of work included the following:

- All Custody Division positions which contact or surveil inmates were included in the staffing analysis
- All facilities within the main perimeter of FSP and the two CIM institutions

- All points of ingress and egress
- All security-related facets of inmate programs and services
- All types of security equipment and structural constraints affecting security.

We did not evaluate peripheral programs such as correctional officer training, inmate classification, gang investigations, investigations of security incidents (including crimes), and inmate programs. These subjects were not included in our scope or work, nor were activities performed outside of the main prison perimeters.

## B. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY

Methods used in performing both the Folsom and Chino studies were the same. Our approach is outlined below.

- (1) Research was conducted concerning current legislation, correctional standards, and correctional literature related to security. Manuals of policy and procedures issued by the California Department of Corrections and the management of the Folsom and CIM institutions also were reviewed.
- (2) Prison security objectives were developed, as were specific criteria for evaluating security measures.
- (3) Serious incidents reported at the prisons we studied were analyzed to determine if trends could be identified, or if causes of prison incidents could be defined more clearly.
- (4) Checklists of security measures were developed and a substantial number of on-site interviews and observations were completed.
- (5) Audits for compliance with the more important current security policies and procedures were completed. Evaluations of current security measures also were conducted, and areas of potential problems identified.
- (6) Alternatives for accomplishing security improvements were identified and subjected to general assessments of cost versus justification and perceived benefits.
- (7) Assessments were completed on the adequacy of current security staffing levels.
- (8) The results of all project work then were documented in the detailed confidential report and this summary report.



### C. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH CONDUCTED

Our study included two types of document research activities:

- Review of legislation and case law
- Review of correctional standards and literature.

Each of these reviews was focused specifically on prison security issues.

#### 1. LEGAL RESEARCH

This research was undertaken to define any significant legal authorities and/or limitations directly impacting prison security policy and procedures, so that subsequent analyses and recommendations would be consistent with statutory and case law.

Our legal research consisted of a review of the California Annotated Codes and a sampling of California case law for information directly related to security issues in the state prison system. We also reviewed a number of California State Senate and Assembly bills associated with new prison construction, as well as the recent Touissant v. McCarthy, Judgment of Permanent Injunction and the labor agreement between the state and the California Correctional Peace Officers' Association.

Overall, the results of this research did not produce any major surprises or findings that are not generally consistent with current correctional standards and good judgment. Most of the statutory information can be classified generally as policy and procedure-related (e.g., Title 15 of the California Administrative Code). Those types of requirements typically are found also in the policy and procedures manuals issued by the California Department of Corrections and the CDC institutions.

Findings related to case law were more general and typically relate to constitutional issues (i.e., searches, living conditions, etc.). Most of these findings were generally consistent with correctional standards, such as those promulgated by the American Correctional Association.

## 2. RESEARCH OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS AND LITERATURE

This research was focused narrowly on prison security procedures and equipment; it did not include facilities, inmate programs, or inmate services. The work included a search of the files of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service and a review of all pertinent publications of the American Correctional Association (ACA).

Several ideas were generated through the research on ways to evaluate the effectiveness of security measures (i.e., security evaluation criteria), but none of the material we reviewed had specific criteria of this type. Overall, the research was informative but not highly useful because most of the material was general in its treatment of security subjects. Also, we determined that written CDC and institutional orders are substantially comparable to ACA standards. This is not surprising in that CDC representatives have been involved actively in ACA standards development for many years.

## II. CURRENT OPERATIONS

This section presents general descriptions of the prisons, inmate populations, custody staffing, and general operating methods at the institutions we reviewed.

### A. FOLSOM STATE PRISON

Folsom State Prison is a Level IV (maximum security) prison located approximately 30 miles northeast of Sacramento, California. The original prison was built in the 1880's, making it close to 100 years old. Other structures have been added over the years without benefit of a master plan. The result in some areas is a patchquilt arrangement of structures that, at best, are difficult to surveil and manage on a cost-effective basis.

Currently, Folsom houses over 2,700 high-security inmates within the main prison, and about 300 inmates at Camp Represa, a minimum security facility located outside the main perimeter. Camp Represa was not included in our study. The main prison has a rated design capacity of 1,772 beds; consequently, it is operating at about 150 percent of capacity. This is accomplished primarily by double-celling inmates in the general housing units.

#### 1. GENERAL LAYOUT

Folsom is bordered on three sides by a high granite wall. The west perimeter, which borders the American River, is controlled by a double security fence. The only entrances are the east gate, used for pedestrians and passenger vehicles, and the north gate, used primarily for trucks and for Camp Represa inmates who work nights in Prison Industries.

In addition to the unplanned expansion of this facility, effective security is made more difficult by several substantially different ground elevations (i.e., the prison complex is built on the side of a hill). The three principal elevations are referred to generally as the lower, main, and upper levels, or yards. The lower level runs along the west side and consists primarily of the Vocational Education and Maintenance shops. Over 250 inmates are allowed to participate in programs in this area.

The Main Yard level is at a higher elevation and is comprised of the key inmate housing and support facilities. It also incorporates what is referred to as the "secure inner perimeter." This inner perimeter is comprised of housing units and other structures, several of which are connected by fencing or walls.

There are five housing units located on the Main Yard level. Buildings #1 and #4 are security housing units (SHUs) where the highest security and protective custody inmates are housed. Only one SHU inmate lives in each cell. Inmates are fed in the cells and are escorted outside their cells only for visiting, counseling, medical/dental, and daily exercise. SHU inmates are not supposed to interface with any other inmates. Approximately 750 inmates are classified as SHU inmates, 600 in SHU II (Building #1) and 150 in SHU I (Building #4).

The other three housing units contain general population (mainline) inmates. These inmates are housed two to a cell and are fed in a common dining facility (Dining Room #2). They are allowed to participate in a number of prison programs including Main Yard sports, vocational activities, education and work. Approximately 2,000 inmates live in the three general housing units, as indicated below:

- Building #2: 600 beds
- Building #3: 800 beds
- Building #5: 640 beds.

The third and highest elevation is the Upper Yard, which consists almost completely of Prison Industries. Prison Industries work areas include several major facilities. A license plate factory is the daily workplace for over 100 inmates. A three-building metal fabrication factory produces metal cabinets and bed frames for the state. A third facility comprises the manufacturing warehouses. All together, about 350 inmates work in this area, primarily under supervision of civilians.

In addition to the three major yard areas, Folsom includes a number of other areas and structures. At the south end, China Hill is a large, high-elevation plot that is used for agricultural purposes. Inmate crews work in this area. To the west of China Hill is a sewage treatment plant and warehouse facilities. This area has only a couple of inmate workers. An Administration Building, Hospital, and visiting area also are provided.

## 2. INMATE POPULATION

The Department of Corrections has a formal classification system for determining the custody (security) level of inmates. This process starts at the reception centers where new inmates are screened, evaluated, and assigned a point score that determines whether they will be assigned to a Level I, II, III, or IV institution. Level I designates the lowest (minimum) security facilities and Level IV the highest (maximum) security facilities. Within each institution, a sub-classification process occurs that further designates inmates into one of four basic custody classifications--maximum, close, medium, and minimum. Within each level, however, there are sublevels A and B, with A being the higher security level. Because this second classification process is institution-specific, a Medium A inmate in a high-security prison like Folsom is typically a greater security risk than a Medium A inmate in CIM-East.

With the above thoughts in mind, we provide below a recent estimate of the classification mix at Folsom, a Level IV institution:

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Inmates</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Maximum (A and B)	750	28%
Close A	280	10
Close B	720	27
Medium A	700	26
Medium B	250	9
	<u>2,700</u>	<u>100%</u>

The prison does not record this information. The above data are estimates we derived through interviews. One of the problems in maintaining the information manually (no automated support) is the considerable turnover in population. As many as 500 inmates are transferred in and out of Folsom each month.

### 3. CURRENT SECURITY STAFFING

Current authorized Folsom security staffing is as follows:

- 1.0 Program Administrator
- 1.0 Associate Warden of Custody
- 1.0 Captain
- 20.5 Lieutenants
- 66.4 Sergeants
- 459.4 Correctional officers
  
- 549.3 Total Positions

The above summary does not include Camp Represa positions nor does it include personnel involved in the institution's

business administration and non-custody programs (e.g., counselors, food services, Prison Industries, maintenance, etc.). The scope of our work extended only to the security staffing.

#### 4. TOUISSANT INJUNCTION

The security housing units (SHUs) at Folsom and San Quentin are operated under a Judgment of Permanent Injunction issued by the U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, in the case of Joseph Touissant, et al, vs. Daniel J. McCarthy, et al. The "Touissant Decision," as this injunction is referred to commonly, covers many aspects of SHU living conditions. It is not our intent to list here all of the Touissant requirements. However, it is important to note that many of the requirements directly impact security staffing requirements (e.g., three showers a week, specific exercise requirements, and law library and visiting privileges). In each of these examples, officers must move, escort and thoroughly search the inmates in question. These are time consuming activities.

## B. CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN (CIM)

CIM is a complex of four individual facilities located three miles south of Chino, California, on about 2,500 acres. It was officially opened in 1941 with what is now called CIM-Minimum. The Minimum facility was planned as a prison but, until recently, did not have a perimeter barrier. However, because of an incident that occurred in 1984, CIM-Minimum is now enclosed within a 12-foot chain link fence which is observed by four armed officers in towers. Despite the existence of the fence and towers, CIM-Minimum is still a Level I institution with a range of vocational, educational, work training, prison industries, and other programs typically found in Level I facilities.

In 1951, Reception Center Central was added to CIM. Later, in 1972, a facility that the Department of Corrections had been operating as the Southern Conservation Center was absorbed into CIM and became Reception Center West. The primary function of the two Reception Centers is to receive inmates committed to the Department from Southern California counties. Their basic task is to evaluate all incoming prisoners and determine which inmate goes to which prison. Statistically, the two Reception Centers process nearly two-thirds of all inmates incarcerated in the California prison system, with Los Angeles County inmates making up almost half of the total intake from the eleven southern counties.

The fourth facility was added in 1974, when CIM took over a near-by institution that had been built for the California Youth Authority and vacated. It is now called CIM-East.



Our study deals only with two of the four facilities at CIM, i.e., Reception Center Central and East. Each is described below.

1. CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL (RCC)

RCC does not have an official security rating as an institution. However, the fact that many incoming inmates have unknown behavior characteristics, and many ultimately are assigned to Level III and IV institutions, indicates that it should be considered a Level IV institution, or at least Level III.

RCC consistently houses upwards of 1,450 inmates, not all of whom are there to be processed as new commitments. The facility also is used to house (1) inmates for disciplinary reasons after referral from other nearby institutions, (2) transient prisoners enroute to other CDC institutions, (3) parole violators being returned to custody, and (4) other inmates of varying status. RCC also houses about 75 Permanent Work Crew (PWC) inmates. They perform a variety of tasks within the institution, including maintenance, custodial, clerical, and food service, and assist in the processing of other inmates. With a rated design capacity of 618 beds, RCC regularly is 230 to 235 percent occupied.

a. General Layout

RCC is a one-structure facility surrounded by a single 12-foot fence topped with razor ribbon. The perimeter also has four armed towers. There is a pedestrian entrance on the north side of the facility leading into the Administration Building, and a vehicle sallyport entrance along the south fence line.

The facility itself features the "Telephone Pole" design, i.e., it has a Main Corridor with all housing and activity areas constructed at right angles. This results in constant activity in the Main Corridor. There are a series of security grilles with gates located at different points in the corridor; however, all are open most of the time except for the end gates.

The main structural units are described below.

- Southwest and Northwest Yards -- Currently these yards are used only on Fridays and Saturdays for PWC contact visiting.
- Madrone Hall -- The only general population housing unit with outside cell construction. It has three tiers and 188 beds, plus the dayroom which has been converted to housing (44 beds).
- Sycamore Hall -- A three-tiered general housing unit with 231 beds, 44 of which are located temporarily in the dayroom.
- Receiving and Release (R&R) -- The point where all inmates enter or leave the facility.
- Medical/Dental Offices -- The area used to conduct medical and dental examinations of incoming prisoners, and to provide sick call services for all residents.
- Administration Building -- Contains space for offices, inmate records, counselor supervisors, and non-contact visiting.
- South Corridor -- Contains three primary areas: (1) the Gymnasium which currently houses over 200 inmates in double bunk beds, (2) several PWC dormitories totalling 71 beds, and (3) the facility maintenance shop.
- Clinical Offices -- Contains watch offices, counselor offices and an academic/psychological testing area.
- Palm Hall -- This is the administrative segregation unit of 170 beds that provides higher custody housing for all CIM facilities and several other nearby CDC institutions.

- Cypress Hall -- The first tier on the east side of this unit is operated as an extension of Palm Hall. This tier contains 17 cells. The remainder of Cypress Hall contains a total of 170 general population cells, plus 44 beds in the dayroom.
- Palm Exercise Yard -- Ad Seg inmates from Palm and Cypress Halls exercise in this yard. It consists of four individual yards for inmate segregation purposes. A tower located in the center is staffed by two armed guards whenever the yard is occupied.
- Birch Hall -- A three-tiered general housing unit with 305 beds, including 46 in the dayroom.

b. Facility Activity

The primary objective of RCC is to receive new commitments and parole violators with new terms, and determine where in the statewide prison system they should be housed. Because this process takes 30 to 60 days, inmates spend much of their time in cells or housing areas. About half of the inmate population requires this processing. The other half of the population requires no special processing, or only minimal processing.

c. Inmate Population

As indicated earlier, RCC does not have an official institutional security classification. Because of this, plus the general absence of a prior custody history for incoming inmates, there is no internal classification status applied to inmates (such as maximum, close, etc.). Rather, inmates are housed to minimize disruption and violence, and to maximize compatibility and control.

About 70 to 75 PWC inmates staff many positions throughout the facility, several of which are critical to the efficient operation of the institution. They assist in

processing incoming inmates in R&R, assist in the clinical testing and scoring, and essentially schedule the flow of inmates through the medical and dental examinations.

d. Current Security Staffing

Security staffing currently budgeted at RCC is as follows:

1	- Associate Superintendent
1	- Program Administrator
1	- Captain
5.3	- Lieutenants
19.1	- Sergeants
<u>158.6</u>	- Correctional Officers
<u>186.0</u>	Total Positions

At RCC, staffing requirements are affected significantly by two factors -- facility design and overcrowding. The design used to build RCC is no longer used in new prison construction because it requires excessive movement within the facility, and it presents numerous blind spots. Generally, this design is labor intensive.

2. CIM-EAST

When CIM-East was constructed for the California Youth Authority in 1966, it included many design features that would never be included in a Level III CDC adult institution. To offset these deficiencies partially, and to provide a fundamental security feature of a Level III facility, CDC erected a single 12-foot fence around the institution, supported by four armed towers (one at each corner).

As with most CDC facilities, CIM-East is overcrowded. The base design capacity is 400 beds, with one bed to one cell. As population increased, a second bed was added to each cell and, subsequently, beds were added to several of the small dayrooms. Currently, East is consistently housing 850 to 860 inmates, which is over 210 percent of design capacity.

a. General Layout

CIM-East consists of a series of structures (connected or connected by walls) arranged in an oval with a large, open yard in the center. This arrangement provides an inner security perimeter. Key structures within the complex are identified below:

- Building A -- The Administration Building is a two-story facility that contains Receiving and Release, medical/dental, and non-contact visiting.
- Entry Building -- Controls pedestrian access to the institution and is used to process inmate visitors
- Building B -- Consists of two, 2-story housing units -- Colusa and Del Norte. Each housing unit has two wings; each wing has two floors; each floor contains 25 cells; and each cell contains two beds. Therefore, each housing unit contains a total of 200 beds, which provides a total of 400 beds in Building B.

The middle area of each housing unit has a central control room and a large dayroom on each floor. The building also has a kitchen and two dining rooms.

- Building F -- Contains a variety of inmate-related activities and services, including the Gym, Warehouse, Prison Industries, and vocational/educational facilities. Located in front of Building F is an olympic size swimming pool and a large weight pile.
- Building C -- This building consists of two additional 2-story housing units -- Butte and Alpine. The building is identical to Building B and contains the same internal facilities.
- Building E -- Contains two chapels.

b. Facility Activity

CIM-East is a facility which, for the most part, houses sentenced Level III inmates. Contact visiting is permitted and usually takes place only on Fridays through Tuesdays, plus holidays. However, due to overcrowding, visiting may be extended to all days of the week.

About 250 or so of the inmates are parole violators who have been returned to custody and are awaiting transportation to another institution. A few may have only a short time left on their parole and will complete their term at East. However, the number of inmates in this category are small. Typically, these inmates are not required to work.

c. Inmate Population

All inmates at CIM-East are considered medium custody and all housing is considered general population. If inmates commit a serious rule violation, they are upgraded temporarily to "close" custody and sent to RCC for higher custody housing (CIM-East has no Administration Segregation cells). Typically, these inmates will revert to a medium level classification and return to East subsequent to serving their disciplinary sentences.

d. Current Security Staffing

Security staffing currently in effect at CIM-East is as follows:

1	- Associate Superintendent
1	- Captain
3.2	- Lieutenants
20.3	- Sergeants
<u>159.8</u>	- Correctional Officers
<u>185.3</u>	Total Positions

### III. ANALYSIS OF PRISON SECURITY INCIDENTS AND RELATED DATA

This report section presents the results of our analysis of prison security incidents and other data related to prison capacities and staffing. The objectives of the analysis were to:

- Develop summary profiles of reported incidents and related data
- Determine if patterns of prior incidents and other data indicate weaknesses in, or relationships to current security and/or staffing arrangements
- Employ the analysis results, as appropriate, in directing our study emphasis.

#### A. METHODOLOGY

To perform our analyses, we first used CDC historical data to develop annual profiles of each of the eleven prisons which house male inmates. The prison profiles were used to examine differences in housing design capacity utilization, staffing ratios, escape and incident rates, and other indicators which might be helpful in identifying causes of violence at the institutions of particular concern to this study. Essentially, this process was intended to identify significant cause and effect relationships (if any could be determined) that were peculiar to the prisons we studied as opposed to being applicable to all or several other CDC institutions.

In performing this part of our analyses, we divided the eleven CDC prisons into two groups for better comparability of data. The first group included the four high security institutions at Folsom, San Quentin, Soledad, and Deuel (Tracy). Generally, these four prisons house the highest security inmates in the state's correctional system.

The second group of prisons included the remaining seven located at Chino (CIM), San Luis Obispo, Vacaville, Norco, Susanville, Techachapi, and Jamestown. Within this group of seven, Vacaville (California Medical Facility) is somewhat unique because it houses all inmates with physical or mental disabilities, and serves as the Department's Northern California inmate reception center. San Luis Obispo probably is the most comparable institution overall to Chino. The other four institutions are of lower security classification and have less direct comparability to Chino.

In addition to the general analysis described above, we performed detailed analyses of assault and stabbing incidents occurring at Folsom from January 1 through October 22, 1985. These analyses were based primarily on information extracted from incident reports which are prepared and maintained at the institution. In total, 172 assault and stabbing incidents were analyzed.

Finally, we performed a general analysis of all incidents reported at CIM-RCC and CIM-East from January 1 through November 1, 1985. This analysis was performed, in lieu of a detailed analysis of assault and stabbing incidents, because of the small number of assaults and stabbings which occurred at these CIM institutions during the first ten months of 1985.



## B. DATA CONSTRAINTS AND EFFECTS

Our analysis of security incident historical data was limited in several respects by data which were distorted by the magnitude of changes that have occurred in inmate population, authorized position counts, and housing design capacity at California's prisons in recent years. As a result, historical profile data from prior to 1981, in general, are not very comparable to years subsequent to 1981 when inmate populations began to significantly exceed housing design capacity at many institutions. Also, data for years subsequent to 1981 are distorted to some extent by "special" situations. Examples of these include (1) the erection and subsequent dismantling of temporary housing at San Quentin, (2) court orders restricting certain operating practices at particular facilities, (3) time lags in the staff (position) budgeting, authorization, and hiring process, and (4) the greater influence of prison gangs on prison security at certain institutions (primarily the high security facilities).

Our analysis of Folsom assault and stabbing incidents is based on detailed data regarding each incident. However, for much of 1985 full or partial lockdowns were in effect at Folsom. This may have affected the location, timing, and frequency of occurrence of these incidents.

## C. SUMMARY PROFILES OF PRISONS

Profiles of each of the eleven major institutions that house male inmates are presented here. The profiles are organized as follows:

- Profiles of Level IV Prisons (including Folsom)
- Profiles of other prisons (including Chino).

### 1. PROFILES OF LEVEL IV INSTITUTIONS

Exhibit III-1, on the following pages, provides profiles of the four Level IV prisons, i.e., Folsom, San Quentin, Soledad, and the Deuel Vocational Institute (Tracy). Key points to be made regarding these profiles are presented in the following paragraphs.

#### a. Housing Design Capacity Utilization

The exhibit shows that all four Level IV institutions have been more than 100 percent utilized. Folsom has been approximately 145-160 percent utilized each of the past four years. This compares to only 120 percent utilization at San Quentin but nearly 200 percent utilization at Soledad and Deuel.


#### b. Level III and IV Male Inmates

Generally, Folsom has a somewhat higher proportion of Level III and IV inmates than the other three major institutions. In fact, basically all inmates housed inside Folsom's main perimeter are Level III or IV. The percentages for Folsom in Exhibit III-1 essentially reflect this main population. The remaining percentage (population) is in the minimum security camp outside the main perimeter.

# SUMMARY PROFILES OF LEVEL IV INSTITUTIONS


## HOUSING DESIGN CAPACITY UTILIZATION

By Institution By Year (12/31/8\_)



## LEVEL III & IV MALE INMATES


By Institution By Year (12/31/8\_)



## SUMMARY PROFILES OF LEVEL IV INSTITUTIONS


### MALE INMATES PER SECURITY POSITION

By Institution By Fiscal Year




### MALE INMATES PER AUTHORIZED POSITION

By Institution By Fiscal Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF LEVEL IV INSTITUTIONS ANNUAL ESCAPE RATES


By Institution By Calendar Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF LEVEL IV INSTITUTIONS


## ANNUAL INCIDENT RATES

By Institution By Calendar Year



## ANNUAL ASSAULT & WEAPONS POSSESSION RATES


By Institution By Calendar Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF LEVEL IV INSTITUTIONS


## FOLSOM INCIDENT RATES <sup>a/</sup>

By Category of Offense By Calendar Year



## SAN QUENTIN INCIDENT RATES <sup>a/</sup>

By Category of Offense By Calendar Year



<sup>a/</sup> See text for abbreviation codes

c. Male Inmates Per Security Position and Per Authorized Position

It appears that the number of inmates per security position has declined in recent years at all Level IV institutions and that inmate-to-security staffing ratios are about the same at Folsom, Soledad and Deuel. San Quentin, on the other hand, has significantly fewer inmates per security position than each of the other Level IV institutions. These same statements are true when the ratio of inmates to all authorized positions is evaluated for these four prisons.

d. Annual Escape Rates

In recent years there has generally been a decline in escape rates from Level IV institutions. Among the Level IV institutions, Folsom has the lowest escape rate. Essentially, escapes have not been a significant problem at Folsom.

e. Annual Incident Rates

"Incidents" are inmate violations of law or CDC regulations that occur while inmates are under the custody of the Department. Title 15, Division 3, of the California Administrative Code, defines these rule violations as either serious or administrative. CDC policy states that serious incidents are to be reported to the Sacramento Headquarters by each institution (although, as discussed later in this report, there is some latitude concerning this reporting requirement). The analyses of data which we describe in this subsection deal only with serious incident reports received and recorded by CDC Headquarters. For 1985, only nine months of incident data were available. Therefore, the nine-month totals were annualized by adding 33 percent to each category of incident.



In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the incident rates at Folsom and at San Quentin. Current incident rates at these two prisons are approximately twice as great as those at Soledad and Deuel.

f. Annual Assault and Weapons Possession Rates

As with annual incident rates, there has been a large increase in recent years in the rate of incidents involving assaults and possession of weapons at Folsom and at San Quentin. Concurrently, except for 1984 at Deuel, rates for these types of incidents have been stable or declining slightly at Soledad and Deuel.

g. Folsom and San Quentin Incident Rates by Type of Offense

Because of the recent large increase in incident rates at Folsom and San Quentin, we conducted a separate analysis of incidents reported at these two institutions over the past nine years. Page 5 of Exhibit III-1 shows the results of this work by the following categories of offenses:

AWW -- Assault with a Weapon (on inmate or staff)

AW/OW -- Assault Without a Weapon (on inmate or staff)

POW -- Possession of a Weapon

NARC -- Possession of Narcotics or Illegal Controlled Substance

OTHER -- All Other Serious (Reportable) Incidents (e.g., refusal to work, destruction of state property, attempting to escape, etc.)

As can be determined by the Exhibit III-1 bar graphs, the recent increase in incident rates is primarily the result of increases in the rates of weapons possessions and

assaults with a weapon. To some extent the two prisons also have experienced an increase in assaults without a weapon. All other incidents, however, are about the same currently as in prior years at Folsom. At San Quentin, narcotics-related incident rates have decreased significantly.

## 2. PROFILES OF OTHER PRISONS

Exhibit III-2, on the following pages, provides profiles of the other seven prisons: Chino, San Luis Obispo, Vacaville, Norco, Susanville, Techachapi, and Jamestown. With regard to the Chino data, in most instances the Department of Corrections does not have this information disaggregated by each of the four prisons within the CIM-Chino complex. As discussed in Section II, CIM consists of four independently-managed and operated correctional facilities, only two of which were included in our study (CIM-East and CIM-Reception Center Central). Excluded were Reception Center West and CIM-Minimum. Where data were not available for these individual units, the inclusion of CIM-Minimum numbers would tend generally to increase inmate-to-staff ratios, and decrease incident rates.

### a. Housing Design Capacity Utilization

The exhibit shows that Chino housing capacity utilization has increased from approximately 120 percent to nearly 200 percent during the past four years. Currently, Chino is one of the most overcrowded prisons in California.


### b. Level III and IV Male Inmates

The proportion of Level III and IV inmates at Chino has been declining in recent years and currently these inmates are only 13 percent of the total Chino population. However, the Chino and Vacaville data are misleading because in 1985 nearly half of the inmates at Chino and

# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## HOUSING DESIGN CAPACITY UTILIZATION

By Institution By Year (12/31/8\_)



## HOUSING DESIGN CAPACITY UTILIZATION


By Institution By Year (12/31/8\_)



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## LEVEL III & IV MALE INMATES

By Institution By Year (12/31/8\_)



## LEVEL III & IV MALE INMATES


By Institution By Year (12/31/8\_)



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## MALE INMATES PER SECURITY POSITION

By Institution By Fiscal Year



## MALE INMATES PER SECURITY POSITION


By Institution By Fiscal Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## MALE INMATES PER AUTHORIZED POSITION

By Institution By Fiscal Year



## MALE INMATES PER AUTHORIZED POSITION


By Institution By Fiscal Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## ANNUAL ESCAPE RATES

By Institution By Calendar Year



## ANNUAL ESCAPE RATES


By Institution By Calendar Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## ANNUAL INCIDENT RATES

By Institution By Calendar Year



## ANNUAL INCIDENT RATES

By Institution By Calendar Year






# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS


## ANNUAL ASSAULT & WEAPONS POSSESSION RATES

By Institution By Calendar Year




## ANNUAL ASSAULT & WEAPONS POSSESSION RATES

By Institution By Calendar Year



# SUMMARY PROFILES OF OTHER CDC INSTITUTIONS

## CHINO INCIDENT RATES By Category of Offense By Calendar Year



about one-third at Vacaville are not "classified." These inmates are a mix of (1) new CDC commitments whose custody and program assessments are being determined, (2) parole violators, and (3) inmates enroute to other institutions.

c. Inmates Per Security Position and Per Authorized Position

These ratios, which fluctuate widely, can be affected by extraneous factors such as facility expansions and the budget/position approval process. Nonetheless, it appears that the number of inmates per security position and per total authorized position at Chino are not out of line with those of other institutions which are most similar to Chino.

d. Annual Escape Rates

Although there were significant problems with the number of escapes at several institutions in the past, it appears that these problems have largely been controlled. Particular improvement is evident at Chino where the number of escapes per 1,000 male inmates has declined from 10.1 in 1981 to 0.7 in 1984.

e. Annual Incident Rates

The incident rate at Chino declined significantly during the past year and currently is slightly less than 3 incidents per year per 100 inmates. This rate is the lowest for any of the eleven state prisons. Data were not available for separate historical comparisons for CIM-RCC and CIM-East.

f. Annual Assault and Weapons Possession Rates

As with overall incident rates, the rate of assault and possession of weapons incidents has declined significantly at Chino during the past year and appears to be the lowest for any of the eleven state prisons.

g. Chino Incident Rates By Type of Offense

Incident rates, by category of offense, for each of the past nine years at Chino also were examined. Bar graphs of this information show that, historically, most incidents at Chino involve drugs, but that all incident rates, regardless of category, have declined for the past several years.

## D. ANALYSIS RESULTS

The analysis of summary data did not result in clearly defined cause and effect relationships that could be used to justify specific recommendations. Nevertheless, it did result in several findings that assisted in directing our field work and our evaluation of alternative security and staffing recommendations. These findings are reported below.

### 1. FOLSOM

#### a. Escapes

Escapes have not been a problem at Folsom and, except for 1982 at Deuel, they have not been a significant problem at any of the four high security CDC institutions. Accordingly, we did not direct much of our Folsom study toward perimeter control issues.

#### b. Overcrowding, Staffing, and Incident Rates

There are no clear patterns of relationships among the data on prison overcrowding, inmate-to-staff ratios, and incident rates. This does not mean that there are no relationships, because we believe that there are. Our statement merely means that statistically significant cause and effect relationships cannot be defined, perhaps because there are so many other variables involved (e.g., prison gangs, frequency and length of lockdowns, availability of prison industries, facility design, etc.).

At Folsom and San Quentin, security incident rates during the past two years are substantially above prior years despite the availability of more staff per inmate.

Concurrently, Folsom's overcrowding has increased only slightly and San Quentin's has declined somewhat.

Conversely, the incident rate at Soledad has been reasonably stable for five years although overcrowding has increased significantly. Only in 1985 did the inmate-to-staff ratio decline; in the prior years it increased annually.

Generally, we believe these analysis results point to the following conclusions:

- Modest changes in staffing levels are not likely to affect the levels of prison security incidents. Massive changes in staffing (add or delete 100 to 200 officers) may impact the problem but such approaches are not reasonable. It may be, however, that small increases in staffing could affect the incidence of security problems if these increases are targeted toward specific causes. The problem we have found is that causes are varied and not well-defined.
- There is good data substantiation that the increase in security problems at Folsom and San Quentin is assault and weapons-related. Accordingly, a major focus of our study was directed toward reduction of internal prison violence at Folsom.
- Although we find no direct relationships among security incidents, inmate-to-staff ratios, and prison overcrowding, we believe that the latter two are factors that contribute to the number and severity of incidents. Common sense tells us that the necessary assignment of 1,000 or more high-security inmates in the Main Yard at Folsom creates a greater potential for violence than half that number. It also presents an extremely difficult surveillance problem for ground and tower officers; they cannot identify potential trouble or actual assailants nearly as well under these congested situations.

## 2. CHINO (CIM)

There is an equal lack of cause and effect relationships at Chino. Security incident rates have declined steadily during

the past four years while overcrowding has worsened and inmate-to-staff ratios have increased. The decline in incident rates is evident in all categories of offenses. The Chino experience is not duplicated at San Luis Obispo or Vacaville. San Luis Obispo has experienced a slight increase in incident rates and Vacaville a decrease and then an increase.

The Chino experience may be the result of disproportionate increases in overcrowding at the two Reception Centers. To explain, in 1981 the year-end population at Chino was 3,055 for all four prisons included under the CIM umbrella organization. In 1985 this figure was 5,261. Historical data were not available for each of the four CIM prisons but we were told that most of the increase in population has been absorbed by the two Reception Centers. In these two prisons, the inmates are essentially in transit; only a small percentage of their populations are permanent. Inmates in transit do not have as much time to organize gangs, develop personal feuds, or familiarize themselves with the institutional security weaknesses so they can acquire weapons materials. Thus, a large increase of in-transit inmates with little change in the actual incident total would drive the incident rates down. At this point, however, the preceding comments are primarily speculative rather than conclusive, given the data available.

In the absence of analysis results that pointed to specific security problems at Chino, our studies of CIM-RCC and CIM-East were not focused on any particular issue. We performed a general review of security, with some additional attention to perimeter control because of the recognized concerns of Chino area citizens regarding the Kevin Cooper escape. The fact that Cooper escaped from CIM-Minimum probably does not alter the public's perception.

## E. INCIDENT PATTERNS AT FOLSOM AND CHINO

Detailed incident data at Folsom and the two Chino prisons we studied were examined to assess whether any trends were apparent. The focus of the Folsom analysis was on stabbings and assaults with weapons. Because so few violent assaults occur at Chino, a more general analysis of all serious incidents was performed. The results of our analyses are described below.

### 1. ANALYSIS OF FOLSOM STABBING AND ASSAULT INCIDENTS

In total, 172 stabbing and assault incidents occurred at Folsom from January 1 through October 22, 1985. Folsom was either partially or fully locked-down much of the period and, as a result, our analysis and findings may be distorted from what would otherwise be the case. In fact, Folsom was in some stage of lockdown for about 114 (39 percent) of the 295 days covered by our incident study.

#### a. Profile of Incidents

Most stabbing and assault incidents at Folsom are characterized by:

- Stabbing by one suspect
- Stabbing of one victim
- Use of a weapon made of flat metal stock.

Also, most of these incidents are observed by Folsom staff as indicated by the chambering of a round in a firearm and/or firing of one or more shots.

Exhibit III-3 on the next page provides data supporting these comments.



SUMMARY PROFILE OF SELECTED FOLSOM STABBING AND ASSAULT INCIDENTSNUMBER OF SUSPECTS PER INCIDENT

<u>Number of Suspects</u>	<u>Number of Incidents</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
1	122	70.9%
2	43	25.0
3	5	2.9
4	1	.6
Unknown	<u>1</u>	<u>.6</u>
	<u>172</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

NUMBER OF VICTIMS PER INCIDENT

<u>Number of Victims</u>		
1	149	86.6%
2	20	11.6
3	1	.6
Unknown	<u>2</u>	<u>1.2</u>
	<u>172</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

TYPE OF WEAPON USEDWeapon Material

Flat Metal Stock	131	62.1%
Plastic	41	19.4
Bar/Rod Stock	14	6.6
Kitchen Utensil/Dinnerware	5	2.4
Radio/TV Antenna	2	1.0
Razor Blade/Box Opener	2	1.0
Melted Mirror	1	.5
Newspaper Spear	1	.5
None Found	<u>14</u>	<u>6.5</u>
	<u>211</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

RESPONSE BY GUN OFFICERSResponse

No Shots; No Rounds Chambered	54	31.4%
No Shots; Round Chambered	24	14.0
One Shot	62	36.0
Two Shots	16	9.3
Three Shots	7	4.1
Four Shots	4	2.3
Five Shots	1	.6
Rifle Jammed	1	.6
Unknown	<u>3</u>	<u>1.7</u>
	<u>172</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

a/ There are more weapons than incidents because more than one weapon was used in some incidents.

b. Incident Suspects and Victims

Nearly half of all stabbing and assault incidents we reviewed involved inter-racial actions of Mexican-American and Black inmates pitted against one another. Actually, however, this percentage is probably higher because we were unable to determine (from the reports) the race of suspects and victims in 50 (29 percent) of the incidents. For the 122 incidents where both races could be determined, the Mexican-American versus Black relationship was present in nearly two-thirds of the cases (65.5 percent).

The number of violent incidents involving Mexican-Americans as aggressors is disproportionately high in comparison to the ethnic profile of inmates housed at Folsom. According to CDC data, as of December 31, 1984 the racial breakdown at Folsom was as follows:

Mexican-American	23%
Black	42%
White	32%
Other	3%

This was the latest information available but there is no reason to believe that the ethnic percentages changed significantly in 1985.

Consistent with the total prison inmate population profile, the suspect, in most instances, is serving time for committing a felony crime against other persons (e.g., homicide, robbery, rape). Exhibit III-4 provides data supporting the foregoing statements.

RACIAL AND SENTENCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED  
FOLSOM STABBING AND ASSAULT INCIDENTS

SUSPECT-VICTIM ETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS

<u>Ethnic Category</u>	<u>Number of Incidents</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Mexican on Black	56	32.5%
Mexican on White	1	.6
Mexican on Mexican	5	2.9
Black on Mexican	24	14.0
Black on White	1	.6
Black on Black	14	8.1
White on Mexican	3	1.7
White on Black	2	1.2
White on White	16	9.3
Other or Unknown	<u>50</u>	<u>29.1</u>
	<u>172</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

PRIMARY SENTENCING OFFENSE OF SUSPECT

<u>Offense Category</u>		
Kidnap	1	0.5%
Rape and Kidnap/Rape	24	10.9
Burglary	16	7.2
Robbery and Kidnap/Robbery	51	23.1
Attempt or Conspire to Murder	10	4.5
Murder I	43	19.5
Murder II	19	8.6
Manslaughter	5	2.2
Assault with Deadly Weapon	8	3.6
Other	8	3.6
Not Documented	<u>36</u>	<u>16.3</u>
	<u>221<sup>a/</sup></u>	<u>100.0%</u>

<sup>a/</sup> There are more suspects than incidents because more than one suspect was involved in some incidents.

LOCATION OF SELECTED FOLSOM STABBING AND ASSAULT INCIDENTS

<u>Location</u>	<u>Location of Incident</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Incidents</u> <u>Percent of Total</u>
Culinary Department	4	2.3%
Dining Room #2	21	12.2
Housing Unit #2	36	20.9
Housing Unit #3	24	14.0
Housing Unit #5	22	12.8
Main Yard	24	14.0
Security Housing Unit I	7	4.1
Interior	2	
Yard #1	1	
Yard #2	0	
Yard #3	1	
Yard #4	1	
Yard # Not Documented	2	
Security Housing Unit II	31	18.0
Interior	3	
Yard #1	2	
Yard #2	13	
Yard #3	5	
Yard #4	5	
Yard Not Documented	3	
Other	3	1.7
Industry	1	
Metal Fabrication	1	
Sacramento County Jail	1	
	<u>172</u>	<u>100.0%</u>

c. Incident Locations and Times

We determined that approximately 21 percent of the violent incidents occurred in General Housing Unit #2 and 18 percent occurred at SHU II (Security Housing Unit). General Housing Units #3 and #5, the Main Yard, and Dining Room #2 were the other primary areas in which stabbing and assault incidents occurred. Specific supporting information is provided in Exhibit III-5, following Exhibit III-4.

These data, however, may be skewed because Folsom was fully or partially locked down for about 39 percent of the period we reviewed. During lockdowns, the Prison Industries and Vocational Education (Voc Ed) shops are not operated. Although we did not perform a detailed review of violent incidents occurring after October 22, 1985, we are aware that the return to normal prison operation brought with it some stabbings in the Industries and Voc Ed shop areas. Such a development may change the percentage distribution of stabbings that previously occurred in general housing units and the Dining Room. It would not, however, significantly alter the experience in the two SHUs because these inmates do not work in Industries or Voc Ed, and are not allowed in the Main Yard or Dining Room.

The smaller number of incidents occurring at SHU I, in our opinion, is not indicative of significantly better security procedures than SHU II. SHU II (600 beds) houses four times as many inmates as SHU I (150 beds), in a facility that was designed for general housing, not security housing. However, Exhibit III-5 does indicate that the overwhelming number of SHU assaults occur in the recreation yards. This pattern is consistent with SHU operating practices, i.e., the recreation period is the only time SHU inmates are allowed to intermingle.

The analysis of Folsom stabbing and assault incidents by time of day and day of week showed that a disproportionately high (25 percent) number of incidents occur on Monday. Also, these incidents tend to occur between 9:00 a.m. (0900) and 1:00 p.m. (1300). Overall, 50 percent of the incidents occurred during these hours, and 30 percent occurred between 1000 and 1200 hours. All but one of the 38 total incidents in the SHUs occurred between 0900 and 1300, and all but three of the 24 Main Yard incidents occurred during these hours. Exhibit III-6, on the following page, provides data supporting these statements. Although we can hypothesize as to the reason for most stabbings occurring before 1300 hours on most days, we have been unable to identify reasons why Monday should have significantly more incidents than other days.

d. Lockdown Periods

Thirty percent (52) of the stabbings we reviewed occurred during the 39 percent (114 days) of the period that Folsom operated under some form of lockdown. Excluding the SHUs, which presumably are not affected significantly by lockdowns, 34 percent (46 of 134 incidents) occurred during the 39 percent lockdown periods.

On the surface, these figures would tend to dispute the effectiveness of lockdowns as a means of controlling inmate-on-inmate violence. However, we did not have data on the number of days that full lockdown procedures were in effect (i.e., all meals served in cells, no exercise periods in the Main Yard, and only a small, select group of inmate workers released to perform necessary job, such as food services). We understand that only a small proportion of the lockdown periods involved full lockdown. Under varying levels of partial lockdown, limited numbers of inmates may be released for exercise, central feeding, education, etc.

DAYS OF WEEK AND TIMES OF SELECTED  
FOLSOM STABBING AND ASSAULT INCIDENTS

<u>HOUR OF DAY</u>	<u>DAY OF WEEK</u>							<u>TOTAL WEEK</u>	
	<u>SUN</u>	<u>MON</u>	<u>TUES</u>	<u>WED</u>	<u>THURS</u>	<u>FRI</u>	<u>SAT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENT OF TOTAL</u>
2300-0600	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
0600-0659	0	2	0	2	0	3	0	7	4.1
0700-0759	0	2	2	1	3	1	2	11	6.4
0800-0859	1	1	3	1	2	1	2	11	6.4
0900-0959	1	3	2	4	1	2	3	16	9.3
1000-1059	2	10	1	6	1	4	1	25	14.5
1100-1159	1	8	3	2	1	2	10	27	15.7
1200-1259	3	6	3	2	1	1	2	18	10.5
1300-1359	2	3	1	0	0	4	1	11	6.4
1400-1459	2	1	1	2	3	1	2	12	7.0
1500-1559	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1.2
1600-1659	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	1.7
1700-1759	1	1	2	1	3	2	1	11	6.4
1800-1859	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	5	2.9
1900-1959	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	4	2.3
2000-2059	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	3	1.7
2100-2159	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.6
2200-2259	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.6
Unknown	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2.3</u>
TOTAL	16	43	21	21	16	28	27	172	<u>100.0%</u>
PERCENT OF TOTAL	<u>9.3%</u>	<u>25.0%</u>	<u>12.2%</u>	<u>12.2%</u>	<u>9.3%</u>	<u>16.3%</u>	<u>15.7%</u>		

Under full lockdown, there is no question that it is very difficult for inmates to assault one another. However, full lockdowns cannot and should not be maintained for extended periods. Assuming most of the Folsom lockdown periods involved partial lockdown, the data indicate that this procedure had no appreciable impact on the rate of violent inmate incidents. At least at Folsom, the use of partial lockdowns does not appear to be an effective way to reduce the number of inmate assaults and stabbings.

e. Summary of Findings

Although the Folsom incident analysis produced no findings that definitively linked causes and effects, we believe it was useful. Some points to emphasize are summarized below.

- Cell search efforts should be intensified the evenings before or in the mornings before inmates are released
- Additional analysis should be conducted regarding the peculiar Monday peak in violent incidents
- Current pre-exercise search procedures in SHU II should be reviewed. The yards are supposed to be searched before inmates are released and inmates are supposed to be strip searched before entering the yard. These procedures may not be sufficient or may not be implemented effectively.
- To the extent possible, administrative and other non-surveillance tasks of search and escort (S&E) personnel, Main Yard officers, and watch supervisors should be scheduled for afternoon performance. Maximum surveillance deployment of all daytime custody personnel should occur before 1:00 p.m. in the Main Yard (and, perhaps, Industries and Vocational shops if the pattern is consistent in these areas).

As for the disproportionate involvement of Mexican-American inmates in stabbing incidents, we can offer no explanations. We were told that most of the stabbings (all races) are gang-related, but the incident reports we read



seldom spoke to this issue. Whether or not the Mexican-American incidents are primarily gang-related, we do not know. The data, however, identifies a need for special communications, programs, and/or policies related to this situation if it does not change materially.

## 2. CHINO INCIDENT ANALYSIS

Our analysis of serious incidents at Chino focused on Reception Center Central (CIM-RCC) and CIM-East. In total, 55 incidents occurred at CIM-RCC and 74 incidents occurred at CIM-East from January 1 through November 1, 1985. Exhibit III-7, on the next page, shows, by category of offense, the number of incidents which occurred at these two facilities. Most incidents at CIM-RCC (51 percent) involve inmate possession of weapons; however, there were so few of these incidents (28) during the ten-month period that the data does not represent a significant trend. At CIM-East, most incidents (58 percent) involve inmate possession of contraband (e.g., eating utensils and drugs).

The analysis of CIM-RCC and CIM-East incidents did not disclose any significant trends nor did it provide any special direction to our study.

## 3. INCIDENT REPORTING

In reviewing incidents at Folsom and Chino we became aware of a certain amount of latitude as to what is reported as a serious incident to CDC Headquarters by the various prisons. For example, we noted a number of assaults (no weapons) that were not classified as serious, while other incidents of the same type were reported to Headquarters. We believe this latitude in reporting should be eliminated or substantially minimized. It can result in a lack of comparability in statistics if staff of one prison interprets incidents differently than another, for whatever reason.

SUMMARY OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS AT CIM-RCC AND CIM-EAST

CATEGORY OF OFFENSE	CIM-RCC		CIM-EAST	
	NUMBER	PERCENT OF TOTAL	NUMBER	PERCENT OF TOTAL
Stabbings and Assaults	2	3.6%	3	4.1%
Assault on Staff	4	7.4	4	5.4
Possession of Weapon	28	50.9	8	10.9
Fighting	13	23.7	4	5.4
Contraband Other than Weapons	2	3.6	43	58.1
Other	6	10.8	12	16.1
TOTAL	55	100.0%	74	100.0%

#### IV. AUDIT AND EVALUATION OF SECURITY MEASURES

Our study included both an "audit" and an "evaluation" of security measures at the Folsom and Chino institutions we reviewed. This report section describes our approach to this activity and the results we developed.

##### A. OVERVIEW OF APPROACH

"Security measures" were defined as any policies, procedures, practices, and equipment directly related to the internal and perimeter security of the institutions. Information of this type was developed primarily through review of CDC and institutional rules and regulations, and on-site interviews concerning operating practices that may not be documented. There are literally hundreds of specific procedures related to security of the prisons. Consequently, it was necessary to (1) focus our attention on the more important measures, and (2) summarize detailed procedural statements into broader categories.

After grouping the security measures, we then prepared materials to support the actual audit and evaluation of these measures. This included the development of security objectives and criteria for evaluating the security measures. The distinctions between measures, audits of measures, and security evaluation criteria are important to understand. Accordingly, we provide the following example:

- The CDC may have a "measure" that requires searches of inmate cells on a random basis by officers assigned to specific posts
- During our study, we randomly "audited" the measure, i.e., we observed if cell searches were performed and whether they were performed in accordance with CDC policy and/or generally accepted correctional guidelines

- Assume in this case that the audit confirmed that the measure is performed as intended. However, there remains the question as to whether the measure itself is effective. The security evaluation criteria addresses this issue by assessing factors such as:
  - Are the searches performed with sufficient frequency?
  - Does the system of random selection unintentionally omit some cells for exceptionally long periods of time (e.g., several months)?

The above example underscores the three-step approach we used in our audit and evaluation of CDC security measures. Under our concept, a security procedure may be evaluated as effective even though it is not being performed as intended. Conversely, the procedure may be performed as intended but may be evaluated as partially or totally ineffective.

Exhibit IV-1, on the following pages, identifies the generalized and function-specific evaluation criteria developed for this project. The function-specific criteria and the supplemental security objectives described on the last three pages of the exhibit were developed after the general objectives and criteria were completed. They were deemed necessary in order to be more specific concerning the assessment of security measures in certain aspects of prison operations.

It should be emphasized that not all criteria are applicable to all security measures, and not all measures warrant full evaluation. It was not our intent to subject every procedure in the Department's detailed regulations and post orders to a step-by-step application of the evaluation criteria. Instead, we focused both our audits and evaluations on the measures most likely to impact significant breaches of security (i.e., assaults, drugs, escapes, etc.).

SECURITY EVALUATION CRITERIA

I. GENERAL SECURITY EVALUATION CRITERIA<sup>a/</sup>

1. The measure is legal or, at a minimum in cases of uncertainty, is not known to be illegal.
2. The measure is documented and approved by authorized personnel.
3. The measure is linked to a bona fide security objective.
4. The measure is communicated effectively to those who should know it, especially those who must implement all or part of it.
5. The measure is implemented as intended, on a consistent basis.
6. The measure is difficult to circumvent in terms of achieving its objective, and/or is effective in achieving its objective.

or

7. The measure is not difficult to circumvent and/or is not highly effective but is necessary or desirable because (cite reason).
8. The measure is monitored periodically by supervisors and management to ensure consistent, correct implementation.
9. Where applicable, the measure is applied randomly to prevent inmates from preparing effectively to circumvent it.
10. Where applicable, the measure is applied with sufficient frequency to contribute meaningfully to the intended security objective(s).
11. Where applicable, the measure specifies assignment of authority and accountability.
12. Where applicable, the measure specifies acceptable or expected behavior of inmates, employees, or others.
13. The measure is not overly restrictive or inefficient, given its importance, relationship to the security objectives and its effectiveness.
14. Where appropriate, the measure provides for prompt (or immediate) supervisory notification and action in the event of specified serious (or potentially serious) events occurring (e.g., missing inmate, restricted tool missing, fight, smoke, etc.)

II. SUPPLEMENTAL FUNCTION-SPECIFIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATION CRITERIA

Functions/Facilities

1. Inmate and Cell Searches

- To conduct searches without undue embarrassment or harassment of inmates

Supplemental Objective(s)

Supplemental Evaluation Criteria

- A. The measure is applied fairly on a random basis, or for cause
- B. The measure for routine inmate strip searches provides for inmate privacy
- C. The measure for random cell searches does not allow some cells to go without searches for extended periods of time

2. Facility and Area Searches

- To minimize the potential for inmates to hide or locate contraband materials throughout the institution

- A. Total facility or area searches are conducted with sufficient staff to complete the task before inmates have the opportunity to relocate contraband from one location (not searched) to another that has been searched

3. Inmate Identification

- To provide a positive means of identifying all inmates

None necessary

4. Inmate Counts and Location

- To verify the number and location of all inmates

None necessary

5. Visual Surveillance

- To detect potential trouble and/or unauthorized behavior

- A. The measure provides the capability for continual inmate surveillance when out of cells, and random or as-needed surveillance when in cells.

6. Inmate Movement and Escort

- To ensure that inmates are not in areas they are not supposed to be

- B. All perimeter areas can be observed at any time by fixed posts that are staffed continually

- A. The measure effectively identifies which inmates are allowed to be in a specified area or facility

- B. The measure for inmate escort provides for both inmate and employee safety

7. Restraints

- To ensure that potentially or actually violent or obstreperous inmates are controlled without excessive physical force

- A. The measure provides reasonable guidelines on when restraints may be used

- Handcuffs, shackles, etc.

- B. The measure provides for supervisory or management authorization for continued use of restraints

8. Use of Force

- In controlling inmates, to use force equivalent only to the justified need

- A. The measure provides detailed guidelines on when and what type of force may be used

- Physical
- Weaponry

- B. Written reports, investigation, and supervisory/management review are required when force is used

- C. Refresher training is provided frequently on the use of weapons, based upon employees' actual or potential assignment to possess or use specific weapons

Functions/Facilities

9. Custody Classification and Segregation

- To segregate inmates by risk levels and behavior patterns

Supplemental Evaluation Criteria

- A. The measure provides for effective separation and control of inmates who potentially are special custody risks or behavior problems (assuming the space available allows such separation)
- B. The custody classification and segregation of an inmate is reviewed systematically at least several times a year
- C. The measure provides for meaningful differentiation in classification which, in turn, results in meaningful segregation of inmates

10. Inmate Discipline

- To provide a fair and prompt system of administering discipline for inmate violations of law or institutional rules

- A. The measure and results are administered fairly and consistently among all inmates
- B. Written reports, investigation, and supervisory/management review are required when inmates violate laws or institutional rules (other than for minor violations of rules)

11. Perimeter Control

- None necessary

- C. The measure specifies the classifications or rule violations and the range of penalties for each classification

12. Disturbance Prevention and Control

- To prevent inmate riots and disturbances
- To minimize the impact of inmate riots or disturbances if they occur, and to regain control as expeditiously as possible

- A. All perimeter areas can be observed at any time by guards on fixed posts that are staffed continually
- B. The measure provides for effective searching of persons and vehicles entering the institution, and vehicles and packages leaving the institution

13. Weapons Control

- To provide extraordinary control and security over firearms, ammunition, and chemical agents assigned to the institution

- A. Employees are trained in their responsibilities in the event of a riot or disturbance
- B. Adequate equipment is available to support the riot or disturbance control plan
- C. The measure provides for systematic collection and review of information that may indicate a potential disturbance is developing or planned
- A. The measure provides for exceptional control over firearms, ammunition, and chemical agents, including frequent inventories
- B. The measure prohibits the carrying or storage of deadly weapons in areas where inmates can access them

Functions/Facilities

Supplemental Objective(s)

Supplemental Evaluation Criteria

- |   |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| <p>14. <u>Key Control</u></p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide special controls over security keys</li> <li>• To ensure the availability of security keys in emergency situations</li> </ul>  | <p>A. The measure accurately identifies the location of all security keys at all times</p> <p>B. The measure provides for rapid identification and location of the primary or backup security keys in emergency situations</p>   |
| <p>15. <u>Tool Control</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintenance and Industry</li> <li>• Culinary</li> <li>• Medical Equipment</li> <li>• Personal Equipment (e.g., razors)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide special controls over restricted tools and equipment used throughout the institution</li> </ul>  | <p>A. The measure identifies who has possession of tools whenever they are not secured</p> <p>B. The measure provides for daily inventory and inspection of restricted tools, and weekly inventory and inspection of non-restricted tools</p>  |
| <p>16. <u>Fire and Hazard Safety</u></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide an effective plan for relocating inmates from areas of fire or chemical/toxic hazard without unnecessarily endangering staff or inmates, or impairing the overall security of the institution</li> </ul> | <p>C. The measure provides for closely controlled distribution and return of restricted tools and equipment used by inmates</p> <p>A. The measure provides for rapid, safe evacuation and relocation of inmates and staff in cases of fire or other major hazard</p>   |
| <p>17. <u>Central Control</u></p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide a central point of control, authority and communications</li> </ul>  | <p>A. The measure provides high security and effective communications capabilities for routine and emergency conditions</p>  |
| <p>18. <u>Visiting</u></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To prevent introduction of contraband by visitors</li> <li>• To prevent unauthorized visitors</li> </ul>  | <p>A. The measure provides for general searches of visitors when no cause exists for more intensive searches</p> <p>B. The measure provides for intensive facility and inmate searches after visiting</p> <p>C. Unauthorized visitors are not permitted to enter the institution without management-level approval</p>   |
| <p>19. <u>Security-Related Records</u></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To provide consistent data for management reporting and analysis of security-related incidents</li> <li>• To maintain the confidentiality and integrity of security-related and inmate records</li> </ul>           | <p>A. The measure requires investigations, written reports, and supervisory/management review of incidents involving an inmate's violation of law or institutional rules</p> <p>B. The reporting, classification, and summarization of security incidents are performed consistently, in accordance with CDC policies</p> <p>C. The reporting, classification, and summarization of security incidents provides the capability for management analysis of security effectiveness</p> |



The security evaluation criteria were developed within the framework of a general set of prison security objectives. These objectives are outlined below:

- To maintain order
- To prevent injury, sexual abuse, and threats to employees, inmates, and others within the institution
- To protect personal and institutional property from theft, damage, or misuse by inmates
- To prevent the introduction of contraband and unauthorized persons into the institution
- To prevent possession of, and trafficking in contraband within the institution
- To prevent the development or manufacture of contraband from materials otherwise allowed within the institution (i.e., non-contraband materials)
- To prevent the unauthorized possession of materials by inmates which they may properly possess during certain authorized times, in certain authorized locations (e.g., metal strips, saws, etc.)
- To prevent escapes
- To maximize the cost-effectiveness of security procedures whenever practical.

The outline of security measures, security objectives, and security evaluation criteria were reviewed by the Auditor General's staff, CDC management, and Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East management before they were used in our study.

## B. SECURITY AUDIT AND EVALUATION FINDINGS

This subsection summarizes the results of our audit and evaluation of security measures. We emphasize that these audit and evaluation findings deal primarily with policies and procedures, as opposed to matters of staffing, equipment, and facilities, which are dealt with in Sections V and VI. For example, at Folsom our evaluation of inmate movement identified significant weaknesses in effective segregation and control. These weaknesses, however, result entirely from the existing layout of facilities. They are not the result of improper policies or staff not performing as directed by written orders. In some other instances, distinctions of this type are not always clear. At CIM-RCC and CIM-East, for example, the extent to which tool control weaknesses are related to improvements in procedures or staffing limitations, or both, is not easy to determine.

Section V of this report describes all of our staffing recommendations for current operations, and Section VI presents all of our recommendations concerning security measures. The latter section includes all issues identified as needing improvement in our audit and evaluation of policies and procedures, as well as other weaknesses resulting from our analysis of staffing, equipment, and facility design issues.

### 1. FOLSOM STATE PRISON

#### a. Folsom Audit Findings

In most cases the prison officers are following documented procedures. However, when applying the procedures to specific facility areas we found inconsistencies and some non-compliance.

Exhibit IV-2 displays the summarized audit results on an area-by-area basis. A key to the exhibit coding is provided at the bottom of the exhibit. Listed along the left side are the 19 security measure categories that we audited. The 19 categories represent summations of the actual security measures which are too voluminous to present in the body of this document. Across the top of the exhibit are the 13 prison areas. Within each exhibit matrix cell we indicate a rating (A, B, or C) or left a blank, indicating the security measure category did not apply to that area. Explanatory comments concerning Exhibit IV-2 are provided below.

(1) Inmate Searches

Prison policy requires that inmates be searched as they move from one part of the facility to another. Generally, this is being done, although more consistency and thoroughness in some areas would be desirable. However, an exception to this statement exists in Prison Industries. Inmate searches are conducted by civilian employees in this area, and the quality of the searches is not as good as those we observed elsewhere in the prison. The lack of portable metal detectors in Prison Industries also detracts from the search quality.

(2) Cell Searches

Cell searches conducted in the general population housing units are not documented as they are in the SHUs. In addition, based on observations and interviews with officers, we concluded that an insufficient number of cell searches are conducted in these housing units. Also, when searches are conducted, it is

# Summary of Security Measure Audit Results Folsom State Prison

CATEGORIES OF SECURITY MEASURES	FACILITY AREAS												
	GENERAL HOUSING UNIT	SECURITY HOUSING UNITS	MEDICAL	FOOD SERVICES	PRISON INDUSTRIES	VOCATIONAL/ EDUCATION	MAIN YARD	TOWER/GUN POSTS	RECEIVING/ RELEASE	VISITING	CENTRAL CONTROL	OTHER AREAS	SALL PORTS/ GATES
1. Inmate Searches	B	B	A	B	C	B	B		A	A		B	A
2. Cell Searches	C	B							B	A		B	B
3. Common Area Searches	B	B	B	B	B	B	B		B	A		A	A
4. Vehicle Searches			B	C	A	A	B		A	A		A	A
5. Visitor Searches													
6. Tool Control	B	A		C	B	B	A		B	A		B	B
7. Key Control	C	B	B	B	C	C	B		B	A		B	B
8. Weapons Control								A				A	A
9. Disturbance Control												UNK	
10. Perimeter Control								A					
11. Inmate Movement	B	A	A	B	B	B	B		A	A		A	A
12. Inmate Supervision	B	A	B	B	C	C	B		A	A		B	B
13. Security Administration	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	B	A	A		A	A
14. Inmate Discipline	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		A	A		A	A
15. Use of Force/Restraint	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		A	A		A	A
16. Escape Pursuit													
17. Communication/Alarm	B	B	B	B	B	B	B		B	A		A	B
18. Mail Security													
19. Gunwalks	B	A		A			A						

**CODE**

A = Satisfactory--Security measures generally followed as directed  
 B = Improvement Desirable--Some security measures not being followed as directed  
 C = Unsatisfactory--Security measures not followed with sufficient frequency  
 UNK = Unknown; not observed.

generally during inmate exercise or work hours. Only occasionally are searches conducted while inmates are in their cells.

(3) Vehicle Searches

A lack of compliance with certain vehicle search procedures is, in part, due to lack of equipment. Vehicle loads brought into the prison are supposed to be searched to ensure that contraband is not included. Although vehicles and the larger cargo are searched, smaller packages are not checked. A fluoroscope for the X-ray of packages would be helpful.

(4) Key Control

After examining key control activities, we concluded that current policies are not being followed closely. Areas of non-compliance are discussed below.

- Folsom policy requires that emergency keys throughout the prison be inspected and checked at least once a quarter. This policy is not adhered to, mainly because it is not clear where the emergency keys are located. Certain towers, Central Control and the Armory are responsible for keeping specific emergency keys. Our audit revealed that, in most cases, emergency keys are not checked and that some keys held for this purpose do not fit any prison locks. The locks in question have been changed without replacing the emergency keys.
- All keys are suppose to be turned in and checked at the end of each shift, according to prison policy. For the most part, Central Control adheres to this policy with its key exchange program. However, this accounts for keyed facilities within the inner perimeter only. Prison Industries and the Vocational area do not adhere to this policy. In some cases, civilian supervisors take their keys home.

- Work orders are supposed to be completed by persons requesting services of the locksmith. This is seldom done. The workload of the locksmith is very high and there are months of work backlogged. The work overload problem is compounded by the fact that no central authority prioritizes work.
- Folsom policy requires the Key Control officer to maintain records of key locations, emergency keys, number of keys issued, types of keys, and other relevant key control information. Our audit indicated that such records are inadequate.

(5) Inmate Supervision

Generally, Folsom officers comply with inmate supervision policies and procedures. However, non-compliance in a few areas should be noted.

- According to policy, inmates are to be supervised at all times. However, in certain areas, such as Prison Industries and Vocational, compliance is not possible. Several factors contribute to non-compliance with this policy in these areas. They include: (1) the layout of the buildings hinders clear observation of inmates without constant movement by supervisors, (2) supervisors are often out of the area performing administrative duties, and (3) officers do not have a vantage point for overhead surveillance.
- Non-peace officer supervisors too often are preoccupied with instructing specific inmates to watch all inmates in Prison Industries and Vocational. The span of control is over 12:1 in both of these areas. Also, based in our observations, non-peace officer supervisors do not have security as their first priority.

b. Folsom Evaluation Findings

Given the constraints of existing staffing, equipment, and facilities, our evaluation of the Folsom security procedures and policies produced positive results. The few exceptions to this conclusion are discussed in this subsection.

(1) Cell Searches

Currently, Folsom cell search procedures require that a minimum of three cells be searched each watch. General population housing units have over 600 cells each (over 800 in Housing Unit #3). Based on the policy and the number of cells, a cell might not be searched for several months. Cells should be searched more often.

(2) Key Control

Folsom procedures require that all locks and keys be checked to ensure they are operational at the end of each shift. In the previous audit discussion, we pointed out that this policy is not complied with consistently. Additionally, the procedure does not specify how these inspections are to be documented and who will be responsible for maintaining records of compliance. We believe the policy lacks an effective enforcement mechanism and should be revised to include one.

2. CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL

a. CIM-RCC Audit Findings

Exhibit IV-3, on the next page, summarizes our security audit results for CIM-RCC. Overall, we found that all critical CIM-RCC security requirements were covered by written procedures, and that custody staff usually acts in accordance with these instructions. There are, however, some exceptions which are explained below.

Summary of Security Audit Results--CIM--Reception Center Central

CATEGORIES OF SECURITY MEASURES	FACILITY AREAS																		
	GENERAL POPULATION HOUSING	ADMINISTRATIVE HOUSING	PMC HOUSING a/	LAW LIBRARY	INSIDE RECORDS	MEDICAL-DENTAL	CLINICAL	MAIN CORRIDOR	MAINTENANCE	MAIN YARD	PALM HALL YARD (AD. SEC.)	SOUTHWEST AND NORTHWEST	RECEIVING AND RELEASE	SALLYPORT/GATES	LOADING DOCK	TOWERS	CONTROL CENTER	NON-CONTACT VISITING AREA	OTHER AREAS
1. Inmate Searches	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	UNK
2. Cell Searches	B	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
3. Common Area Searches	A	A	A	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
4. Vehicle Searches																			
5. Visitor Searches																			
6. Tool Control	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
7. Key Control	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
8. Weapons Control	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
9. Disturbance Control																			
10. Perimeter Control																			
11. Inmate Movement	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	UNK
12. Inmate Supervision	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
13. Security Administration (Counts, Rosters, etc.)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
14. Inmate Discipline	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
15. Use of Force/Restraints	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
16. Escape Pursuit																			
17. Communications/Alarms	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	UNK
18. Mail/Telephone Security	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

a/ PMC Housing is for the minimum security inmates who form the Permanent Work Crew

CODE

A = Satisfactory--Security measures generally followed as directed  
 B = Improvement Desirable--Some security measures not being followed as directed  
 C = Unsatisfactory--Security measures not followed with sufficient frequency  
 UNK = Unknown; not observed.



(1) Cell Searches

- Although procedures specify the number of cells to be searched daily, the goals are not being met. We believe there are two explanations. First, search procedures (and other procedural requirements) do not appear to be enforced consistently by supervisors. Logs indicate fewer searches are conducted than required, yet no corrective action is evident. Second, in some areas the extreme overcrowding has increased the frequency of routine activities, thereby reducing the time previously available to perform time-consuming individual cell searches.
- Policy states that all searches will be unannounced and irregular. We found that although searches are unannounced, they typically are conducted during the times inmates are in the exercise yard or eating; thus, these searches are not truly random.
- If inmate property is confiscated during a cell search, the procedure requires that the items be documented and a copy of the document given to the inmate resident. Our observations of cell searches indicate that this is not being done.

(2) Inmate Searches

Procedures state that inmates are subject to random clothed body (pat) searches in housing units and during movement within the facility, singly or in groups. This implies that such searches will be conducted periodically, even without cause. We found that random pat searches are very infrequent, and thus do not meet the intent or spirit of the procedure. However, it is also our opinion (as discussed in the subsection on evaluation results) that pat searches of this type are relatively ineffective in the prison environment.

(3) Inmate Movement

- All inmate movement is controlled by special work passes, or ducats, based on pre-determined scheduling. Although general population inmates are not escorted individually, their movement is supposed to be monitored by corridor officers and other post officers as they move throughout the facility. We found that monitoring of inmate movement is inadequate, primarily due to the excessive number of inmates moving within the Main Corridor.
- Post orders for Madrone Hall discuss the movement of protective custody inmates to the dining room for feeding. The observed practice is to feed such inmates in their cells. Either the procedure is out of date and should be changed, or the unit officers need redirection and supervision.
- Post orders for corridor officers specify that all inmates going to the yard will be walked through a metal detector. This is not being done because a working walk-through detector is not available.

(4) Key Control

Overall key control practices follow the requirements of CIM policy and procedures with one exception. There is a policy that states . . . "no inmate shall use, handle, or possess a key which has custodial significance." This probably has reference to cells and other doors leading to the exterior of the facility. However, inmates do have control of keys that unlock tool cabinets and general maintenance material areas that could have "custodial significance" in the broad sense.

(5) Tool Control

The exception in tool control is related to the one described above for key control. The procedure states that inmates will use a metal tag system to withdraw tools. Because inmates are issued keys to tool cabinets, metal tags are not used to obtain all tools.

(6) Perimeter Control and Vehicle Searches

Our assessment of certain practices related to perimeter control and vehicle searches is that there are both audit and evaluation weaknesses. Vehicles entering the CIM complex are inspected at the Main Gate before proceeding to their destination within the complex. The inspection procedures at this point as well as those at CIM-RCC (when the vehicle arrives there) need to be improved. The actual inspections are cursory at both locations. Also, at CIM-RCC the physical configuration of the controlling rear gate post and the vehicle sallyport prevents effective security operations. Basically, the rear gate officer "recognizes" authorized vehicles and permits entry accordingly. Generally, the caution exercised at this entry/exit point is not up to the level of care that we believe the Department requires or desires. Our subsequent security recommendations address this issue at CIM-RCC.

b. CIM-RCC Evaluation Findings

Our evaluation of the effectiveness of existing CIM-RCC security procedures concluded that, in general, they

provide satisfactory instructions for providing adequate institutional security, given the constraints of existing staffing, equipment, and facilities. There are, however, a few exceptions where modifications to current policy or procedures should clarify and/or enhance the effectiveness of security. These exceptions are discussed below.

(1) Common Area Searches

Existing procedures require non-living areas to be searched; however, such searches are not always quantified in terms of frequency, nor are results documented. We suggest that non-living area search plans be established that identify the specific areas to be searched and the frequency of searches. Logs should be maintained to assist in monitoring compliance.

(2) Inmate Searches

To improve the effectiveness and frequency of random clothed inmate searches, procedures should require the use of walk-through metal detectors or a reasonable number of hand-held detectors. One walk-through detector should be placed permanently in the passageway leading to the yard and be operated as inmates move in each direction. Other hand-held units should be used in the main corridor.

(3) Key Control

The key control procedure states that keys operating gates leading out of the security perimeter will not be stored or taken into security areas. The

procedure needs to define more clearly the "security perimeter" and "security areas" so that the policy can be enforced effectively. For example, the door leading from Madrone Hall to the Main Corridor may not lead out of the "security perimeter." However, it is a significant security door and the key is carried by the Madrone Hall officer, not a corridor officer.

When a sufficient amount of broken/damaged keys are accumulated, current procedures require only that the locksmith contact local salvage companies and sell the scrap metal for the highest price. The locksmith should be required to mutilate each key segment to preclude repair and re-use.

(4) Inmate Movement

The problem associated with inmate movement is essentially one of volume. Due to overcrowding, large numbers of inmates being processed and work crew inmates simultaneously move through the Main Corridor. To reduce the number of inmates in this area, we suggest several procedural modifications in Section VI of this report.

(5) Security Administration

The procedure on receiving and releasing inmates requires Receiving and Release (R&R) staff to ensure that each inmate received be identified correctly. However, new inmate documentation typically includes only court commitment papers and a probation officer's report; no photo or state or federal arrest record is available. Although inmate identification using the available documentation is generally accurate, the method is subject to error. Better identification capabilities should be provided.

(6) Eating Utensils

Current procedures require that only forks and spoons be counted after use by inmates. This procedure omits trays, metal bowls, and plastic cups, all of which should be under count control.

3. CIM-EAST

a. CIM-East Audit Findings

Exhibit IV-4, following this page, is a summary of the findings of our security audit at CIM-East.

As with CIM-RCC, we found that security aspects of the institution have been addressed rather thoroughly by written policies and procedures, and that staff is operating in overall accordance with those instructions. The exceptions are discussed below.

(1) Cell Searches

As at RCC, cell search goals are not being met. We believe this is because the overcrowded facility has created additional workload for officers, and that supervisors do not enforce procedures consistently.

Searches are not random as required by procedure. They typically are conducted when inmates are out of their cells working or in the yard, thus eliminating the element of surprise.

# Summary of Security Audit Results--CIM--East

CATEGORIES OF SECURITY MEASURES	FACILITY AREAS																	
	GENERAL HOUSING UNITS	KITCHEN-DINING	PRISON INDUSTRIES	MAINTENANCE	VOCATIONAL EDUCATION	LIBRARY	GYM	MAIN YARD	VISITING AREA	RECEIVING AND RELEASE	MEDICAL-DENTAL	CONTROL TOWER	GYM TOWER	PERIMETER TOWERS	VEHICLE SALLYPORT	PEDESTRIAN ENTRANCE	ENTRY CONTROL AND MAIL	OTHER AREAS
1. Inmate Searches	B	B	A	B	B	B	B	A	A	B	B				B	B	B	
2. Cell Searches	B																	
3. Common Area Searches	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
4. Vehicle Searches															B	A		
5. Visitor Searches															B	A		
6. Tool Control	A	B	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
7. Key Control	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
8. Weapons Control																		
9. Disturbance Control																		
10. Perimeter Control																		UNK
11. Inmate Movement	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
12. Inmate Supervision	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	
13. Security Administration (Counts, Rosters, etc.)	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
14. Inmate Discipline	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
15. Use of Force/Restraints	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
16. Escape Pursuit																		
17. Communications/Alarms	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	
18. Mail/Telephone Security	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	

CODE

A = Satisfactory--Security measures generally followed as directed  
 B = Improvement Desirable--Some security measures not being followed as directed  
 C = Unsatisfactory--Security measures not followed with sufficient frequency  
 UNK = Unknown; not observed.

There is inconsistent documentation of cell searches. To illustrate, a cell may have the same deficiency over a period of time (e.g., missing metal on window frame). Some officers will note this deficiency and others will not.

(2) Inmate Searches

The general policy is that inmates are subject to random clothed body searches at any time by custodial staff. Our observation is that such searches are very infrequent. This practice would seem to be contrary to the intent of the policy.

(3) Inmate Supervision

Most correctional officer post orders indicate a basic responsibility of supervising inmates whenever inmates are within their area. Although this responsibility appears to be performed adequately, there are at least two exceptions to be noted.

- There are about twelve inmates assigned to the mechanical maintenance shop but only two civilian supervisors. This ratio indicates that all inmate maintenance crews cannot be supervised directly as they perform their assigned activities.
- A more critical area is Tower No. 5. The primary function of this officer is to monitor inmates in the yard, weight pile, swimming pool, and Gym. However, another responsibility, i.e., monitoring scheduled inmate telephone calls, consumes an inordinate amount of the tower officer's time. The result is less than effective surveillance of other inmate activities.



(4) Vehicle Searches

The CIM Manual of Procedure, Gate Procedure No. 87, describes how commercial vehicles shall be processed in and out of the CIM Main Gate. However, the procedure does not indicate how CIM-East is to handle vehicles of this type that can drive directly to CIM-East without passing through the Main Gate. Although post orders for the CIM-East sallyport officer provide some direction regarding the processing of vehicles, it is not totally clear as to what is required. As a result, it was difficult to determine if vehicle searching was in accordance with current procedure.

(5) Key and Tool Control

The deficiency noted in key and tool control for CIM-East is identical to that described in our CIM-RCC audit findings. Keys are issued to inmates for tool cabinets in violation of established policy, and tools are not always issued through the metal tag system as required by procedure.

b. CIM-East Evaluation Findings

The evaluation of existing security policy and procedures at CIM-East resulted in findings very similar to CIM-RCC. Generally, current security procedures provide satisfactory instructions to correctional officers and are sufficiently comprehensive to provide adequate institutional security within existing equipment and facility constraints. The few exceptions where improvements can be made are discussed below.

(1) Cell Searches

Log documentation of cell searches is inconsistent from officer to officer. This inconsistency appears to be due to a lack of specific instructions in post orders, and possibly a lack of training and/or supervision. We suggest that the post orders be more specific as to what is to be entered in the cell search logs, and how the log is to be used as a reference in each subsequent search.

(2) Common Area Searches

The situation relative to common area searches at CIM-East is identical to CIM-RCC. The procedures need expansion, clarification, and added requirements for documentation of search activities.

(3) Inmate Searches

As at CIM-RCC, random clothed body searches are done infrequently and typically involve a "pat" search which is not very effective. Although CIM-East has almost no weapons-related problems, we believe it is still appropriate to modify procedures to require more metal detector screening of inmates.

(4) Inmate Supervision

The officer in Tower No. 5 spends the majority of his/her time directing and monitoring scheduled phone calls by inmates. The assignment of this function to this post should be changed.

Procedures should require yard officers to periodically patrol the Prison Industries structure. Currently, officers seldom enter this area.

(5) Vehicle Searches

Procedure No. 87, Gate Procedure, should be revised to more clearly describe how each institution processes vehicles and their loads through the perimeter.

(6) Key and Tool Control

- Our previous CIM-RCC suggestion that damaged keys be mutilated before being sold for scrap metal is pertinent also at CIM-East.
- Current procedures do not require a count of any food services utensils used by inmates (forks, spoons, etc.) We believe a control count system should be established.

## V. SECURITY STAFFING ANALYSIS

This report section presents the results of our analysis of security staffing requirements for Folsom State Prison, CIM-Reception Center Central, and CIM-East. Our analysis of security staffing is based upon current operating methods, equipment, facilities, and inmate populations at the institutions we studied. Staffing recommendations made in this section also are based on current operating methods and populations. Subsequently, in Section VI, we discuss our recommendations concerning security measures. Where such recommendations impact staffing, we provide an estimate of the incremental addition to, or subtraction from, the recommended staffing presented here.

The scope of our work extended only to security-related (custody) staffing of peace officer positions. We did not study the various civilian positions in Prison Industries, Vocational Education, food services, counseling, etc. Also, our work did not include the detailed development of workload data and staffing standards. Our assessments are based primarily on general reviews of:

- Workload and required inmate services
- Basic employee safety requirements
- Inmate movement and surveillance needs
- Inmate members in various facility locations
- Supervisory requirements.

A. CDC METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING TOTAL  
STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

Staffing figures are computed and presented in accordance with the California Department of Corrections' format. Each post is subject to adjustment by one of the following four relief factors, where such relief is required:

- Regular Days Off (RDO)--This relief factor is 104 days based on two days off each of the 52 weeks of the year. Therefore, 104 days of relief is required for posts that must be staffed seven days a week.
- Vacations (VAC)--Based on the average number of days taken off by correctional officers for vacations, fifteen days of relief is allowed for posts that must be staffed when the assigned officer is on vacation.
- Holiday (HOL)--Officers receive eight hours of compensatory time off (CTO) for each of twelve holidays if the holiday (1) falls on their regular day off, or (2) falls on their work day and they are not allowed to take the day off. The holiday CTO then is used some other day during the year. Therefore, twelve relief days are provided to cover posts that must be staffed on holidays.
- Sick Leave (SLV)--Based on the average number of days that officers take off for reasons of illness, the Department allows ten days of relief for posts that must be staffed when the assigned officer is off sick.

Under CDC's system, the following steps are necessary to calculate total staffing requirements:

- a. Determine the number of posts to be staffed, by shift.
- b. Determine for each post whether it must be staffed for RDOs, vacations, holidays or sick leave absences.
- c. Determine the total number of units of relief for all posts, by category of relief (e.g., 100 RDOs, 50 VACs, etc.)

- d. Multiply the total units of relief per category times the appropriate relief factor (e.g., 100 RDO reliefs x 104 days per unit = 10,400 relief days for regular days off).
- e. Divide each product from "d" above by 224 days (which represents the average total workdays per year). This will be the number of relief positions required for each relief category.
- f. Add all relief positions to the total number of post positions to arrive at the total number of full-time positions needed.

The above approach is technically correct. However, in practice the required sick leave coverage cannot be staffed entirely with full-time positions calculated for this purpose. Short-term sick leave absences do not occur on a scheduled basis that is distributed proportionately on all shifts and all days of the week. Consequently, paid overtime often is used to replace personnel off sick.

For an organization as large as Folsom, there may be a minimum sick leave absence rate that occurs all or nearly all days, especially when considering long-term sick leave (disability) absences. This minimum absence level could be staffed with an appropriate number of full-time "sick leave relief" positions at slightly less cost than overtime. The overtime rate is 1.5 times direct salary. The direct salary plus fringe benefit rate for the middle pay step of a full-time correctional officer is about 1.38.

In FY 1985-86, CDC initiated a practice of transferring all correctional officer sick leave relief hours from the full-time position allocation to an overtime allocation. (This approach was not applied to sergeants and lieutenants.)

We believe the Department should institute analyses to determine the minimum predictable correctional officer sick leave absence rate, and meet this need with the less costly full-time employee rather than via overtime. As for sergeant and lieutenant sick leave coverage, the CDC has not instituted this overtime transfer approach. The sick leave relief factor is built into full-time staffing for these positions. This is ironic because:

- There are substantially fewer sergeants and lieutenants than correctional officers; therefore, it is much more difficult (if not impossible) to match available excess sick leave positions with actual sick leave absences
- We understand that paid overtime is used to cover some sergeant and lieutenant sick leave absences. Because these absences presumably are covered already in the full-time positions, there is an effective double counting of the requirements.

Basically, we believe that sergeant and lieutenant sick leave relief should be treated the same as correctional officers to avoid double counting and to maximize management's flexibility in filling these unscheduled absences.

## B. FOLSOM STATE PRISON

### 1. CURRENT SECURITY STAFFING

Folsom security (Custody Division) staffing has been adjusted administratively during the current budget year; therefore, explanations are required to understand the situation we evaluated. Exhibit V-1, following this page, summarizes the changes that have occurred and why our "current staffing" totals differ from both the budgeted and Post Assignment Schedule (PAS) numbers. The PAS is the Department's official distribution of budgeted positions. It lists all posts, by shift, and indicates the relief factors that apply to each post. The PAS of October 31, 1985 was the source document we used to identify and assess current staffing. Additional comments concerning Exhibit V-1 are provided below:

- During FY 1985/86, CDC has authorized 1.63 lieutenant positions and 30.0 officer positions to meet the requirements of the Touissant Injunction in SHU II. Folsom management actually requested 12 more officers, but they were not authorized.
- CDC also provided mid-year authorization for a sergeant and five officers to form a Search and Investigation team. These posts and those mentioned above are being staffed currently but are not shown on the PAS because they have not been approved officially as part of the budget.
- The sick leave relief staffing for correctional officers was discussed previously in subsection V.A. These positions are included in the PAS and in our summary of current staffing.

### 2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS

Overall, we believe current security staffing levels at Folsom are reasonably adequate for the current method of operation



RECONCILIATION OF FOLSOM CUSTODY DIVISION STAFFING--  
AUTHORIZED, BUDGETED, POST ASSIGNMENT SCHEDULE,  
AND ARTHUR YOUNG STUDY

	<u>MANAGEMENT</u>	<u>LIEUTENANT</u>	<u>SERGEANTS</u>	<u>CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Officially Budgeted Positions</u>					
° Total Authorized Positions Start of FY 1985/86 <sup>a/</sup>	3.00	19.00	72.16	467.99	562.15
° Plus Positions Added Back (Section 20)	-	-	1.36	1.00	2.36
° Less Inmate Full Employment Program Positions Not Budgeted	-	-	(1.11)	(22.71)	(23.82)
° Total Budgeted Positions	3.00	19.00	72.41	446.28	540.69
<u>Reconciliation with the Post Assignment Schedule (PAS)</u>					
° Add Sick Leave Relief	-	-	-	14.17	14.17
° Add Administrative Lieutenant's Post that is Carried in the Custody Division PAS	-	1.00	-	-	1.00
° Total PAS Position	3.00	20.00	72.41	460.45	555.86
<u>Reconciliation with Arthur Young (AY) Current Staffing Summary</u>					
° Less Camp Represa and Range Positions	-	(1.11)	(7.11)	(34.20)	(42.42)
° Less Budgeted Relief Positions <sup>b/</sup>	-	-	-	(1.42)	(1.42)
° Add Positions Authorized Administratively Pending Official FY 1986/87 Approval					
- SHU II (Touissant Injunction)	-	1.63	-	30.00	31.63
- Search and Investigation Team	-	-	1.00	5.00	6.00
° Total AY Current Positions	3.00	20.52	66.30	459.83	549.65

<sup>a/</sup> Includes sick leave relief for lieutenants and sergeants; excludes this relief for correctional officers.

<sup>b/</sup> No full-time positions included; only includes vacation and sick leave relief for miscellaneous positions throughout Folsom.

and current inmate populations. Our recommendations, as described in this subsection, result in some minor reductions but they are not significant given the total number of positions involved. Essentially, we do not see the need for substantial increases in security personnel.

In completing our analysis of current staffing requirements we reviewed each of the posts currently staffed. In each case, we made an assessment of:

- Whether the post was necessary for reasons of workload, surveillance, employee safety, or other security purpose
- Whether the post had to be staffed by a correctional officer (versus a civilian classification)
- Whether each relief factor was necessary for the post.

A point-by-point discussion of areas where we considered staffing changes is provided below. Where posts are not discussed, we agree with current staffing levels.

a. Management

In FY 1986/87, Folsom is planning to implement the unit management concept for each of the five housing units. This will add three program administrators to current staffing. Were it not for this plan, we would suggest additional management-level staffing. The current management group in the Custody Division is very "thin," i.e., three positions to manage a complement of nearly 550 personnel. If the unit management approach is not approved, then we believe at least one and probably two additional captains should be added to current staffing.

b. Reclassification of Officer Positions to Civilian Positions

An examination of the duties of the following four posts concluded that there is no reason to staff them with correctional officers:

- Associate Warden's Assistant
- Captain's Assistant
- Personnel Officer
- One of the two officer posts that process visitors (retain the other post as a correctional officer, and the civilian can assist this other officer).

We believe reclassification of these posts poses no security risks. A cost benefit will be realized in a reduction in base salaries.

Two of the above posts are provided full relief and one other is provided relief for vacations and sick leave. This amounts to 307 relief days, or 1.37 positions. The total reclassification recommendation, therefore, is 5.37 positions. Personnel employed as assistants to the Associate Warden and Captain should possess administrative and analytical skills; the other positions are primarily clerical in nature.

c. Elimination of Certain Posts

Our review of security requirements throughout the prison leads us to recommend that the following five posts be eliminated:

- Dining Room #1 gun officer, on both the 1st and 2nd shifts
- One of the three dayshift officers assigned to the Administration Building
- One of the three Laundry officers
- The 3rd shift officer in Tower #5.

Our rationale for suggesting that these posts be eliminated is as follows:

- Currently little activity occurs in Dining Room #1. Only a few inmates work in this area preparing bagged lunches for distribution at lunch time. Although at one time several hundred inmates were fed in this dining room, that is no longer the case. At present, both a ground surveillance officer and a gunwalk officer are assigned to both shifts. We believe that the ground surveillance officer provides sufficient staffing for Dining Room #1.
- We found that no specific custody duties are assigned to one of the Administration Building officers. Currently, two officers are stationed at the building's north sallyport to process inmates into and out of committee conference rooms or attorney meetings which are held at that end of the Administration Building. However, duties of the additional officer are less clear. The few administrative duties this officer performs can be assigned to clerical or other personnel in the building.
- There is probably a need for two officers in the Laundry, based primarily on employee backup and safety. A third officer, however, serves little added purpose. Certainly there is more safety and surveillance with more officers, but two officers for the 25 to 30 inmates assigned should suffice. Comparatively, there are over 300 inmates in Prison Industries and only three officers (plus civilian supervisors).
- Tower #5 oversees the extreme northwest corner near the American River and the Filtration Plant outside the wall. This post is staffed on both the 2nd and 3rd watches. However, during the 3rd watch all inmates are within the secure inner perimeter of the facility. Tower #5 is an outside, almost remote, perimeter tower which, on the 3rd watch, has inmate responsibility only for inmates from Camp Represa while they work in the Filtration Plant. We see no need to operate this tower on the 3rd watch and recommend that this post be eliminated.

Three of the above discussed posts are provided full relief; the other two posts have relief only for vacations and sick leave. The resulting relief and total positions involved in these recommended post reductions are as follows:

- 473 relief shifts, or 2.11 positions
- 7.11 total correctional officer position reductions.

d. Elimination of Relief for Certain Posts

There are a number of posts assigned varying types of relief that, in our estimation, are not required. These posts and relief factors are discussed below.

(1) Lieutenants

The practice of providing certain types of relief for many of the dayshift lieutenant (and other) positions is, in our opinion, unnecessary. We agree that posts such as Watch Commander and Main Yard Lieutenant warrant full relief. Most of the other lieutenant posts, however, do not need relief for sick leave, and a few do not need it for other relief factors. Below we list the specific relief factors we believe should be eliminated for lieutenants:

- Eliminate sick leave relief for all posts except Watch Commander and Yard Lieutenants
- Eliminate holiday relief for the Mail and Visiting Lieutenant
- Eliminate vacation relief for the Personnel Lieutenant.

The result of the above recommendations is 77 relief shifts, or .34 of a lieutenant's position.

(2) Sergeants

We suggest elimination of the following relief factors for sergeant posts:

- Personnel Sergeant--delete sick leave relief
- Mail Room Sergeant--delete holiday and sick leave relief
- Armory Sergeant--delete sick leave relief
- Training Sergeant--delete vacation and sick leave relief.

The result of the above recommendations is 67 relief shifts, or .30 sergeant positions.

(3) Correctional Officers

The following eliminations of correctional officer relief factors are recommended:

- Personnel--delete sick leave relief
- Training--delete vacation and sick leave relief
- West Gate--delete holiday relief for one of the two officers assigned.

The results of the correctional officer relief factor reductions is 47 relief shifts, or .21 positions.

e. Additional Posts

There are several areas where additional staffing is warranted, given current operating methods. These are discussed below.

Presently, there are three surveillance officers assigned to the Upper Yard/Prison Industries area, and two such posts in the Lower Yard/Vocational Education area. We believe each of these areas warrant addition of one officer, with relief provided for vacations and sick leave.

- The layout of the Upper Yard consists of four distinct buildings. With the addition of another officer, one officer can be assigned responsibility for each building. Currently, with only three officers ground surveillance is poor. The assigned officers (and the unit sergeant) should enlist the assistance and full cooperation of the civilian supervisors that work in each of the buildings.
- In the Lower Yard (vocational training and maintenance) there are four separate buildings also. However, not all buildings are utilized fully each day (e.g., diesel mechanics in the old Powerhouse employs only a few inmates on a rather sporadic basis). Two officers (and a sergeant) patrol these buildings which contain as many as 250 to 300 inmates. With the addition of another officer for Lower Yard ground surveillance, all buildings can be surveilled more consistently. Again, the cooperation and assistance of civilian supervision is essential to more effective security in this area.

The above recommendations total 2.22 additional correctional officer positions.

We have made no recommendations for increases or decreases in SHU II correctional officer staffing during the 2nd shift, despite being told that certain functions have large backlogs (e.g., transfer of inmate property said to lag behind the arrival of new inmates by six weeks). Frankly, our observations in SHU II indicate a great deal of activity by some

officers while others tend to congregate and chat. (We also observed that gunwalk officers tend to pair up frequently, or stay in one location for extended periods.) We believe that effective levels of supervision, plus a close management review of how work is assigned and performed, would result in better utilization of existing resources.

f. Additional Relief for the S & I Team

Folsom has received temporary authorization for a Search and Investigation (S & I) team consisting of one sergeant and five officers. We support this addition and recommend that the positions be authorized officially in the FY 1986/87 budget. The only caution we offer is that the "investigation" function should be minimized. Such groups have a tendency to devote increasing proportions of time to non-search activities. Management needs to control the S & I focus by directing it first and foremost to random, intensive searches throughout the facility, but particularly to supplement cell searches by housing unit personnel.

Currently, no relief for the S & I team is provided. This means that supplemental search activities would not occur on the team's days off or on holidays. This five-day approach, although much better than the situation existing before the team was authorized, tends to make the supplemental search function more predictable. One of the significant security weaknesses we found at all institutions is that searches seldom are random in the true sense. Inmates certainly must be aware that the overwhelming majority of cell searches occur during the day shift, while inmates are at work or in the recreation yards. Also, SHU cell searches usually occur while inmates are showering.



We believe the S & I team concept should be employed seven days a week, and that the team should periodically work shifts other than days.

The recommendation for additional relief for S & I team personnel results in .52 additional sergeant positions and 2.59 additional correctional officers.

g. Summary of Staffing Analysis

Recommendation FSP No. 1: Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the Folsom State Prison posts we reviewed should consist of about 546.7 positions (including sick leave relief), as follows:

<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Current</u>
1.00	Program Administrator	1.00
1.00	Associate Warden	1.00
1.00	Captain	1.00
20.19	Lieutenants	20.53
66.61	Sergeants	66.39
451.54	Correctional Officers	459.42
<u>5.37</u>	Civilian Classifications	<u>-</u>
<u>546.71</u>	TOTAL POSITIONS	<u>549.34</u>

We emphasize that the above recommendations include the sick relief for positions below the rank of captain. These sick leave relief positions are as follows:

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Current</u>
Lieutenant	.23	.45
Sergeant	1.65	1.83
Correctional Officer	12.59	12.95

Some significant proportion of the above position requirements should be transferred to an overtime budget.

Exhibit V-2 summarizes the recommended incremental changes resulting from our analysis of Folsom staffing. The estimated annual cost impact of these recommendations is summarized below:



Staffing cost estimates provided here and elsewhere in this report are based on the current mid-point salary for peace officer positions, plus 30.4 percent fringe benefit costs and \$2,105 per position for annual dental and health plan coverage. Civilian costs shown above assume an annual salary of \$24,000 (\$2,000 per month), plus 32.9 percent for fringe benefits and \$2,105 per position for dental and health plan coverage.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN STAFFING--  
FOLSOM STATE PRISON

POST/POSITION	NUMBER OF POSITIONS/SHIFT					RELIEF FACTORS				
	FIRST	SECOND	THIRD	TOTAL	RDO	VAC	HOL	SLV		
<b>I. Reclassify Correctional Officer Positions to Civilian Positions</b>										
Associate Warden's Assistant	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	0	0	0		
Captain's Assistant	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		
Personnel Officer	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)		
Visitor Processing	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Reclassifications	0	(4)	0	(4)	(2)	(3)	(2)	(3)		
<b>II. Eliminate Posts</b>										
Correctional Officer	0	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)		
- Dining Room #1, Gunwalk	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)		
- Administration Building	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)		
- Laundry	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)		
- Tower #5	0	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)		
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Eliminations	0	(3)	(2)	(5)	(3)	(5)	(3)	(5)		
<b>III. Eliminate Relief</b>										
Lieutenant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Housing	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(1)		
- Mail and Visiting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Inmate Assignment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- SHU I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- SHU II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Personnel	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	0		
Subtotal: Lieutenant Relief Reductions	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(1)	(5)		
Sergeant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Personnel	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(1)		
- Mail Room	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Armory	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Training	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	(1)		
Subtotal: Sergeant Relief Reductions	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(1)	(4)		
Correctional Officer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- Personnel	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0	(1)		
- Training	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)		
- West Gate	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	0		
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Relief Reductions	0	0	0	0	0	0	(1)	(2)		

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN STAFFING--

FOLSOM STATE PRISON

(Continued)

POST/POSITION	NUMBER OF POSITIONS/SHIFT					RELIEF FACTORS		
	FIRST	SECOND	THIRD	TOTAL	RDO	VAC	HOL	SLV
<u>IV. Add Posts</u>								
Lieutenant								
- SHU II	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Subtotal: Lieutenant Additions	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
Sergeant								
- SHU II	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Subtotal: Sergeant Additions	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
Correctional Officer								
- Upper Yard	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
- Lower Yard	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Additions	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2
<u>V. Add Relief</u>								
Sergeant								
- S&T Team					1	0	1	0
Subtotal: Sergeant Relief Added					1	0	1	0
Correctional Officer								
- S&T Team					5	0	5	0
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Relief Added					5	0	5	0
<u>VI. Total All Recommendations</u>								
Lieutenant								
- Eliminate Relief								(.94)
- Add SHU II								1.07
Subtotal: Lieutenant								.13
Sergeant								
- Eliminate SHU II								(3.26)
- Eliminate Relief								(.88)
- Add SHU II								1.63
- Add Relief								-.52
Subtotal: Sergeant								(1.99)
Correctional Officer								
- Reclassify to Civilian								(10.26)
- Eliminate Posts								(10.37)
- Eliminate Relief								(.28)
- Add Posts								2.22
- Add Relief								2.59
Subtotal: Correctional Officer								(16.10)
Civilian Classifications								
- Reclassify from Correctional Officer								10.26
Subtotal: Civilian Classifications								10.26
TOTAL NET POSITION CHANGE								(7.7)

## C. CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL

### 1. CURRENT SECURITY STAFFING

CIM-RCC currently uses more correctional officers than are authorized in the FY 1985/86 budget. The additional officers come from the Permanent Intermittent Employee (PIE) pool, and are used to staff full time correctional officer posts deployed to guard inmates housed in the Gym. It is our understanding that authorization for these positions is based on the following criteria:

Less than 50 inmates:	Total staffing = one officer
50 to 100 inmates:	Total staffing = two officers
100 to 175 inmates:	Total staffing = three officers
Over 175 inmates:	Total staffing = four officers.

The FY 1985/86 budget includes four correctional officer positions identified as Recreation, Recreation/Yard, Orientation Room and Gym. These positions actually are used to staff the Gym housing; two on the 2nd shift and two on the 3rd shift. PIEs are used to bring Gym staffing to four officers on all shifts (i.e., four PIEs on the 1st shift, two on the 2nd shift, and two on the 3rd). In our staffing analysis we did not evaluate the PIE concept; however, we understand that such employees are used primarily to cover posts on an interim basis. Recognizing that the use of the Gym for housing is an interim situation, we agree that staffing it with PIE officers is logical. We suggest, however, that officer coverage for the Gym housing should not drop below two positions, primarily for officer safety. Also, we assume that when inmates are no longer housed in the Gym, the permanent officer positions will revert to their former duties.

## 2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS

Given the current methods of operation and inmate populations, it is our opinion that staffing levels in several areas of activity are inadequate. The remainder of the subsection contains a discussion of areas of activities where we think changes in staffing are appropriate. Where posts are not discussed, we agree with the current staffing levels and relief factors.

### a. Management

Currently, three lieutenant positions are authorized (excluding gang investigations, which we did not review). Two lieutenants work the 2nd shift and one is on the 3rd shift. On the 1st shift, there is only one lieutenant for the entire CIM complex (not part of RCC's staffing). It is our opinion that another lieutenant's position should be authorized for the 1st shift, with primary responsibility for both CIM-RCC and CIM-East. This span of control for one lieutenant is significant when considering the total number of inmates involved, the geographical dispersion of facilities, and the early morning (0300 hours) preparations for moving inmates out of RCC and RCW.

This position will be required seven days a week and needs all relief allocations. This will result in the addition of 1.63 lieutenant positions.

### b. Reclassification of Officer Positions to Civilian Positions

A review of the duties and responsibilities of the following three posts indicates that they probably could be staffed with civilians:

- Visiting (Front Entrance)
- Property
- Control Room, data input.

The visiting post is located outside the security perimeter at the front entrance of the Administration Building. The officer is responsible for controlling civilian visitors and directing them to the non-contact visiting room as necessary. This is a seven-day a week activity which could be assigned to a civilian clerk.

The inmate property activity takes place in two locations -- Receiving and Release (R&R) and the Property Room. The duties of the property officer are performed primarily in the Property Room and deal with packaging inmate personal property for mailing. The position is supported by the R&R property officer and is assisted by Permanent Work Crew (PWC) inmates. The job could be converted to a civilian position without compromising security.

The Control Room is staffed on the 2nd watch with a sergeant and two correctional officers. One officer is assigned to input data into the inmate/housing computer information system. This appears to be a standard clerical function and should be staffed by a civilian clerk.

We do not think that security or safety of staff or inmates would be compromised with these changes. The three posts are allowed full relief, which amounts to 1.89 relief positions. Therefore, the total number of positions recommended for reclassification is 4.89.

c. Additional Posts

There are a number of areas/activities where additional staffing is merited, considering current operations and inmate population. These areas are discussed below. However, we emphasize that if the population ever is decreased to a level approximating design capacity, most of these additional positions would not be needed.

(1) General Population Housing

• Sergeants

Presently there are four sergeants assigned to the second shift, i.e., Control, R&R, Watch and Housing. The sergeants for Control and R&R are fully consumed with their assigned activities and have no time available for other duties. At current staffing levels this means that the other two sergeants (Watch and Housing) are responsible for supervising about 31 officers dispersed throughout the facility and in the towers. In addition to the dispersion factor, there are other conditions that exacerbate the current span of control. They are:

- Housing units are extremely overcrowded, resulting in nearly continuous inmate movement
- Inmates are housed in many areas where supervision is difficult, such as the Gym, Orientation Room, and Room No. 1
- There is considerable distance between the extreme ends of the facility making it difficult to effectively supervise and monitor correctional officer activity
- Inmate activity is at its highest on the 2nd shift
- Because of the current method of operation, PWC inmates and process inmates intermingle throughout the facility.



Because of the above factors, we recommend that an additional sergeant be assigned to the 2nd shift. Proper allocation of area responsibilities will reduce each of the sergeant's span of supervisory control.

With RDO and all other relief allowances, this recommendation will result in the addition of 1.63 sergeant positions.

- Correctional Officers

The number of correctional officer positions varies among the primary housing units as well as among shifts. This occurs in spite of the relative consistency in the number of inmates housed in each unit. For example:

- Madrone Hall has 221 beds (44 in the dayroom) with two officers on the 1st watch, and four on the 2nd and 3rd watches
- Sycamore Hall has 221 beds (41 in the dayroom) with one officer on the 1st watch and three on the 2nd and 3rd watches
- Birch Hall has 266 beds (45 in the dayroom) with two officers on the 1st watch and four on the 2nd and 3rd watches
- Cypress Hall has 204 beds (41 in the dayroom) with one officer on the 1st watch and three on the 2nd and 3rd watches

Inmates identified as gang members, those with long sentences, those with potential for violence, and Palm Hall (administrative segregation) overflow tend to be housed in Sycamore and Cypress Halls. On the other hand, extra feeding workload is assigned to Birch and Madrone Halls (e.g., inmates from the Gym, PWC, etc.).

Based on our analysis of workload and safety considerations, we recommend that one officer be added to each of the shifts at Sycamore and Cypress Halls. The justification is as follows:

1st Watch

- Act as back-up when counts are made and during the required periodic inspection tours of the tiers
- Assist in awakening and moving inmates transferring to other institutions

- Inspect cells vacated by transferring inmates
- Assure that grille gates separating the tier from the guard space are locked with a key that is kept outside the cell areas.

#### 2nd and 3rd Watches

- Staffing is inadequate in terms of the types of inmates housed, the configuration of the units, high levels of inmate activity, and insufficient search activity.

The above recommendations for general population housing will result in the addition of 9.78 correctional officer positions.

#### (2) Administrative Segregation Housing Officer

Activities in the administrative segregation housing in Palm Hall and Cypress Hall (one tier) are controlled tightly and, therefore, staffing is intensive. Movement of inmates is frequent and typically requires two officers. Also, whenever the Cypress officer enters the tier, he must call at least two officers from Palm Hall, one to accompany the officer and one to guard the front cage. Such activities consume much of the staffing capabilities in Palm Hall.

We suggest that one officer be added to the 2nd shift administrative segregation staff, which is when peak activity occurs. With RDO and all other relief allowances, this recommendation will result in the addition of 1.63 correctional officers.

#### (3) Search and Escort Officer

An additional 2nd shift S&E officer is needed to assist the two corridor officers in controlling inmates moving throughout the facility. One of the existing S&E officers is essentially assigned to a

fixed post to operate the corridor grille to the PWC/Gym housing areas, and to provide access to the Orientation Room, Room No. 1, and the Law Library. Also, the 2nd shift is the peak inmate movement period and the time when incidents are most likely to occur.

We believe another S&E officer is required to control inmate movement more adequately. This recommendation, with full relief, will total 1.63 correctional officer positions.

(4) Receiving and Release Officers

We believe there is a need for at least one more officer in R&R, and probably two. One position is needed to assist the sergeant in screening incoming inmates for housing assignments. This job should be done more thoroughly than time currently permits. Another position is needed simply to observe all activities when large groups of inmates are present, and to assist other personnel in processing and escorting inmates.

The addition of two officers, with relief for vacations and sick leave, amounts to 2.33 positions.

d. Additional Relief for Certain Posts

There are a number of posts that currently do not have certain relief factors allocated. Based on a conversation with the CIM assignment lieutenant and his staff, we understand that this occurs when total positions allocated by CDC Headquarters are reconciled to the Post Assignment Schedule for the institution. In order to meet the decimal

point requirements, relief factors are eliminated arbitrarily from selected posts. The decisions as to which posts suffer reductions in relief are subjective.

The posts that we think warrant additional relief are:

- Correctional Officers, Receiving and Release -- Add holiday relief for two officers
- Correctional Officer, Administrative Segregation -- Add RDO and holiday relief for one officer.

The net result of this recommendation is the addition of .63 correctional officers.

e. Summary of Staffing Analysis

Recommendations RCC No. 1: Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-RCC posts we reviewed should consist of about 205.2 positions (including sick leave relief), as follows:

<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Current</u>
1.00	Correctional Administrator	1.00
1.00	Program Administrator	1.00
1.00	Captain	1.00
6.88	Lieutenant	5.25
20.72	Sergeant	19.09
169.71	Correctional Officer	158.60
<u>4.89</u>	Civilian Classifications	<u>-0-</u>
<u>205.20</u>	TOTAL POSITIONS	<u>185.94</u>

As discussed previously in our Folsom staffing analysis, some significant portion of the sick relief component of the above positions should be converted to overtime hours. The total sick leave relief positions are listed below:

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Current</u>
Lieutenant	.13	.09
Sergeant	.58	.54
Correctional Officer	4.69	4.38

Exhibit V-3, following this page, summarizes the recommended incremental changes resulting from our staffing analysis. The estimated annual cost impact of these recommendations is presented below:

Lieutenant Changes	\$ 79,261
Sergeant Changes	69,365
Correctional Officer Changes	422,718
Civilian Classification Changes	<u>166,265</u>
TOTAL ALL RECOMMENDATIONS	<u>\$737,609</u>

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN STAFFING--

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN-  
RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL

POST/POSITION	NUMBER OF POSITIONS/SHIFT					RELIEF FACTORS			
	FIRST	SECOND	THIRD	TOTAL	RDO	VAC	HOL	SLV	
<b>I. Reclassify Correctional Officer Positions to Civilian Positions</b>									
Visiting Officer (Front Entrance)	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Property Officer (Property Room)	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Control/Data Input Officer	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Reclassifications	0	(3)	0	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
<b>II. Add Posts</b>									
Lieutenant	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
- Watch Commander	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Subtotal: Lieutenant Additions	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sergeant	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
- Housing	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Subtotal: Sergeant Additions	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Correctional Officer	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
- Sycamore Hall	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
- Cypress Hall	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
- Palm Hall	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
- Search and Escort	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
- Receiving & Release	0	2	0	2	0	2	2	2	2
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Additions	2	6	2	10	8	10	10	10	10
<b>III. Add Relief</b>									
Correctional Officer					0	0	2	0	0
- Receiving and Release					1	0	1	0	0
- Administrative Segregation									
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Relief Added					1	0	3	0	0
<b>IV. Total All Recommendations</b>									
Lieutenant				1.63					
- Add Watch Commander Post				1.63					
Subtotal: Lieutenant				1.63					
Sergeant				1.63					
- Add Housing Post				1.63					
Subtotal: Sergeant				1.63					
Correctional Officer				(4.89)					
- Reclassify to Civilian				15.37					
- Add Relief				-.63					
Subtotal: Correctional Officers				11.11					
Civilian Classifications				4.89					
- Reclassify from Correctional Officer				4.89					
Subtotal: Civilian Classification				4.89					
TOTAL NET POSITION CHANGE				19.26					

## D. CIM-EAST

### 1. CURRENT SECURITY STAFFING

Our assessment is that CIM-East is staffed appropriately with only minor exceptions. As indicated in the discussion of staffing for Folsom and CIM-RCC, we based our analysis on the following factors:

- Whether the post was necessary for reasons of workload, surveillance, employee safety or other security purposes
- Whether the post required a correctional officer position versus a civilian position
- Whether each relief factor was necessary for the post.

### 2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS

The discussion that follows identifies areas of activities where we think changes in staffing are appropriate. Where posts are not discussed, we agree with the current staffing levels and relief factors.

#### a. Elimination of Certain Posts

There are several posts that we believe are not warranted on a full-time basis.

##### (1) Sergeants

The current Receiving and Release (R&R) sergeant supervises two officers and some inmate workers. The Visiting sergeant supervises about three officers. We believe these two supervising functions can be combined, especially if full relief is provided for the remaining position (as recommended later).

The requirement for a Culinary sergeant is questionable. This position supervises only four officers, two in the East Dining Hall and two in the West Dining Hall. We recommend that this position be eliminated and that Culinary supervision be assigned to Housing sergeants.

The Culinary sergeant has full relief; all relief except RDO is provided for the R&R and Visiting sergeants. The net reduction resulting from the above recommendations is 2.8 sergeant positions.

(2) Correctional Officers

When considering the number of positions and the scheduling of correctional officers for Search and Escort (S&E) and yard assignments, the functions appear overstaffed on the 3rd shift. This is a period when all work crews are finished, and there is virtually no yard activity after dinner and the count immediately following at 1800 hours.

Currently on the 3rd watch, the following S&E and yard assignments are in effect:

- Yard                                    One officer
- Yard Patrol                            Three officers
- Search & Escort                    Three officers.

It is our opinion that at least two of these seven positions could be eliminated without affecting institution security.

This recommendation will result in a reduction of 3.26 officer positions, as full relief is included.



b. Additional Post

Currently there is one Housing sergeant on the 1st and 3rd watches, and two on the 2nd shift. Although the requirement is somewhat marginal, we recommend that the Culinary sergeant position eliminated previously be converted to a second Housing sergeant on the 3rd watch.

In our discussion of the Culinary sergeant recommendation, we suggested that the Culinary responsibility be assigned to Housing sergeants. This should create no particular problem on the 2nd shift which already has two sergeants. However, it may prove burdensome to the single 3rd shift sergeant.

Another factor we considered was the degree of activity on the 3rd shift. Although the yard activity decreases at this time, a congested level of housing activity increases substantially. All inmates are inside for the count, feeding, showers, and general dayroom activity. Increased supervision during this period is desirable.

The recommended position will be required seven days a week, including all relief factors. It will result in the addition of 1.63 sergeant positions.

c. Additional Relief for Certain Posts

A review of the post assignment schedule for CIM-East indicates that some relief factors have been eliminated for the reasons discussed previously for CIM-RCC. We think that the following relief factors are legitimate for the listed positions, and we recommend that they be added:

(1) Sergeant (either Visiting or R&R, whichever remains)

Add RDO relief for one sergeant, which results in the addition of .46 sergeants.

(2) Correctional Officer

Add RDO and holiday relief for one officer in the Receiving and Release activity. R&R activity occurs seven days a week, but at a reduced rate on weekends and on the 1st and 3rd shifts. The R&R post is provided RDO relief on the 1st and 3rd shifts, but not on the 2nd shift.

This recommendation will result in the addition of .52 officer positions.

d. Summary of Staffing Analysis

Recommendation EAST No. 1: Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full time authorized security staffing for the CIM-East posts we reviewed should consist of about 181.8 positions (including sick leave relief), as follows:

<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Current</u>
1.00	Correctional Administrator	1.00
1.00	Captain	1.00
3.25	Lieutenant	3.25
19.55	Sergeant	20.26
<u>157.02</u>	Correctional Officer	<u>159.76</u>
<u>181.82</u>	TOTAL POSITIONS	<u>185.27</u>

The sick leave relief positions included in the above totals are shown below:

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Current</u>
Lieutenant	.09	.09
Sergeant	.54	.58
Correctional Officer	4.33	4.42

Exhibit V-4, following this page, summarizes the recommended incremental changes resulting from our staffing analysis. The estimated annual cost impact of these recommendations is presented below:

Sergeant Changes	(\$ 30,214)
Correctional Officer Changes	( <u>104,253</u> )
Total All Recommendations	( <u>\$134,467</u> )

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN STAFFING--  
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR MEN - EAST

POST/POSITION	NUMBER OF POSITIONS/SHIFT						RELIEF FACTORS			
	FIRST	SECOND	THIRD	TOTAL	RDO	VAC	HOL	SLV		
<b>I. Eliminate Posts</b>										
Sergeant										
- Visiting or Receiving & Release	0	(1)	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
- Culinary	0	(1)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Subtotal: Sergeant Reductions	0	(2)	0	(2)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
<b>Correctional Officer</b>										
- Yard Patrol/Search & Escort	0	0	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Reductions	0	0	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
<b>II. Add Posts</b>										
Sergeant										
- Housing	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Subtotal: Sergeant Addition	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<b>III. Add Relief</b>										
Sergeant										
- Visiting or Receiving & Release					1	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal: Sergeant Relief Added					1	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Correctional Officer</b>										
- Receiving and Release					1	0	1	0	1	0
Subtotal: Correctional Officer Relief Added					1	0	1	0	1	0
<b>IV. Total All Recommendations</b>										
Sergeant										
- Eliminate Posts				(2.80)						
- Add Housing Post				1.63						
- Add Relief				.46						
Subtotal: Sergeant				(.71)						
<b>Correctional Officer</b>										
- Eliminate Yard Posts				(3.26)						
- Add Relief				.52						
Subtotal: Correctional Officer				(2.74)						
<b>TOTAL NET POSITION CHANGE</b>										
				(3.45)						

## VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY MEASURES

This section presents recommendations for improvements in security measures at Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East. In addition, the section includes several general recommendations affecting these and probably other institutions that are directed to the Department of Corrections.

Within each subsection, recommendations are grouped into logically related functions or areas of the institution. At the end of the section, all recommendations are summarized in priority order. Also, recommendations are coded and numbered to identify which institution they refer to, or if they refer to the Department generally. The codes are:

- CDC No. \_\_: General recommendations directed to the California Department of Corrections and/or all three of the institutions we studied
- FSP No. \_\_: Folsom State Prison recommendations
- RCC No. \_\_: CIM-Reception Center Central recommendations
- East No. \_\_: CIM-East recommendations.

### A. METHODOLOGY

Our approach to analyzing current security measures and effectiveness involved various steps and information sources, as outlined below:

- Review of correctional standards and literature, departmental policies, and institutional orders
- Analysis of security incidents (Section III of this report)
- On-site observations of practices, equipment, and facilities

- Numerous interviews with prison staff at all levels
- Audit and evaluation of security measures. Results related solely to current procedures are reported in Section IV of this report. Findings which indicated a need for changes in equipment, facilities, or staffing are reported in Sections V and VI
- Identification of specific security weaknesses and evaluation of alternatives for improvement, where it was practical to consider more than one alternative
- Selection of preliminary recommendations, which were reviewed generally with representatives of the Auditor General, CDC, and prison management before they were prepared in final form for this report.

The evaluation of alternatives for improvement, and the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of our recommendations, relied primarily upon judgmental factors. Objective cost/benefit quantification and identification of direct cause and effect relationships for a specific prison security measure are difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. Certainly some measures have obvious benefits (e.g., if no fence is provided, inmates can walk away at will). However, few measures can be isolated in terms of identifying a definite effect, and even fewer can be quantified in terms of the effect (or benefit). For example, at Folsom we are recommending additional staffing and capital costs associated with re-routing of inmate movement. Our judgment is that these costs are warranted to improve a significant security-related problem. However, it is virtually impossible to quantify the potential benefits of these investments in terms of fewer stabbings or drug problems.

Another issue concerning our recommendations is that cost estimates are not available in all instances. Our original proposal to perform this study included an architect to estimate the costs of facility modifications. This position was deleted as part of the reduction in project scope. Consequently,

capital costs included herein should be considered as rough order-of-magnitude estimates. In some instances we were unable to provide even this level of estimating.

With these comments in mind, we provide our security findings and recommendations in the remainder of this section.

## B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have several overall findings and recommendations that are worthy of discussion. These comments relate generally to Department-wide issues and/or all three of the institutions we studied.

### 1. ENFORCEMENT OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

First, we believe the departmental and institutional security policies and procedures we reviewed are basically sound. There are very few instances where we suggest changes in these written orders. The problem we observed, however, is that the policies and procedures are not being followed on a consistent basis. Also, the larger and more complex the facility, such as Folsom, the more prevalent the problem. To some extent this issue may be related to a need for more or better training of officers, supervisors, and middle management, particularly when temporary correctional officers (Permanent Intermittent Employees, or PIEs) are used to staff positions that are vacant. More appropriately, however, we believe that weaknesses in policy/procedure compliance are related to one or more of the following factors:

- Lack of consistent enforcement by supervisory and management personnel, despite reasonable supervisory-to-officer staffing ratios in most areas. Procedural enforcement is particularly important for search activities, especially cell searches
- At Folsom, a large, rambling facility, a need for more management inspection of operations. During the 30 to 40 person-days we spent at this facility, no one above the rank of lieutenant was observed in any of the housing units or other major inmate areas. We assume this need will be addressed by the addition of program administrators if the unit management concept is installed at Folsom in July 1986.



- Severe overcrowding in some areas (e.g., Receiving and Release at CIM-RCC), or other additional workload (e.g., the Touissant Injunction), which consume available officer time and often results in procedural shortcuts or omissions.

Basically, we give relatively equal weight to the lack of enforcement and overcrowding as causes of the problem.

Recommendation CDC No. 1: Management and supervisory personnel should increase efforts to enforce departmental and institutional security policies and procedures.

The first key point of policy enforcement is the sergeant. However, if sergeants are not performing satisfactorily in this regard, it is management's responsibility to correct the problem through effective direction, inspection, training, or whatever other remedy is deemed appropriate.

We recognize that much of the correctional officer's job can be tedious and boring (e.g., cell searches and inmate searches). However, it is also true that major prison problems often occur because sound, written security procedures were not followed.

There is no direct cost impact related to this recommendation.

## 2. USE OF FORCE

Our team members spent a total of about 75 person-days on-site at the institutions we studied. Most of this time was on the 2nd shift (days); relatively little time was spent on the 1st (morning) and 3rd (evening) shifts. During our on-site time we found no evidence of excessive force used on inmates by CDC personnel, nor did we observe or hear abrasive conduct or language directed toward inmates.

### 3. FACILITY-RELATED SECURITY ISSUES

Our review of operations and plans indicated that institutional managers may have more success obtaining additional staffing than capital funds for facility modifications and security equipment. In all three institutions, we identified facility-related constraints to effective security. In fact, most of our institution-specific recommendations deal with facility design changes and maintenance needs (e.g., locking mechanisms). Many of these capital (as well as operational) recommendations were derived from institutional personnel at all levels. In a number of these instances, the recommendations had been made in years past but were not approved by prison or departmental management.

Our concern is that sufficient state-level priority may not be placed on the long-term maintenance and renovation needs of the current prisons. We realize that the Department's overriding major concern is the construction of new facilities to relieve the pressure on current prisons. We agree completely with this top priority. At the same time, security problems related to the design of, and wear on current prisons are becoming evident in the three institutions we studied. If these prisons are representative of the other CDC institutions, particularly Level III and IV prisons, then the state has a growing problem that should be addressed.

Within the scope of this study, we have no specific recommendations to offer. We emphasize, however, that the facility modifications recommended subsequently for the three institutions are considered minimum requirements. Were we to make a detailed architectural and operational analysis of design alternatives--suitable for long-range planning--our suggestions surely would have been more extensive (and costly).

#### 4. SECURITY EQUIPMENT

In general, we found that some basic items of security equipment are not provided by the Department. Examples are provided below.

- Tower and Gunwalk Megaphones

We found towers at all three institutions that did not have operating megaphones for use in calling inmates or others, inside and outside the perimeter. Many gunwalk officers also do not have this capability.

- Search Equipment

None of the institutions provide search kits or small flashlights for searching cells and other areas. To the extent that such equipment is available, it is usually purchased by the officers. Large housing units, such as those at Folsom, should have several search kits secured at the guard station; one kit of this type should suffice for smaller housing units. The kits should contain a variety of probes for searching containers, cracks in walks, etc., plus dental-type mirrors, disposable gloves, evidence containers, and similar materials. All officers assigned to inmate areas should be provided with the small flashlights.

- Portable Metal Detectors

There are many areas of the three institutions where additional hand-held metal detectors would be very useful in searching inmates. Clothed body (pat down) searches are relatively ineffective in a prison environment. Walk-through metal detectors are effective but (1) they are not as selectively sensitive as portable devices, and (2) they can be used in only one location.

- Safety Vests

The current labor agreement with the California Correctional Peace Officers' Association requires the Department to provide protective vests in FY 1985/86. Nearly \$1.3 million is set aside by this agreement for

initial procurement. The problem, however, is that the Department has not been able to identify a vest that will stop a sharp object (such as an ice pick), although there are many vests that will stop small caliber bullets. Also, the weight (6 to 7 pounds) of existing vests is viewed as a limiting factor.

We can offer no guidance on this issue. We are aware that some of the officers we spoke to are concerned about the lack of vests. They do not seem to know about the design problems being experienced, and some communication to all personnel may assist in reassuring them that the subject is not being neglected. Lack of safety vests can be an emotional issue to some personnel, while others are not particularly concerned. This is why we suggest that wearing of the vests be optional, once they are provided.

- Fluoroscopes

There are a few areas where fluoroscopes would be helpful in screening packages. Examples at Folsom include the north and west gates. At CIM-RCC, a fluoroscope would be helpful at the loading dock.

- Personal Duress Alarms

At CIM-RCC and CIM-East, officers are equipped with a portable duress alarm that is reasonably effective, although it has limitations. There is no such system in place at Folsom and the Department is opposed to implementing the CIM system because it does not use current technology. There is even some question as to how effective it would be within the granite and concrete walled housing units at Folsom.

We are aware of private sector research being conducted on this problem and there are predictions that substantially improved equipment will be available commercially in the near future. When this occurs, there is a major need for purchasing officer duress alarms for Folsom, and updating the equipment at the two CIM institutions.

Other types of security equipment we reviewed seemed adequate. Sufficient restraints are available and firearms are adequate. Each gun post officer is equipped with a M-14 rifle and a .38 caliber revolver. In some instances, the post also has a shotgun available. An ample supply of chemical agents also was available in each institution.

Recommendation CDC No. 2: Acquire additional security equipment for Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East, as follows:

- Tower and gunwalk megaphones
- Search kits
- Small search flashlights
- Portable metal detectors
- Fluoroscopes
- Protective vests (when effective vests are available)
- Personal duress alarms (when effective equipment is available).

We did not complete a detailed inventory of how many items are needed, by type, at the three institutions. Excluding the vests (already budgeted) and the personal alarm (costs cannot be determined), we estimate that the first year cost of this recommendation is less than \$45,000. This is based on the following estimates:

- 50 megaphones @ \$50 each
- 70 search kits @ \$50 each
- 700 flashlights @ \$7 each
- 50 portable metal detectors @ \$500 each
- 3 fluoroscopes @ \$2,000 each.

5. AUTOMATION NEEDS

Common to Folsom State Prison, CIM-Reception Center Central, and CIM-East are problems of effective recordkeeping. Nearly all records are prepared and maintained manually. There are also many areas of duplicate manual records that must be reconciled periodically. For example, at Folsom three separate inmate housing files are maintained. The files are intended to identify which cell is assigned to which inmate. Approximately two

full-time positions are, in some way, maintaining and reconciling these files. Records often do not match, requiring more work and verification. This is but one example of the very labor intensive, inefficient manner in which the prisons maintain data. Other examples include personnel assignment, incident data, disciplinary records and inmate work assignments.

Recommendation CDC No. 3: Design and implement an automated prison management information system

We understand that the Department is currently developing some modules of a generic prison management information system, but has experienced delays in implementing the software at the prison sites. It is clear, therefore, that the Department recognizes the need for this system. We support the efforts of the Department and recommend that this project continue to receive reasonably high priority. The difficulty of obtaining accurate and timely information in the prisons has led to inefficient allocation of resources and, in turn, less security than would otherwise be possible with the number of correctional officers available.

It is difficult to estimate costs for this recommendation because the Department's planned modules do not cover all prison functions, nor did our study. What is needed is a system design that effectively integrates various data sources within a prison, and provides an efficient means of processing and analyzing the data. Assuming some portions of the recommended system are budgeted and under development now, we generally estimate that additional costs would be in the range of \$250,000 to \$500,000, over a two-year period. Our first-year cost estimate, therefore, is \$250,000.

## 6. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY INCIDENTS

When serious rule violations are committed by inmates--including criminal offenses--investigative reports are written and reviewed, disciplinary and/or prosecution action is taken, and very summarized statistical data are reported to CDC Headquarters. We found no evidence of systematic, detailed analysis of security incidents in this process. Only generalized information is available systemwide. No one records or analyzes information such as:

- Specific location, day, and time of the incident
- Potential source of the contraband (or several possibilities, particularly when weapons are involved)
- Race, age, sentence offense, term, gang affiliation, and similar characteristics of suspects and, where appropriate, victims
- Potential reasons why the incident occurred (for violence-related offenses), and whether it might have been prevented by changes to procedures, staffing, equipment, or other factors.

We provide below several reasons why the above types of analysis are needed on a detailed level at the institutions, and on a more detailed level at Headquarters than is now possible.

- At Folsom, the locations where most stabbings occur were defined differently depending on who we talked to and, perhaps, where the most recent stabbing occurred. For example, we were told by supervisors or managers that many stabbings occur in the "weight pile" (near the Main Yard) and few occur at SHU II. Our analysis of Folsom stabbings disclosed the opposite results.
- No one could explain why a disproportionate number of Folsom stabbings occur on Mondays; perhaps it is not explainable. At a minimum, however, this finding would indicate the need for special analysis.

- Two recent deaths at Folsom involved inmates who were due for release within a day or so. For whatever reason, others did not want them to leave the prison alive. Whether this is a frequent occurrence, we do not know. Findings of this type, however, should cause a re-evaluation of CDC policy. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to initiate unannounced, randomly scheduled movement of prisoners due to be released soon from the maximum security institutions.

Recommendation CDC No. 4: Institute detailed, systematic analysis of serious incidents.

Our recommendation envisions nothing more than fundamental crime analysis that has been practiced for years by law enforcement agencies. Programs of this type can be developed for use on a microcomputer at the institutions. Code sheets can be provided to Headquarters for analysis of data on a statewide basis.

The only significant additional costs associated with this recommendation may be the purchase of two microcomputers, one for Folsom and one for CIM. CDC personnel should be able to develop the software and existing personnel should be sufficient to code forms and perform analysis tasks. Added costs, therefore, are estimated at about \$15,000.

#### 7. INMATE DISCIPLINE

Inmates who commit serious rule violations may forfeit up to 180 days of time that had previously been credited toward their sentence, e.g., time earned for working or remaining free of disciplinary action. Title 15 of the California Administrative Code requires that forfeited credits be "restored liberally" to encourage subsequent good behavior and participation. Exceptions are made only for an offense in which a victim died or was disabled permanently. Accordingly, the practice is to restore the 180 days of credit lost for stabbings and other serious



offenses, usually within a year or so after the offense. We were told that this practice is common knowledge among the inmate population.

Recommendation CDC No. 5: Seek changes to Title 15 that prohibit return of sentence credits forfeited for selected serious violations.

The current practice lacks fairness and provides no deterrent to violent actions. To illustrate, one inmate with a ten-year sentence may serve his time without committing a serious incident. Another inmate with the same sentence length may be involved in one or several stabbings. Yet, the second inmate can be released at about the same time as the first through restoration of forfeited credits.

We understand that the CDC is reviewing this aspect of Title 15 and may recommend changes to the Legislature. We suggest that CDC's review might be broadened to evaluate the reasonableness of all penalties prescribed in Title 15 (e.g., maximum denial of 30 days good behavior credit for possession of a weapon or attempted escape). Some increases in penalties may be warranted under today's conditions, particularly in the four CDC Level IV institutions.

#### 8. SEGREGATION OF KEY MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES

Although it is difficult to quantify without extensive, confidential inmate interviews, prison gang and inmate peer pressure are said to be major causes of prison violence today. This theme is supported in correctional literature and by the prison staff we talked to. Additionally, there will always be some inmates who are particularly violent, regardless of gang influences.

Recommendation CDC No. 6: Consider establishing a special maximum security prison for the most troublesome inmates.

Traditionally, CDC has housed a mix of inmates in its Level IV institutions, i.e., the most troublesome are not all located at one prison. What we are suggesting is a more detailed evaluation of establishing one of the new prisons (or a separate unit of a prison) as the facility for key gang leaders and particularly violent prisoners. The primary objective is to isolate as much as possible the influence that gang leaders have on other inmates. Even though gang leaders are placed in segregated security housing, they still manage to coerce mainline (general housing) inmates to commit serious offenses.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons has established full lockdown, maximum security prisons to completely isolate gang leaders and other problem inmates from the general population. This approach may be useful for CDC.

No additional costs are associated with this recommendation. Staffing may be more intensive at the centralized prison for problem inmates, but it should be offset by less staffing intensity at the institutions they were removed from.

#### 9. SIDE BATON TRAINING

Currently, all officers receive training with the short baton. Training for, and carrying of the longer side baton is optional. It is generally accepted that the side baton is much more effective in warding off or fighting assaultive inmates. We suggest that at least the officers assigned to Level III and IV institutions receive side baton training as a precautionary measure.

Recommendation CDC No. 7: Provide side baton training to all officers.

There are probably additional in-service training costs related to this recommendation but we are unable to estimate the

amount because of the varying implementation possibilities. For example, implementation costs will vary considerably depending upon the following factors:

- The number of officers who have not received this training, and whether all officers or just those in Level III and IV institutions are trained
- The extent to which overtime has to be used for all of the training time or just some of it
- The extent to which regularly budgeted in-service training overtime can be used for this purpose (i.e., postpone or supplant other training not considered of equal or higher priority).

#### 10. USE OF CIVILIAN (NON-PEACE OFFICER) CLASSIFICATIONS

During our review of current staffing, we found that posts internal to the prison's operations usually are performed by peace officer personnel except:

- When the functions are purely clerical or administrative (e.g., typists, business management, purchasing, etc.)
- When the functions require specialized professional or trades training (e.g., medical technicians, plumbers, etc.).

Generally, we found a reluctance in the past to consider the use of non-peace officer employees for other jobs that do not involve significant guarding and inmate control activities. Examples include:

- Personnel administration
- Inmate property movement (after the property is searched by an officer)
- Control room assistance to other peace officer positions

- Gate control, where it is not the primary perimeter control point and where no inmate search activities are concerned
- Positions that serve as assistants to high ranking management personnel
- Mail room support to correctional officers.

In our opinion, there are several reasons why the current practice has evolved. These reasons, which were identified primarily through discussions with CDC and prison officials, are summarized below together with our assessment of their validity.

- a. There is a general belief that if a position performs any custodial function, even if it is proportionally a small part of the job, then that position needs to be staffed by a correctional officer, sergeant, or lieutenant. Our view is that the controlling factor ought to be the specific duties and responsibilities for which correctional officer training and experience are important. At a minimum, these would include direct control of inmates, inmate and facility searching, investigative and disciplinary activities, and any post assigned the use of firearms, chemical agents, etc.
- b. We were told that certain positions (e.g., control room assistance or personnel administration) need peace officer staffing in order to deal effectively with other peace officers. In our opinion, this is not a valid justification although we recognize that some correctional officers will resist acting upon the instructions of anyone other than another officer or supervisor. Essentially, we believe this concern is manageable through effective supervision.
- c. There is some concern that if a specific job is reclassified to a civilian position in one institution, the state's control agencies will require the Department to reclassify similar jobs in all other institutions. We do not know if this is a valid concern or not. Certainly we would expect control agencies to look closely at the reasons why similar positions in other institutions could not be reclassified. However, controlling factors should be (1) the specific duties assigned to each position, and (2) the institutional environment in which the functions are performed (i.e., within the secure perimeter of a Level IV prison versus a Level II facility).

- d. It is not always clear that the alternative civilian personnel classifications available within the State's civil service system provide a proper match to the varying duties and responsibilities of the positions we have cited and others. Prison managers have concerns that inappropriate classifications may be force fit to the job, rather than the job being matched logically with an existing classification. Again, we do not know how valid this concern is because our study did not encompass an evaluation of all existing civilian classifications in state service. However, the unusual characteristics of prison work would tend to support this concern.
  
- e. There is a desire of management to maximize flexibility in personnel assignments. In other words, a correctional officer can often perform all functions that a civilian employee might be assigned, but the reverse is not true. In emergency situations, therefore, the ability to pull peace officers away from non-critical jobs adds to an institution's ability to respond. In a few instances (e.g., control room assistance), these jobs also provide a place to assign injured officers who are on light duty status, rather than have them remain at home.

The above management concern is essentially valid in our estimation. It should be addressed, however, in accordance with the needs of specific institutions. To explain, institutions with large staffs have less need for full flexibility than those with a small complement of personnel. Also, institutional experience in terms of the average number of light duty personnel should be the controlling factor in reserving peace officer posts for this purpose.

Recommendation CDC No. 8: The Department of Corrections should thoroughly evaluate the potential use of more civilian (non-peace officer) classifications to perform quasi custodial functions that do not require full correctional officer training and capabilities.

The point of this recommendation and the preceding discussion is that there appears to be a reasonably significant potential for increasing the use of civilian classifications to support CDC operations. We have made a few reclassification recommendations of this type in this report (Section V) but have deferred on others because of the concerns described previously.

Instead, what is needed is a thorough statewide review of CDC positions to determine at least the following:

- Which posts are supportive and not directly and substantially concerned with custodial functions? How critical to institutional security are these posts?
- For posts with minor custodial duties, is it practical to reassign those duties to other posts that clearly require peace officer status?
- Is there an appropriate civilian state personnel classification that can be used in lieu of a correctional officer, sergeant, etc.? If not, what are the knowledge, skill, and ability requirements that a civilian employee would require.
- What is the institutional experience regarding average numbers of correctional officers on light duty?
- What are the costs and benefits of reclassification to civilian status, including cost avoidance for the future major increases in staffing that must occur as new facilities come on line? Costs should include indirect expenditures related to training and disability retirements of peace officer personnel.

In support of the recommendation, we offer the following additional comments.

- During the past ten years or more, local law enforcement agencies have substantially "civilianized" many jobs that historically had been performed only by peace officers. This has been done to minimize costs without undue adverse effects on service levels. Functions involved include jail support activities (including control of security gates), criminal investigation support, evidence/property control, etc. Certainly a Level IV CDC prison is a different environment than, for example, most county jail facilities. However, there are similarities between county jails and other CDC institutions that point to the need for a thorough examination of civilian position alternatives.
- The growth in civilian positions in local police and sheriff's departments often has been accomplished by creating special para-professional "assistant" classification (e.g., police service assistant). Employees in these classifications are assigned to a variety of supportive functions after brief training periods. Also, incumbents may use the position as a stepping stone to the peace officer classification. This approach may be warranted within CDC.

- Current CDC practices include some fundamental inconsistencies regarding the use of civilian classifications. For example, civilians supervise inmates and search them as they leave certain work areas where weapons materials abound (prison industries and vocational education shops). The latter practice does not seem to be related to a lack of correctional officer staff to perform the function. Also, some civilian personnel work inside the highest security housing units, coming into frequent and direct contact with inmates (medical technicians, plumbers, etc.). On the other hand, there was concern expressed about the feasibility of using civilian classifications to perform duties of the type we described previously in this subsection.
- We understand that there are over 7,000 peace officer positions assigned to CDC institutions, with major increases expected in the next five years. If over this period just 500 positions could be reclassified, and if a net cost reduction could be achieved of \$500 per month, per position, the resulting annual savings would be \$3 million. The 500 positions undoubtedly would amount to much less than 5 percent of the total peace officer positions.

Overall, we believe there is reasonably significant potential for CDC to realize large annual savings without adversely affecting the security of its institutions. However, we offer no specific estimate of the savings in this report.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED  
TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON

This subsection discusses findings and recommendations specific to security measures at Folsom. The information is organized under the following headings:

- Overall Inmate Movement and Segregation
- Search Measures
- Surveillance Measures
- Safety and Preventive Measures
- Security Housing Units
- Vocational Education Area
- Tool Control
- Key Control
- Other Comments.

1. OVERALL INMATE MOVEMENT AND SEGREGATION

The current methods and routes used to move inmates from one part of the prison to another hinders effective contraband control and inmate segregation. Examples of required inmate movements we are concerned about include the following:

- Movement of general population inmates to and from Vocational, Industries, Yard, and Dining areas
- Extensive escorting of SHU inmates to and from the Hospital, Dental, Visiting, and Counseling facilities.

Currently, movement of general population inmates from one area to another requires that they pass through one or more housing units or other activity areas which they would not otherwise be allowed in. For example, inmates living in Housing



Unit #3 who are going to Vocational Education assignments must travel through Housing Unit #2, Dining Room #2, Housing Unit #5, and the Main Yard. Following this route, the inmates could pass through areas where over 1,000 other inmates work or live. Routing of inmates between many other points poses similar problems.


As for SHU inmates, they must be escorted along the same routes. According to prison policy, each SHU inmate, when escorted outside the SHU (e.g., Visiting, Hospital, Dental, etc.), must be accompanied by two officers. Moreover, as the inmate passes through an area, all other inmates must clear a path for the escort regardless of the activity. This necessary security practice has a disruptive effect on activities throughout the prison. It also is a significant consumer of staffing resources and may be an image-enhancer for the inmates being escorted (i.e., they may gain prestige among general population inmates).

To address security needs related to contraband control, effective inmate segregation, and better utilization of security staffing, we have developed two significant recommendations for facility modifications, the first of which is described below.

Recommendation FSP No. 2: Modify Folsom facilities to improve inmate movement and segregation, and to establish housing unit integrity.

Exhibit VI-1, on the next two pages, presents diagrams of recommended modifications to the current prison movement routes that was prepared by our subcontractor, MW Consulting Engineers. The diagram displays a new movement path from the Main Yard to the Hospital corridors. Inmates proceeding


# Recommended Inmate Movement Route



AREA AT YARD END OF NEW  
MOVEMENT CORRIDOR  
NOT TO SCALE

PROJECT FOLSOM PRISON FOLSOM, CALIFORNIA	DRAWING SKETCH 'A'
	DATE 2-3-86
MW CONSULTING ENGINEERS SPOKANE, WASH.	CHECKED RHW

# Recommended Inmate Movement Route



AREA AT HOSPITAL END OF NEW MOVEMENT CORRIDOR  
NOT TO SCALE



PROJECT FOLSOM PRISON FOLSOM, CALIFORNIA	DRAWING SKETCH 'B'
	DATE 2-3-86
MW CONSULTING ENGINEERS SPOKANE, WASH.	CHECKED RHW

past this point to Prison Industries would go under the Building #3 Rotunda (through an existing vehicle sallyport) and move north along the east wall of Building #3 (within a fenced corridor to be constructed). Details and alternatives concerning the suggested re-routing are provided in the following paragraphs.

Shortly after entering the proposed corridor from the Main Yard, there is an existing unused door that, if opened, would provide entry to Dining Room #2 near the serving lines. The fence and gate inside this door divides the Dining Room corridor from the rest of the dining area. This fencing should be modified so that the door from the new path would allow entry to the corridor and not the Dining Room.

Under this design, the above door to the outside might serve as the only way to enter or exit Housing Units #2 and #5. The #5 count gate could be closed (with provision for emergency exits) and the east end of Housing Unit #2 could be fenced in front of the Hospital). This would allow only one path into and out of both housing units. The ability to monitor who is in these units would be enhanced substantially with only one exit/entry point near the guard station. The #5 count gate office could be moved to the new Main Yard exit/entry post, thus not requiring additional staff at this location. The officer's duties at this new location would be the same.

An alternative is to maintain the #5 count gate and have it provide the only entry/exit point for inmates living in Building #5 (except for the current mealtime routing into Dining Room #2). This alternative eliminates traffic in the Dining Room corridor, but would require another post for the new Main Yard gate leading to the new inmate corridor.

The corridor in front of the Hospital could be designed similar to Exhibit VI-1, page 2. Inmates entering this corridor from the outside path must be enroute to one of five places: Visiting, Administration Building conference room, Hospital, Dental, or Housing Unit #3. The new design provides a direct path to each of these areas. In addition, an inmate holding cage is still provided in the area. The existing officer post at the Hospital door should be sufficient to monitor movement through this area.

Movement of general population inmates from either of the three housing units to Prison Industries would require inmate routing under the Building #3 Rotunda (through an existing unused vehicle sallyport), then north along the east outside wall of Building #3 and up the stairs currently used. In effect, this path routes inmates around Building #3 instead of through it. Under this arrangement, the Building #3 gun officer will not have to be called to open the door at the north end of the building. Inmates housed in Building #3 would exit and enter the building through the south rotunda door, near the sergeant's desk.

Implementation of this suggestion will require gun coverage of the new corridor along Building #2 (on two shifts) and of the fenced path to Industries along Building #3 (on one shift). The Building #2 requirement could be met by constructing a bridge over the corridor from the gunwalk inside Building #2. Depending on the design, which could include an additional outside gunwalk over the corridor wall, day shift coverage might be provided by the officer currently assigned to Tower #17. This tower covers the SHU I exercise yard. If the new arrangement would permit dual coverage, no additional post would be needed during days.

Gun coverage for the path along Building #3 would require construction of a new gun tower/gunwalk and a new five-day post.

We have gone into some detail concerning this recommendation because we believe it is very important. We stress, however, that the above re-routing is only one of several we considered, and there are certainly more. Our intent is only to demonstrate that at least one alternative is functional, even if it is not perfect.

We believe implementation of the recommended re-routing, or another version that accomplishes the same purpose, will add substantially to contraband control, inmate control, and integrity of the general housing units. It will provide direct routes to and from each housing unit, and improved monitoring of who is in each housing unit.

Capital costs for this recommendation are difficult to estimate because of the potential design variations and uncertainties as to how much of the work can be done by inmate labor. A rough estimate is in the range of \$150,000. We estimate additional staffing of one 16-hour post with full relief, and one 8-hour post with relief only for vacations and sick leave. This total estimate of 4.37 correctional officer positions might be less depending on the feasibility of using the Tower #17 post for some of the requirement.

Recommendation FSP No. 3: Establish SHU visiting and counseling/committee areas in the north half of Dining Room #1.

This recommendation has several objectives:

- Elimination of most of the SHU escorts through the rest of the prison complex
- More effective isolation of SHU inmates from the general population.


Exhibit VI-2 provides an example of how this recommendation might be implemented. The modifications necessary to accomplish this change are outlined below:

- a. Construct a visitor corridor from the road along the east prison wall to Dining Room #1.
- b. Construct a new inmate corridor (fenced) from Building #4 to Dining Room #1.
- c. Construct new SHU visiting and counseling areas in the north end of Dining Room #1.
- d. Construct sallyports for inmate control and searching at both inmate entrances.

Under the preceding approach, counseling and committee hearings for SHU inmates would occur in the modified Dining Room #1, as would non-contact visiting. This plan is not without problems, especially in constructing an appropriate bridge or four-way sallyport where the visitor path would cross the current inmate path to Prison Industries. The overwhelming majority of inmate traffic to and from Industries occurs only twice a day. Perhaps other arrangements could be made for the few inmates who return during the work day.

Prison management also is concerned about the potential future return of Building #1 (SHU II) to general population use. If that ever occurs, Dining Room #1 will be needed for its original purpose. Our concern is that this conversion to general housing may not occur for several years or more. If a definite plan and near-term date are approved for using Building #1 for general housing, then we would withdraw the recommendation. In any event, more detailed architectural analysis is needed before a definitive modification plan can be implemented.

# Recommended Layout for SHU Visiting



NEW SHU VISIT AREA  
NOT TO SCALE



PROJECT FOLSOM PRISON FOLSOM, CALIFORNIA	DRAWING SKETCH 'C'
	DATE 2-3-86
MW CONSULTING ENGINEERS SPOKANE, WASH.	CHECKED RHW



Additionally, prison management is considering the use of Dining Room #1 for general population inmates because it now takes three to four hours to feed all of them in Dining Room #2. If this change is instituted, and if Building #1 continues to be operated as a SHU, then alternatives would be to (1) construct a new, separate SHU visiting and counseling building just north of Building #3, (2) remove a significant number of first tier cells in SHU II (east end) and convert the space to visiting and counseling use, or (3) add to the east end of SHU II for this purpose.

The recommendation as presented is estimated to require about \$200,000 in capital costs. As for staffing, about two to four day shift officers would be needed, depending upon the final configuration. One or two officers would have to operate the sallyports, and one or two to surveil the visiting and counseling areas. Also, there is some increase to the average time spent escorting visitors (i.e., the distance increases and SHU visitors would be escorted apart from other visitors). Despite these requirements, we do not believe that additional officers will be required. Currently, there are about 30 search and escort (S & E) officers assigned to SHU I and II staffing. The equivalent of six or more of these officers is used to escort SHU inmates to visiting and counseling areas. These escorts would no longer be needed.

## 2. SEARCH MEASURES

It is impossible to identify specifically how and when weapons materials, drugs, and other contraband are being obtained by Folsom inmates. From the level of violent and other serious incidents, however, it is apparent that current search practices are not as effective as desired.

Of major concern here are weapons and narcotics/drugs. There is no reason to believe that significant amounts of weapons or weapons materials are being brought into the institution from outside. The problem with weapons is primarily an internal one which we have attempted to address through (1) tightening supply sources, and (2) controlling movement from one area to another. Most drugs, on the other hand, probably are being brought in from the outside. The reference here is to commercially available drugs, processed narcotics, and marijuana. The only internal legitimate source of these substances is the Hospital which has a small supply of commercially available medications. Drug/narcotics-related contraband brought into the facility has to be transported by one or more of the following sources:

- Visitors
- Deliveries of supplies, trash collection, etc.
- Employees
- Minimum security (Camp Represa) inmates.

Although it is conceivable that contraband could be sent through the mail or thrown over the wall/fence, current procedures for mail searches and perimeter control make these alternatives unlikely.

Other findings related to contraband control are as follows:

- Facilities for unclothed body searches at key transition locations do not exist. Officers must rely on the metal detectors and pat searches. This is a particularly significant weakness in the Vocational and Industries areas.
- Pat down searches of inmates are not performed randomly by officers in all locations. The thoroughness of these searches also varies among locations. Even when performed thoroughly, they are not very effective in controlling contraband.

- Cell searches are not truly random. Very little cell search activity is performed when inmates are not at work or recreation. Non-daytime search activity is very limited.
- The level of detail for most of the cell searches falls somewhere between thorough and cursory.
- Officers do not have proper equipment for conducting thorough cell searches.

We believe there is a need for significant improvement in overall search activities within Folsom. Elsewhere in this report we have discussed several issues and recommendations related to this need. These other discussions included:

- A recommendation for more management and supervisory enforcement of policies and procedures
- A recommendation to acquire more portable metal detectors and search kits
- Support for the new Search & Investigation (S & I) team, with urging that the team frequently work special shifts to perform cell searches
- More detailed, systematic analysis of security incidents.

Here we provide a series of additional recommendations intended to improve control over the movement of contraband and, to the extent practicable, make it more difficult for inmates to acquire and possess contraband.

Recommendation FSP No. 4: Construct strip-search and shower facilities at the Lower and Upper Yard gates.

Two Folsom lieutenants directed a review of internal security. One of their recommendations was to install strip/shower facilities at the Lower and Upper Yard gates. We support that recommendation, which would allow inmates who work in these key

areas to be showered and strip-searched at the end of each work day. We believe this would substantially reduce the movement of weapons contraband from Vocational and Industries shops to the housing units. The operation of this facility would be as follows. Upon reaching the yard in the morning and being properly identified, the inmate would go into the strip/shower facility where he would remove all his clothes and place them in a locker. While unclothed, he would then move through an inspection point to another locker room. There he would put on his work clothes and go to work. At the end of the day the inmate would be routed back to this facility where he removes his work clothes, showers and again moves through the unclothed inspection point. The work clothes would remain in a locker. Following the unclothed inspection, the inmate would put on his regular clothes and move up to the Main Yard or his housing unit.

This recommendation would involve converting the Lower Yard maintenance warehouse (next to the count gate) into a strip/shower facility and constructing a new strip/shower building on the Prison Industries patio, next to the Industries Administration Building.

According to prison officials, the estimated cost to implement this recommendation is \$200,000. However, we believe the investment is well worth the expected benefits. Currently, the control over potential movement of weapons materials from these two shop areas is inadequate. The problem may increase if the prison assigns close classification inmates to work in Vocational Education, as currently planned.

Recommendation FSP No. 5: Employ two canine search units.

In our opinion, the internal security problems at Folsom are severe enough to warrant use of dogs trained in drug/narcotics detection. CDC has experience with these dog teams to search visitor vehicles, cells, yards, prison shops, etc. They can also be used to search inmates. Search capabilities extend to marijuana, hashish, cocaine, and heroin. It is claimed that the dog teams at Soledad were the major reason why narcotics-related incidents declined by 25 percent last year.

Two dogs are needed because of the size of Folsom and the fact that the dogs work as a team, i.e., 15 minutes of searching by one dog, then it is relieved by the other dog for 15 minutes.

Trained dogs can be acquired for less than \$5,000 each, which includes training for the handler. Two additional officers would be needed to work with the dogs.

Recommendation FSP No. 6: Institute more random and frequent search activity, and enforce documentation policies.

This recommendation reinforces and supplements our earlier suggestion for more enforcement of existing policies. One of the most effective methods of controlling contraband is the cell search. However, it is relatively ineffective if not performed thoroughly and when inmates least expect it. We were told that a recent surprise evening search of just one tier (30 cells) at Folsom netted six strips of flat metal, plus a variety of other contraband. Much more of this activity is needed.

In addition, cell searches in the general housing units are not documented consistently in accordance with policy. Without such documentation, officers do not know when or how often a cell has been searched.

The random search activity should result in each cell being searched thoroughly at least once a month. We do not

think this goal is being met in general housing units, but we cannot confirm it due to the current lack of documentation.

Recommendation FSP No. 7: Enforce the policy of limiting inmate property to six cubic feet.

Cell searches are unnecessarily difficult to conduct due to excessive inmate property in general population cells. According to CDC policy, inmates are entitled to have six cubic feet of property in their cells. Our observation of the cells in the three general population housing units indicated considerably more property is kept by some inmates. A reduction of inmate property would reduce the time required to search a cell. In addition, surveillance by gun officers would be enhanced as they would have better visibility into the cells.

### 3. SURVEILLANCE MEASURES

This subsection addresses issues related to general surveillance and identification of inmates, and surveillance of the prison grounds.

Recommendation FSP No. 8: On a pilot basis, install remote control CCTV recording units in selected areas.

For both preventive and prosecution/discipline reasons, we believe the above recommendation has merit. About half of the stabbing incidents we reviewed did not result in prosecution. There are many reasons why the District Attorney refuses complaints, including cases where the suspect is serving a life sentence and additional sentencing is meaningless. However, in many cases it is because sufficient evidence is not available to warrant prosecution.

We propose the use of continuous recording tapes that can be retained if a serious incident occurs. The tapes could be

used for disciplinary as well as prosecution purposes. For a full test, several inside and outside areas should be selected.

The estimated cost for a solid state camera, lens, weather-proofing, continuous recorder and various cables is approximately \$7,000 installed. We suggest that a \$50,000 pilot test be authorized.

Recommendation FSP No. 9: Relocate weight pile or remove lavatory roof to improve surveillance.

The weight pile cannot be seen by any ground officers until they walk up to the front gate. Only one tower officer, with a partial view, has surveillance over the weight pile. This area is obstructed because of a cover over the lavatories.

We attempted to identify an alternative location for the weight pile in the Main Yard. However, the only alternative sites we identified were too small, would increase congestion in another area, or would eliminate ground used currently (although infrequently) for other sporting activities. Therefore, at a minimum we recommend that the view of the tower officer be unobstructed by removing the lavatory roof. No additional costs are associated with this recommendation.

Recommendation FSP No. 10: Escort all trucks at all times when they enter the prison.

The addition of at least one and probably two correctional officers is required to implement this recommendation. The intent of this recommendation is to prohibit inmates from getting near vehicles, and to prevent inmate/driver interfaces. All trucks would be escorted to and from their destination, much like visitors are escorted to the visiting rooms.

A number of state and outside vehicles are allowed within the prison walls. Further, deliveries of kitchen supplies and the garbage pick-up requires that some vehicles travel inside the secure inner perimeter. Frequent intrusion of outside vehicles increases the chances of contraband being transported and inmates escaping.

We recognize the need to pick up garbage and deliver supplies to the inner perimeter of the prison but are concerned with the frequency and the proximity of these trucks to hundreds of inmates in the Main Yard. We considered several alternatives for improving the situation, including some type of conveyor belt to move supplies, trash, etc., in and out of this area without using trucks. However, the costs of these alternatives (versus the benefits) appeared prohibitive. On a long-range basis, prison management should analyze this problem in more detail to determine if a more cost-effective approach is viable. In the interim, we address the problem with the above recommendation.

Recommendation FSP No. 11: Remove abandoned structures, equipment and materials

There are several areas where abandoned property lies dormant. For example, the equipment beside the Plumbing Shop in the Lower Yard, the buildings in the sewer treatment area (near Tower #8), and unused materials in Prison Industries. These areas provide opportunities for avoiding tower and ground officer surveillance, and are ideal for hiding contraband. Generally, the grounds of the prison need a good cleaning.

We do not estimate any significant additional costs related to this recommendation.

Recommendation FSP No. 12: Install high pressure sodium lights on hills and slopes, and elsewhere as current lights are replaced.



Hillside areas near certain towers require better night lighting. Night lighting of all outside areas would benefit from sodium-type lights. However, for cost reasons we recommend that current lights be replaced only as they require replacement. The addition of several lights for areas near certain towers are recommended now, at a capital cost of less than \$10,000.

Recommendation FSP No. 13: Establish inmate picture rosters in the general housing units and an ID card rack in the Prison Industries and Culinary areas.

The intent of this recommendation is to provide a quick method for identifying inmates and determining whether they are in the right location. SHU II provides a good example of the type of picture roster board we recommend for the general housing units. The Vocational (Lower Yard) count gate provides a good example of the type of ID card rack we propose for Prison Industries and Culinary.

The only significant cost related to this recommendation is an increase in annual photographic supplies. We do not know what this cost will be but have estimated it as less than \$3,000.

#### 4. SAFETY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Recommendations presented in this subsection deal with matters of employee safety and prevention of security weaknesses, or at least elimination of potential security weaknesses that could develop.

Recommendation FSP No. 14: Relocate Central Control to a location outside the secure inner perimeter.

The location and security of Central Control (the Custody Division communications center) are poor. Currently, this vital communications center is located near the Main Yard. Potential better locations for Central Control might be the Administration Building or the old Officer and Guard Building. The new center should be locked securely and access should be limited.

We cannot estimate the capital costs necessary to implement this recommendation, primarily because such costs will depend upon the new location selected.

Recommendation FSP No. 15: Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Housing Units #2 and #3.

Currently, the upper tiers of Housing Units #2 and #3 pose safety risks because they only have waist-high railings. Officers or inmates can easily be pushed over the railings, resulting in severe injuries. As a precaution, we recommend that safety bars be installed on all upper tiers in these buildings.

We were unable to obtain a cost estimate for this recommendation, which we believe can be implemented with inmate labor. Our rough guess is that materials costs would be in the range of \$25,000. CDC has installed these railings in other institutions and can obtain more accurate cost estimates from these sources.

Recommendation FSP No. 16: Relocate all counselors to the housing units.

In an effort to reduce inmate traffic to the counseling areas, we recommend that all counselors be relocated to the housing units. This recommendation complements Folsom's plans to adopt the unit management operating concept.

To implement this recommendation, counseling offices must be constructed in each housing unit. We understand the space constraints but have been assured by prison officials that the

offices can be included. Based on the number of counselors (approximately 24) and their varying shifts, we estimate that three to four offices would be required for each of four housing units. The other housing unit (SHU I) is much smaller and already has some office space used for this purpose. Overall, the recommendation probably can be implemented for under \$50,000, especially if substantial inmate labor is used.

Recommendation FSP No. 17: Decentralize the storage of tasers so they are more immediately accessible when needed.

Tasers are electrical stunning weapons used only to control violent inmates, either through actual operation or as a deterrent when they are displayed. However, the accessibility of these units limits their value. Currently, tasers are stored in one of two locations--the Armory and Central Control. Officers seldom request a taser because it takes up to fifteen minutes to get the lieutenant's approval to use it and have it delivered. By that time, the problem usually has ended or has escalated significantly.

In view of the high number of assaultive incidents at Folsom, we recommend that tasers be stored securely in various locations, such as housing units, Vocational, and Industries. In some of these areas, they can be stored in nearby towers.

We also suggest that authority for approval to use tasers be lowered to the sergeant level, with a written report required any time a taser is deployed (whether or not it is used).

No additional costs are associated with this recommendation.

Recommendation FSP No. 18: Use lockable garbage dumpsters.

The small garbage barrels currently used and stored in the Main Yard should be emptied into a large, lockable dumpster.

The locked dumpster will hinder inmates from transferring contraband via the trash barrels.

Ideally, the trash should be compacted before it leaves the Main Yard. However, this would require the purchase of a new, expensive garbage truck. Thus, we defer to the current practice of compacting the trash outside the prison.

The cost of the additional lockable dumpsters is not known, but we would expect that two dumpsters could be acquired (or built in the prison shops) for under \$5,000.

Recommendation FSP No. 19: Replace metal eating utensils with plastic utensils.

According to prison officials, metal eating utensils have seldom been the raw stock from which weapons have been developed by inmates. However, if all recommended security improvements are implemented, it should be more difficult for inmates to obtain weapons materials from other sources. Thus, we believe that metal forks and spoons may provide a ready source and are suggesting that they be replaced with plastic utensils. Additional costs are associated with implementing this recommendation, but we are unable to estimate the amount.

Recommendation FSP No. 20: Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units.

The springs and connecting wires in many of the current cell bunks are a source of weapons material that is very difficult to control. Weapons made from these materials usually are not as strong or rigid as those made out of flat metal stock. Nevertheless, they can be life threatening.

Complete replacement of these bunks would be an expensive investment (allowing for the use of inmate labor). We understand that CDC's costs for materials and inmate fabrication have been about \$200 per bunk. Therefore, as an alternative to full conversion in one year, we suggest a phased implementation over several years. This would require an investment of at least \$100,000/year for at least three years.

#### 5. SECURITY HOUSING UNITS

SHU inmates present special security problems. Except for many of the protective custody inmates who are kept in the SHUs (about 20 percent of the total), these inmates are the most violent and troublesome in Folsom's population. We have several recommendations related to the SHU facilities and operating practices.

Recommendation FSP No. 21: Install expanded metal screens on the inside of cell doors in SHU II.

This is an expensive but important recommendation. The intended purposes are to prevent or hinder the following:

- "Spearing" and other physical assaults on tier officers
- Throwing objects at officers
- Passing contraband vertically and horizontally through the use of "fishlines", i.e., strips of bedsheets tied together to form a rope.

We do not hold out this recommendation as a panacea for security effectiveness. The metal screens have to be checked regularly to ensure they have not been cut. They also restrict visibility by gun officers and allow less light into the cells from outside. Flaps for meal trays also have to be provided.

Screens of this type were installed at San Quentin after a sergeant was murdered by a SHU inmate. CDC officials thought that San Quentin personnel have experienced problems with the screens, but our discussion with a San Quentin representative concluded that they are pleased with the additions.

Using inmate labor, the installation cost at San Quentin was about \$225 per cell. For all 600 cells in SHU II, this would amount to about \$135,000. However, the cost might be less at Folsom if (1) the screens can be produced by the fabrication shop at San Quentin, and (2) some of the special installation equipment purchased for San Quentin can be used at Folsom.

Recommendation FSP No. 22: Prohibit general population inmates from working in security housing units.

Because of the large expense involved if contracted labor is used to install metal screens in SHU II (as recommended above), implementation of Recommendation No. 22 should be delayed until the metal screens are in place.

The needs being addressed by this recommendation are as follows:

- Improved control over contraband moving into the facilities
- Restricting the communications (gang pressure) between SHU and general population inmates.

Implementation of this recommendation will require two additional civilian trades employees for ongoing maintenance activities.

Recommendation FSP No. 23: Eliminate contact visiting for security housing inmates.

It is extremely difficult to prevent the introduction of drugs, narcotics and certain other small contraband items when

contact visiting is permitted. Although we have not obtained a legal opinion, the current Touissant Injunction does not appear to require contact visits for SHU inmates. If this is true, we see no need to continue this practice. In addition to better control over contraband, the lack of contact visiting privileges may be an inducement for some SHU inmates to work their way out of the maximum security classification.

#### 6. VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AREA


Supervision of inmates in the Vocational Education shops is hindered by the design features of the buildings. In a number of areas supervisors and officers cannot see inmates without walking around corners or down corridors. The best layout for supervising inmates is a open area where the supervisor has a clear view of the entire floor from several vantage points. At Folsom, this situation is rare.

We realize that Folsom's outdated structures and hilly terrain prevent optimum surveillance patterns. However, there are several areas where the situation can be improved in the Vocational shops without prohibitive investments. The recommendations presented here are intended to improve interior and exterior surveillance and control of inmates in this part of the prison.

Recommendation FSP No. 24: Relocate the Lower Yard custody office to a point across from the count gate.

Exhibit VI-3 depicts the recommended position for relocation of the Lower Yard custody office. In this new location, inmates can be viewed entering and leaving the primary Vocational buildings, and while they are in the yard. Moreover, access to the various buildings can be controlled from this location. We estimate the cost of materials to construct a 600 sq. ft. custody office at less than \$10,000. Inmate labor can be used for the construction.

# Proposed Location of Lower Yard Custody Office





Recommendation FSP No. 25: Rearrange the internal structure of Vocational Education buildings.

To further assist in observing inmates participating in Vocational activities, we recommend that the internal structure of these buildings be as open as possible. This is particularly important in the large hangar-style main Vocational building. All offices and storerooms should be moved to the back walls (i.e., north and south walls), and all partitions should be removed from both sides of the main aisle. However, if such partitions are deemed necessary to separate work areas, they should have extensive use of glass or wire mesh. An officer should be able to walk down the main aisle and see all inmate activities to the left and right. His/her view would no longer be obstructed by office walls or barriers as it is now.

Assuming extensive use of inmate labor, the cost impact of this recommendation is related primarily to materials. We do not know how many of the existing partitions, walls, and other materials can be salvaged. Assuming a fairly significant salvage benefit, materials costs may be in the \$10,000 to \$20,000 range.

Recommendation FSP No. 26: If the assignment of significant numbers of close custody inmates to Vocational Education results in serious incidents, construct a gunwalk along the length of the main Vocational building.

Prison management is considering assigning 100 or so close custody inmates to work in the Vocational shops. A similar number already work in Prison Industries. This custody classification -- between the maximum and medium levels -- requires "constant supervision" according to the CDC Classification Manual (Section 6900, which pertains to Folsom State Prison).

Also, the CDC Classification Manual does not currently allow close inmates to be assigned work outside the secure inner perimeter. Prison management, however, is under pressure to have more inmates working; therefore, management is considering the Vocational shop assignment for these inmates, in addition to Prison Industries.

If the close custody inmates are classified correctly and objectively, then we have reservations about the appropriateness of assignments where weapons materials abound and effective security is extremely difficult to accomplish. If, on the other hand, the assignment would be restricted to inmates who are due for reclassification to medium, then our concern is not warranted. Our understanding, however, is that this latter example is not the type of assignment being considered for Vocational.

Assuming substantial numbers of true close custody inmates are placed in Vocational shops, a gunwalk probably should be constructed over the main aisle of the large Vocational building. As part of our previous recommendation to improve visibility in this structure (by moving offices, etc.), ceilings over work areas should be minimized (e.g., just a few supervisors' offices).

This is a relatively expensive recommendation for the benefits to be gained. Consequently, we have structured the wording to allow for an interim test period to determine if close custody inmates create additional security problems in Vocational areas. If they do, and if continued assignment is necessary, then the gunwalk should be installed. The capital cost of this recommendation is difficult to estimate but it probably is over \$100,000. Also, at least one additional officer would be needed.

## 7. TOOL CONTROL

Currently, tool control throughout the prison is decentralized with inconsistent compliance with policies. Tools are

maintained in almost all areas of the prison. Responsibility for supervision of tools rests with correctional officers in some areas, civilian supervisors in others, and even inmates in a few instances. The source of tools also varies, e.g., some civilian supervisors bring tools from their homes. There is no centralized record of the number and type of tools that exist within the prison.

Recommendation FSP No. 27: Establish centralized tool/material cribs in the Vocational and Industries areas.

All tools and work materials should be stored, issued and returned to centralized cribs in both the Vocational and Industries shop areas, with each crib managed by a civilian. All inmates, civilians, and officers should check out tools and materials. We understand that prison officials have recently concluded that such an arrangement is needed and are currently pursuing funding to implement the proposal. We have reviewed the details of the proposal and understand it to be substantially what we have recommended above.

The tool cribs can be constructed by inmates, and the cost of supplies should not be significant (e.g., under \$5,000). Operation of the tool cribs will require two additional civilian positions.

Recommendation FSP No. 28: Strictly enforce prison policy requiring inmate workers to carry tool lists.

In order to perform duties assigned to them, some inmates must carry tools such as saws, hammers, wrenches, etc. The prison has a policy that an inmate worker must carry a special pouch to hold the specific tools assigned to him, and a list of the tools so that officers can verify that he has only the tools he is supposed to have. Further, the list makes it possible to account for all tools once the pouch is returned at the end of the day. Unfortunately, the policy is not enforced in all areas. Our recommendation is to strictly enforce the policy throughout the prison.

## 8. KEY CONTROL

Currently key control at Folsom is inadequate. Although there is a key control officer, records are considerably out of date. Copies of keys to various locations are maintained in several different places. For example, each officer carries ten to thirty keys, according to the number of locks in his work area. In addition, several towers have back-up key boards for the ground locations near the tower. Central control maintains a master key board only for the Main Yard areas. The Armory has a master key board for all areas. The key control office is in a location separate from the Armory.

The problems with key control are many. Examples include:

- There is no record of how many keys there are, or where each key is located
- Civilian supervisors in Prison Industries are known to take home keys to various storerooms
- Locks are not serviced on a routine basis
- Work orders for lock repair, key exchange, or other work by the locksmith are rarely written
- The locksmith works independently of the key control officer
- The locksmith is months behind in the work to be done
- Emergency keys in towers are outdated.

Obviously, the control of keys is vitally important to the security of the prison. Existing key control policies need to be enforced. The following recommendations are intended to remedy other weaknesses.

Recommendation FSP No. 29: Establish key exchange system for the Vocational and Prison Industries areas.

This key exchange system would work similar to the ones used in the Main Yard where keys are obtained from, and returned to Central Control. All Vocational and Industries keys should be accounted for prior to allowing assigned officers or civilians to leave the prison. As a suggestion, keys for Vocational and Industries can be stored overnight in Towers #6 and #19, respectively.

No additional costs are associated with this recommendation.

Recommendation FSP No. 30: Assign the locksmith to report administratively to the key control officer.

The locksmith and key control officer must work together. We recommend that the key control officer receive and prioritize work orders, and assign the work to the locksmith. They should work from the same office and meet regularly. To assist in recordkeeping, computer support also would be helpful.

No additional costs are associated with the recommendation (computer support is addressed generally in Recommendation CDC No. 3).

## 9. OTHER COMMENTS

In addition to the specific recommendations presented previously in this subsection, we provide below a few supplemental or explanatory comments.

### a. Emergency Communications

We considered recommending interim improvements in emergency communications until a suitable personal

duress alarm system can be acquired as described previously under Recommendation CDC No. 2. These considerations extended to the following:

- Installation of a master security intercom system for telephones, emergency telephones, and public address/paging. Such a system would interconnect all facilities at an estimated cost of \$50,000.
- Providing an interim duress system (similar to CIM-RCC) for the Prison Industries and Vocational shop areas because of their distant location, minimal staffing, and poor internal visibility. A separate system for each of the two areas would cost a total of about \$20,000.
- Installation of only ring-down telephones in housing units and other inmate areas.

In our final analysis, we concluded that significant costs probably are not justified until the technology of an effective personal duress alarm is known. What is needed, therefore, is close monitoring of the development of such a system, and then a full communications study to determine the best design for overall emergency and routine communications in the prison.

b. SHU II Exercise Yards

If our Recommendation FSP No. 3 is not implemented essentially as suggested, then the area at the east end of Building #1 (SHU II) should be considered for use as additional SHU II exercise yards. The current availability of only four yards limits the ability of management to adequately segregate SHU II inmates for gang affiliations and other reasons. Although we recognize this limitation as a security weakness, we view the greater problem to be the overall segregation needs addressed by Recommendation FSP No. 3. Assuming this recommendation is implemented, we could not identify any other suitable location for additional SHU II exercise yards.

c. Portable Metal Detectors

Recommendation CDC No. 2 suggested that more portable metal detectors be acquired for all three institutions we studied. At Folsom, locations where one or two of these devices are needed include the following:

- Lower Yard Count Gate
- Inspection Post
- Industries Post
- Building #5 Count Gate
- Building #2 Count Gate
- New Main Yard Count Gate (see Recommendation FSP No. 2).

With regard to metal detection equipment in general, we were told by several Folsom staff members that malfunctioning equipment cannot be repaired (e.g., six unusable portable metal detectors were located in one housing unit). Conversely, CDC and prison management stated that there is ample capability to repair these units. Obviously, there is a communications gap that needs to be addressed.

d. Building #5 Gun Officers

Finally, we questioned -- but did not recommend changes -- the effectiveness of the two gun officers in Building #5 on all shifts. The gunwalk runs north to south, at the east end of a building that is very long (in an east-west direction). The officers cannot observe inside any cells and can effectively see only portions of the aisles. They can observe all of the guard station area and the showers. An extension of the gunwalk goes into Dining Room #2, and one of the officers covers this area during meal times.

Psychologically, there may be a benefit to the officers insofar as housing unit coverage is concerned. As a practical matter, however, their use is limited severely. Options for the prison to consider that might be more cost effective are:

- Elimination of both posts during the overnight lockdown period (i.e., reschedule the other two shifts for coverage from about 0600 to 2200 hours)
- Staffing with just one officer, regularly or just overnight
- Some combination of the above two alternatives.



D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO  
CIM - RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL

General comments made previously in subsection B, for the most part, apply to CIM-RCC as well as the other institutions. For example, there is a need for additional security equipment and better enforcement of written orders, particularly in search-related activities. Recommendations on these matters have been provided already. Here we discuss additional findings and recommendations specific to CIM-RCC under the following headings:

- Southern California Reception Center Needs
- Processing of Incoming Inmates
- Perimeter Security
- Inmate Movement and Segregation
- Safety and Preventive Measures
- General Housing Units
- Administrative Segregation Units
- Control Room and Emergency Operations
- Tool and Key Control
- Other Comments.

1. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RECEPTION CENTER NEEDS

Prison commitments have been increasing at a dramatic rate over the past few years, which has resulted in all CDC institutions operating over design capacity. CIM is the receiving institution for the southern counties and currently uses two facilities to receive and process prisoners, i.e., Reception Center Central (RCC) and Reception Center West (RCW). RCC is currently about 235 percent occupied and RCW 170 percent. This extensive overcrowding is also affecting CIM-East which is providing overflow housing for the Reception Centers. Currently, CIM-East houses over 200 parole violators that have been returned

to custody. CIM-East is currently about 210 percent occupied, including the parole violators, and it is increasingly difficult to operate this facility as a Level III institution.

Another factor affecting reception center overpopulation is the number of inmates housed at RCC and RCW that do not require normal processing. For example, on January 22, 1986, RCC had the following inmates in custody:

- 709 - New Commitments and Parole Violators with New Terms (require intake processing)
- 150 - Enroute to Other Destinations (no processing)
- 334 - Roll-ups to Higher Custody From Other CIM Facilities for Disciplinary Reasons (no processing)
- 68 - Permanent Work Crew Inmates (no processing)
- 216 - Parole Violators Endorsed for Return to Custody in the CDC Parole Regions (no processing)
- 1,477 - Total Population

This indicates that 52 percent of the population is at RCC for reasons other than routine reception center processing.

On the same day, RCW had the following inmates in custody.

- 713 - New Commitments (require intake processing)
- 109 - Diagnostic Cases (require intake processing)
- 5 - Parole Violators Returned to Custody (no processing)
- 57 - Post-Processing Inmates From RCC (no processing)
- 147 - Roll-ups to Higher Custody From Other CIM Facilities for Disciplinary Reasons (no processing)
- 7 - For Court Appearance (no processing)
- 9 - For Pre-Release (no processing)
- 98 - Permanent Work Crew (no processing)
- 1,145 - Total Population

This indicates that 28 percent of the population is at RCW for reasons other than routine reception center processing.

Finally, on the same day CIM-East had a reception center overflow of 245 parole violators, primarily return to custody inmates who do not require normal processing. Overall, on January 22, 1986, a total of 2,867 inmates were under reception center responsibility, of which 47 percent were in custody for reasons other than normal intake processing.

The overcrowding at RCC (and perhaps at RCW, a facility we did not review) is creating obvious, major security weaknesses. These weaknesses include:

- Inordinate congestion which makes it impractical to search and surveil facilities effectively (e.g., over 200 inmates housed in the Gym)
- Property, food and other materials necessarily moved within the same areas as inmates of all custody levels
- Inability to segregate inmates effectively, except for those identified at some point as the highest security risks.

Additionally, we should note that additional beds cannot be constructed in Chino; such construction is prohibited by current legislation.

Major security problems have not surfaced yet at CIM-RCC. but the potential is substantial. This condition has led us to two major recommendations one long-range and the other short-range. The longer-term recommendation is discussed first.

Recommendation RCC No. 2: Build a new reception center in Southern California.

This is the obvious eventual solution, and the CDC is well aware of the need. Funds are available through prison bonds approved by the voters, but a site has not been located. However, site selection, planning and construction may take several years or more, and something significant needs to be done in the interim. This leads us to the next recommendation.

Recommendation RCC No. 3: Develop and implement interim plans to relieve reception center overcrowding at CIM by some combination of the following alternatives:

- Conversion of CIM-East into a satellite reception center
- Decreasing inmate processing time by adding processing personnel and/or modifying procedures
- Establishing another facility for (1) parole violators already endorsed for return to custody, (2) inmates enroute from one location to another, and (3) inmates who are transferred from CIM-East and CIM-Minimum for disciplinary reasons.

Implementation of just one of the above alternatives without either of the other two is unlikely to provide adequate relief over several years. Also, none of them can be implemented unless there is another institution capable of accepting more inmates. Given CDC's current statewide overcrowding problems, actual implementation may be delayed until some of the prisons under construction are completed.

Conversion of CIM-East to a reception center would provide about 550 additional beds (250 already hold RCC inmates). Coincident to this conversion, a management plan should be developed specifying where processing will take place. There may be a need for additional medical, dental and classification capability at CIM-East (i.e., a full service operation). Depending on the mix of inmates housed at CIM-East under this concept, facility modifications related to security also may be

necessary (in addition to what is suggested in this report). For example, one or more of the 200-bed housing units may need to be "reinforced" and stripped of potential weapons materials.

With regard to the second alternative, the average daily population (ADP) of new commitments and other inmates requiring normal processing might be reduced by increasing processing staff. To explain, the current average calendar time for inmate processing is about 34 days. However, most of this time the processing staff is waiting for replies to correspondence distributed to obtain or confirm detailed information needed to complete each inmate's classification and institutional assignment. Consequently, a simple increase in staff (e.g., a second shift and/or weekend shift) may not decrease the processing span time demonstrably.

For every day that can be eliminated from the average processing time, a reduction of about 45 in the total ADP for RCC and RCW should be realized. If, for example, the average time can be reduced to 25 days, a reduction of about 400 inmates in the ADP for these two institutions should result (assuming they are transferred promptly).

To understand fully the cost and operational implications of this staffing alternative, the following actions need to be taken:

- Detailed analysis of the current inmate processing activities, focusing on the types of span time delays and the reasons for these delays
- Analysis of alternatives for eliminating the time delays, particularly for inmates who are likely to be classified into Level III or IV prisons. For example, can some information be obtained by telephone and confirmed later by correspondence? Processing shortcuts, however, should not be used to classify inmates into minimum security institutions.

- Analysis of actual staffing (workload) requirements per type of inmate case, considering both paid employees and the inmate workers who assist in processing.
- Based upon the above findings, calculation of potential ADP reductions and increased staffing costs to obtain these reductions.

The final alternative we have raised involves relocation of inmates who are not being processed, particularly parole violators who are endorsed for return to custody in the parole regions. This alternative is straightforward and easy to implement if and when beds are available in other locations.

It is our opinion that an indepth evaluation should be made of the alternatives we have identified, and any others that might surface. We understand that the Department is planning to divert some parole violators to local facilities on a contract basis. Any reduction in the numbers sent to RCC and RCW will help alleviate the problem, but plans need to address the relocation of up to 1,000 inmates. Otherwise, effective security will be difficult to achieve.

We do not know the costs associated with Recommendation RCC No. 3 because we do not know what mix of alternatives will be most effective. Under any arrangement, however, the costs will be significant.

## 2. PROCESSING OF INCOMING INMATES

New commitments, parole violators, and various other categories of prisoners arriving at RCC are processed initially in the Receiving and Release (R&R) area. The transporting vehicle passes through a vehicle sallyport controlled by the rear gate officer and unloads the prisoners into a sallyport within RCC. At times, the transporting vehicle and the incoming

inmates compete for space with other trucks (food, canteen, trash, etc.) and RCC inmate work crews that utilize the same loading dock.

Once inside RCC, the inmates are stripped, searched, showered, issued clothes, and interviewed by officers and inmate workers who complete various forms. Included in the process is an interview by the R&R sergeant to determine where in RCC the inmate should be housed, or if he should be sent to RCW. Typically, the only paperwork accompanying the inmate is the court commitment paper and a probation officer's report. Occasionally, this information is insufficient to adequately pre-classify each inmate. The proper housing of inmates is critical to effective security in the facility.

Physically, the R&R area is small, narrow, and noisy. It is totally inadequate for processing inmates in a secure and expeditious manner. Extreme congestion results when large groups of new inmates arrive, and the resulting noise and confusion creates an ineffective operation from a security viewpoint.

Recommendation RCC No. 4: Substantially expand and improve operations in the Receiving and Release area.

The R&R area should be expanded to provide about 5,000 square feet of space for the inmate processing activity. The location and configuration of the expansion should be based upon a floor plan schematic showing an effective, efficient flow pattern, with a minimum of contact between incoming prisoners and RCC inmate work crews. The design should also permit full visual coverage of all processing areas for proper supervision.

A rear gate officer station should be included which has clear visibility and a location proximate to the vehicle sallyport so that positive identification of vehicle occupants can be made. At least two single cells are needed within the R&R area to house inmates who become physically violent or disorderly.

Finally, the design should include an office (or several) for conducting the initial interview with each incoming prisoner. The reason for privacy is to protect those inmates who want to declare enemies, homosexuality, etc., or ask for protective custody without other inmates overhearing. This information, sometimes not obtained in the open environment of the existing R&R area, is critical to determining housing requirements that provide reasonable inmate safety.

The estimated cost to construct the recommended R&R area is about \$600,000. No additional staffing needs are identified at this time, beyond the two positions recommended previously in Section V.

Recommendation RCC No. 5: Request committing counties to provide copies of State and FBI arrest records for incoming inmates.

State and federal arrest records would provide more useful information concerning the recent criminal history of committed inmates. Currently, the R&R sergeant may or may not find information of this type in the probation officer's report. Committing counties, however, may resist this request because of the volume of copying involved. Our suggestion is that CDC officials initiate discussions with sheriffs and/or chief probation officers to determine if these documents can be provided, at least for most of the inmates received.

No state costs are estimated for this recommendation.

Recommendation RCC No. 6: Conduct orientation of new inmates within 24 hours.



Under the current system, a new inmate could be in RCC for as long as one week before receiving an orientation. This results in consistent questioning of officers that, in turn, produces antagonism towards inmates and, eventually, angry inmates. We recommend that orientation be held nightly after the dinner meal. At a minimum, a video tape could be used to provide basic information if time does not permit a full orientation.

No significant additional costs are estimated for this recommendation.

### 3. PERIMETER SECURITY

The perimeter, for purposes of this discussion, refers to the towers and fence line that encircle the institution forming a barrier to inmate escape. The perimeter also includes the facilities that control access through the perimeter, such as vehicle sallyport. There are a number of problems associated with the perimeter at RCC. They include:

- Prisoners processed in RCC will be transferred to all levels of institutions, I through IV. The Department's Classification Manual describes Level II, III, and IV institutions as having a secure perimeter and armed coverage. Given the inmate population, it is our opinion that a single fence around RCC is not adequate.
- There are frequent occurrences of heavy fog which severely limits the visibility of tower officers
- Inspection procedures related to vehicle cargo being moved into the facility need to be improved
- Current loading dock activity interferes with the security of inmate processing activity. Inmates are being received and released at same time trash, clothing, laundry, canteen, and food trucks are being loaded and unloaded.

Recommendation RCC No. 7: Construct a second fence around the perimeter, install razor ribbon in appropriate locations, and install an electronic detection system.

A second fence will slow inmates attempting to escape and provide additional time for staff to respond. In a recent escape attempt at RCW, the inmate climbed the first fence but was apprehended while scaling the second. If the attempt had been made at RCC, he might have escaped successfully.

The electronic detection system will be particularly useful during fog conditions. The estimated cost to install the fence and electronic detection system is \$50,000. If inmate labor is used extensively, the cost might be less.

Recommendation RCC No. 8: Construct a second loading dock at the east end of the Main Corridor, including a second vehicle sallyport.

Our objective here is to separate all institutional vehicle traffic not related to receiving and releasing inmates. Under this recommendation, all inmate movement into and out of the perimeter will be performed at the existing rear loading dock and sallyport. All other vehicle activity will occur at the new loading dock including delivery of food, canteen items, institutional supplies, laundry, trash disposal, and pick-up of donated inmate clothing.

The current procedure requires that a state lock be placed on delivery trucks when incoming vehicles are inspected at the CIM Main Gate. However, it does not provide for a key at RCC, and open, unlockable, trucks cannot be processed in this manner. Essentially, the current security procedure is weak and more effective screening of vehicles and contents is needed at RCC.

The cost to provide the loading dock and sallyport is estimated to be less than \$50,000. Inmate labor may be used for some or all of this work.

One additional officer also will be needed, with full relief. When not busy at the sallyport, this officer can assist with inmate surveillance and control in the Main Corridor.

Recommendation RCC No. 9: Construct a new tower at the southeast corner of the perimeter fence.

Perimeter security is weak at the southeast corner due to the absence of a tower. Also, if the recommended new loading dock and sallyport are constructed at the east end of the Main Corridor, the volume of activity will tend to attract the attention of Tower #11 away from the southeast corner.

Capital costs for this recommendation are estimated at less than \$25,000. One additional officer will be required, with full relief. The new tower should be staffed at all hours, but staffing for Tower #12 could be reduced to only the day shift, seven days per week. This existing tower would be needed only for coverage of the Main Yard during inmate exercise periods. Thus, the net increase in staffing is one position, plus relief.

#### 4. INMATE MOVEMENT AND SEGREGATION

Overall institutional security is jeopardized because of the large number of inmates moving within the facility at any one time. It is very difficult to monitor these inmates and, therefore, they have many opportunities to circumvent existing security measures. To improve control over inmate movement and segregation, the following recommendations are made.

Recommendation RCC No. 10: Reduce inmate traffic in the Main Corridor during peak processing times by instituting revised procedures.

There are a number of changes that, if implemented, should contribute to a reduction in inmate movement in the Main Corridor. These include:

- Change canteen days to Saturday and Sunday so the canteen line will occur only during non-processing times
- Dispense controlled medications in the housing units to eliminate the twice-a-day "pill line" by the Medical area
- Schedule exercise for Madrone and Sycamore Hall inmates in the southwest and northwest yards that are currently used only for weekend visiting by the Permanent Work Crew (PWC) inmates. If desired, one housing unit officer and one S&E officer could be assigned to each yard to supplement the gun coverage of Towers #10 and #14.
- Schedule clinical interviews and sick call to minimize the number of inmates moving and waiting in the Main Corridor. Because inmates essentially move unescorted, most of the waiting time should be in the housing units.
- Review PWC schedules in an effort to reduce the current high volume of movement in and out of the PWC Dormitory area.

Recommendation RCC No. 11: Motorize two of the Main Corridor grille gates.

Existing Main Corridor grille gates are operated under a variety of conditions. We recommend that the two gates now locked/unlocked by the Control Room be motorized so that they can be closed by the Control Room in emergencies. This is an important capability in the event of trouble. It allows the Control Room to seal off access to the center of the building (where the Control Room is located).

Our estimate of costs to accomplish this recommendation is less than \$10,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 12: Provide Corridor officers with portable radios.

Corridor officers operate the length of the Main Corridor and frequently are located a significant distance from the Control Room. They do not carry personal duress alarms but do have whistles. The need, however, is related primarily to communications with the Control Room and/or the watch sergeant concerning inmate movement, grille gate control, etc. Portable radios will provide this capability. The cost of three radios is estimated to be less than \$5,000.

#### 5. SAFETY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Presented here are findings and recommendations generally related to basic security issues of safety and prevention of potentially dangerous situations.

Recommendation RCC No. 13: Examine all cell locking mechanisms and prepare a plan for replacement.

Most of the locking mechanisms at RCC are suffering from some type of deficiency. The basic result is that some cell doors can be opened by inmates without knowledge of unit officers, a condition that poses obvious and significant security problems. Additionally, other cell doors cannot be opened or closed without manually lifting and moving the doors.

Fundamentally, the locking mechanisms are wearing out and, because of their age, replacement parts are difficult if not impossible to obtain. Because the number of locking mechanisms needing replacement is not known, we cannot estimate the cost of this recommendation. We expect, however, that the total cost could be fairly significant.

Recommendation RCC No. 14: Install a walk-through metal detector at the Main Yard entrance.

In addition to our previous general recommendation to acquire more portable metal detectors (Recommendation CDC No. 2), there is a specific need for a walk-through detector at the Main Yard entrance. Current "pat" searches are ineffective and time consuming. The capital cost of this recommendation is estimated at about \$10,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 15: Place expanded metal screens over windows in several areas.

There are a number of window areas in the Main Corridor that experience constant breakage due to vandalism and to permit inmate-to-inmate conversation and contraband movement. These windows should be covered with metal screens.

In addition, there are certain windows that border directly on the Main Yard that can be opened. The windows in question are part of Room #1, Orientation Room, Law Library, and Records. These windows also should be covered with metal screens to prevent movement of contraband.

Assuming inmate labor is used, the materials costs for this recommendation are estimated at less than \$5,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 16: Relocate the high voltage power lines located next to Tower #11.

The high voltage lines next to Tower #11 appear to be rather close. If these lines snap during a storm, they might come in contact with the tower. As a precautionary measure, we suggest that the lines be moved further away from this tower. An estimate of costs to implement this recommendation is under \$5,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 17: Increase the lighting in the Main Corridor.

Several areas in the Main Corridor are dark. It is difficult to monitor inmates from any distance, especially from areas that have higher light levels. The cost to add lighting is estimated at less than \$2,500.

Recommendation RCC No. 18: Remove inoperative heating units in the Main Corridor.

These units are a source of metal which can be converted to weapons. Because the wall heaters are inoperable, they should be removed. Inmate labor can be used; thus, there are no costs related to this recommendation.

Recommendation RCC No. 19: Purchase or fabricate lockable trash containers.

Trash from throughout the institution is currently collected in open 55 gallon drums and moved through the Main Corridor to the loading dock where it is dumped into bulk trash containers. Some of this trash is considered "hot." That is, the contents include weapons materials. Trash containers should have covers to prevent theft of contraband by inmates. Implementation of this recommendation could be achieved by fabricating covers for the 55 gallon drums, or by fabricating larger rectangular containers on wheels.

Assuming inmate labor is used, the estimated materials costs for this recommendation should be less than \$2,500.

Recommendation RCC No. 20: Include metal food trays, soup bowls, and plastic cups in the count of eating utensils.

All of the above feeding utensils are subject to use as weapons materials and should be controlled by counts. No additional costs are required to implement this recommendation.

## 6. GENERAL HOUSING UNITS

There are a number of security problems associated with the operation of general housing units. Findings and recommendations concerning these issues are presented below.

Recommendation RCC No. 21: Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Madrone, Sycamore, Birch, and Cypress Halls.

The tiers in these housing units currently have a single waist-high railing on the outside of the walkway in front of the cells. In the event of an assault, this railing would not provide sufficient protection against a fall.

Implementation of this recommendation would require significant purchases of materials but the work can be done by inmates. We do not know what the material costs will be, but the CDC has installed the safety bars in other locations and can obtain cost estimates from its records. We roughly estimate these costs to be about \$25,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 22: Install expanded metal cage around cell lockboxes on second and third tiers of Cypress Hall.

The existing design of Cypress Hall requires that inmates released from second and third tier cells must proceed through a grille gate at the end of the tier, behind the officer operating the lockbox, through the other grille gate, and then down the stairs. In this position, the officer is very vulnerable to attack. A metal cage should be provided to protect the officer and prevent inmate access to all cell locks on a tier.

Assuming the use of inmate labor, the cost of this recommendation should be under \$2,500.



Recommendation RCC No. 23: Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units.

The springs and connecting wires in the current cell bunks are a source of weapons material that is very difficult to control. Weapons made from these materials usually are not as strong or rigid as those made out of flat metal stock. Nevertheless, they can be life threatening.

Complete replacement of these bunks would be a reasonably expensive investment (even allowing for the use of inmate labor). We understand that CDC's costs for materials and inmate fabrication have been about \$200 per bunk. Therefore, as an alternative to full conversion in one year, we suggest a phased implementation over several years. This would require an investment of about \$55,000/year for the 800 or so permanent bunks (excludes Palm Hall and the temporary beds in dayrooms and the Gym).

#### 7. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION UNITS

Our general finding is that Palm Hall and the first tier of Cypress Hall - East are operating effectively and safely as administrative segregation units. The cell area is quiet and the day-to-day activities seem to be performed well. The following recommendations should assist in maintaining these current satisfactory operating levels.

Recommendation RCC No. 24: Electrically interlock certain doors in Palm Hall (administrative segregation housing).

Currently, the external door that opens on to the Main Corridor is electrically controlled by the cage officer. The interior door is key operated by one of the Palm Hall floor officers. Under the arrangement, both doors can be opened at the same time, thus defeating the purpose of a sallyport. This happens when certain service carts (that are too long to fit in the sallyport) are brought into the unit.

We recommend that the sallyport doors be electrically interlocked and that they both be controlled by the cage officer. (Ideally, the interior door also should be changed to a grille gate for better security.) The cart problem can be solved by using smaller carts.

In addition, one kitchen door leads to the Main Corridor and the other opens into the officer's space on first tier. Although both keys are not carried by the same officer at the same time, there is potential for circumventing the established practice. We recommend that both doors be electrically interlocked and controlled by the cage officer.

The cost to electrically interlock these doors is estimated at less than \$2,500.

Recommendation RCC No. 25: Modify food services procedures in Palm Hall by using stacked trays or installing a small mechanical lift.

The current method of serving food in Palm Hall is to carry each tray (one in each hand) to each cell on all three tiers. This is cumbersome and time consuming, and it adversely affects the desired temperature of the food. It is recommended that alternate food trays be evaluated to identify one that can be stacked and carried four to six at a time. If an appropriate tray cannot be located, a carrying device might be designed and fabricated with inmate labor.

An alternative, which is more expensive, is to install a mechanical lift ("dumbwaiter") capable of moving bulk food carts to the second and third tiers. Then food could be served directly from the original containers. Under this or the other alternative, the feeding process would be expedited, and officer time would be conserved. No cost has been estimated for this recommendation because we do not know how it will be implemented. Certainly the stacked tray alternative is much less expensive.

Recommendation RCC No. 26: Install a sallyport at the entrance to the Palm Hall exercise yards.

The current procedure for moving Palm Hall inmates to the four exercise yards involves the following. One officer stands at the gate to the assigned yard and waits for the inmate to arrive. The tower officer operates a switch that opens the yard gate. The inmate then steps just inside, the officer uncuffs inmate, the inmate goes into the yard, and the ground officer closes the gate (no sallyport). During this procedure the ground officer is vulnerable to assault from inmates within the yard.

We suggest that a sallyport be installed at the entry to the corridor that leads between the two south yards to the tower. The inmate would be uncuffed while in the new sallyport, then the tower officer would open the other gate and the inmate would proceed through the corridor to the appropriate yard. The yard gate would be opened by the tower officer and closed by the inmate. This process would be more effective in eliminating the potential for hostage-taking or attacks on staff. The cost to erect a chain link type of sallyport, with electrical controls, is estimated to be less than \$5,000.

#### 8. CONTROL ROOM AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Recommendation RCC No. 27: Modify the Control Room access door to electrically interlock with the two pedestrian sallyport gates.

The only door to the Control Room (central communications and control) is key-operated. This doorway is inside the main pedestrian sallyport which often has numerous inmates on one side (i.e., the Main Corridor side). Currently, the Control Room door can be opened when either of the pedestrian sallyport grilles are open. This is an inadvisable procedure which should be changed as recommended above. The cost of this modification is estimated at less than \$2,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 28: Install bars over Control Room windows that face the pedestrian sallyport.

Subsequent to the New Mexico prison riot, RCC management installed bars over the windows of the Control Room that face the Main Corridor and the visiting area. At that time, an assumption was made that the windows within the sallyport would not be accessible to inmates. However, because the Control Room provides access to the Armory, we believe all windows should be secured against entry. The estimated cost of this installation is less than \$1,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 29: Install an effective ventilation system in the Control Room.

If an emergency occurs which results in smoke or gas in the Control Room, there is no existing exhaust system. This facility needs to operate effectively under emergency conditions, and could not do so under the above circumstances. A rough estimate of the cost of an effective ventilation system is in the range of \$30,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 30: Monitor the shelf life of chemical agents in the Armory and replace as indicated.

It appeared during our observations that "tear gas" canisters were leaking in the Armory below the Control Room. The fumes enter the Control Room, creating an obviously uncomfortable environment in this important area. Proper monitoring and replacement procedures would eliminate the problem. No additional costs are required.

Recommendation RCC No. 31: Install an effective emergency generator and an emergency lighting system.

There is a need for substantial improvements in RCC capabilities related to emergency power. The lack of an effective emergency power and emergency lighting system can result in significant security problems. The estimated cost of this recommendation is in the range of \$40,000. We believe, however, that the cost is justified for staff and inmate protection. Implementation probably should be delayed, however, until the results of a current CDC statewide study of emergency power alternatives is completed.

9. TOOL AND KEY CONTROL

Recommendation RCC No. 32: Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity.

The current maintenance activity is essentially inmate-operated. They have keys to critical tools and unlimited access to a range of maintenance materials, parts, corrosives, etc. In addition, they generally move throughout the institution unescorted.

We recommend that a tool crib operation be established whereby tools and materials are issued by a civilian to inmates, based on specified work orders. The operation should include inventory control of all tools and materials, and inmate workers should be required to carry tool lists.

The construction of counters and material cribs should be accomplished with inmate labor and existing materials. Therefore, the only materials costs should be less than \$1,000. However, staffing for this recommendation will require one additional civilian position.

Recommendation RCC No. 33: Establish a procedure for destruction of broken and worn keys.

Current procedure only requires the sale of broken and damaged keys to the highest bidding salvage firm. We recommend that these keys be mutilated before they are sold to preclude copying or repair. No added costs are associated with this recommendation.

10. OTHER COMMENTS

We considered, but have not recommended, a special Search and Investigation (S&I) team of two officers. The primary purpose of the team would be to supplement cell and common area search capabilities of other personnel. The reason why this concept was omitted is that other recommendations, if implemented, will provide a net increase of well over 20 positions. We believe this level of increased personnel resources, plus related equipment and supervisory enforcement of procedures, should be sufficient to accomplish desired levels of effective search activity.

In addition, we identified some institutional procedures at RCC that were out of date, and some where goals and documentation requirements were not clear (e.g., common area searches). This would suggest that a general review and updating of RCC institutional procedures and post orders is advisable.

Finally, we evaluated the pros and cons of recommending a new grille and gate barrier at the entry to Madrone Hall (at a cost of about \$40,000). Unlike the other housing units, Madrone Hall, has outside cell construction and there is no grille system separating the officers from the cells.

We elected not to present this recommendation officially because (1) the Madrone Hall configuration provides officers almost full unrestricted visibility, and (2) inmates are kept in their cells most of the time. However, if a full-scale upgrading of RCC is ever undertaken, installation of a grille system in this location would be advisable.

## E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST

Overall, findings and recommendations related to security needs at CIM-East are less significant than those reported for Folsom and CIM-RCC. East is a more relaxed institution which, although overcrowded, is less congested than either of the other two institutions.

For general findings and recommendations applicable to East, readers should review subsection VI.B. Here we discuss security issues pertinent only to East, under the following headings:

- Perimeter Security
- Towers
- General Housing Units
- Prison Industries
- Safety and Preventive Measures
- Tool and Key Control
- Other Comments.

### 1. PERIMETER SECURITY

The perimeter, as defined previously for CIM-RCC, consists of the fence and towers surrounding the institution, and the two control points that provide access through the perimeter. Deficiencies associated with the current perimeter control include the following:

- East is classified as a Level III institution which, by CDC definition, requires a secure perimeter and armed coverage. It is our opinion that a single fence line does not constitute a secure perimeter in this environment.
- Existing perimeter lighting is poor
- Pedestrian access to the facility is controlled by a single door and a single officer.

- The vehicle sallyport does not have razor ribbon on top of the fencing and is lighted inadequately.

Recommendation EAST No. 2: Construct a second perimeter fence with razor ribbon, and install additional perimeter lighting.

The second fence will reduce the potential for escapes by providing staff more time to respond. The razor ribbon can be installed between the fences if weed control can be maintained, or on top of the fence.

Existing perimeter lighting is located along the elliptical roadway inside the fence. Due to this configuration, lighting in certain areas is inadequate. Supplemental lighting should be installed at appropriate intervals along the recommended second fence.

Implementation of this recommendation will require capital costs in the range of \$100,000. Use of inmate labor may reduce this cost estimate.

Recommendation EAST No. 3: Construct a new visitor processing center and pedestrian sallyport at the main entrance.

The existing pedestrian control facility is inadequate from both security and functional points of view. It is very small and a single door provides entrances to the prison grounds. All entrances through a security perimeter should include a two-gate sallyport, electrically interlocked, to control the flow of people.

In addition, visitor processing is congested and ineffective, and there are no restroom facilities for visitors awaiting authorization and escorting.



A new main entrance facility can be constructed by adding on to the current structure. The estimated capital cost for a 1,000 square foot structure is about \$50,000, assuming some use of inmate labor.

Recommendation EAST No. 4: Install razor ribbon along the top of the vehicle sallyport.

Although this sallyport is inside the perimeter fence, razor ribbon would further discourage inmates from attempting to climb over the sallyport fencing. The cost estimate for this addition is less than \$1,000.

Recommendation EAST No. 5: Install additional lighting in the vehicle sallyport.

Additional lighting would provide better nighttime visibility for Control Tower and sallyport officers. The cost of this addition should not exceed \$1,000.

## 2. TOWERS

Findings and recommendations presented here deal with the operation of gun towers at CIM-East.

Recommendation EAST No. 6: Modify the Gym Tower to improve visibility and effectiveness.

Currently, the configuration of this key tower precludes observation of activity directly below the tower. Also, the existing Gym observation port is covered with expanded metal. Visibility is limited for certain parts of the Gym. We recommend changing the design of the windows to permit better observation, and modification of the Gym observation port to eliminate the noted deficiencies. Consideration should also be given to raising the height of this tower.

We are unable to estimate the costs related to this recommendation because they will depend, among other things, upon whether the elevation is increased.

Recommendation EAST No. 7: Implement a planned replacement program for certain tower windows.

Our observation of the towers indicated that much of the glass is pitted or etched to the point that it gives off a severe glare at certain times of the day. This is a particular problem in the afternoon. We recommend that maintenance staff initiate an ongoing replacement program to preclude the tower glass from reaching this point. The additional costs associated with this recommendation should not be significant.

Recommendation EAST No. 8: Relocate the inmate yard telephones from the Gym Tower area to the housing units.

The scheduling and monitoring of inmate telephone use requires the majority of the Gym Tower officer's time. This function pre-empts the officer's primary duty of monitoring inmate activity in the Main Yard, weight pile, Gym, and swimming pool. The telephones should be relocated to each housing unit and placed under the control of the housing officers. The cost to relocate telephones is estimated at less than \$1,000.

### 3. GENERAL HOUSING UNITS

There are numerous security deficiencies in all housing units due primarily to the fact that the institution was built for juvenile detention, not adult detention. If CIM-East is to remain as a Level III facility, these deficiencies should be addressed and resolved.

Recommendation EAST No. 9: Install security grilles and gates at extreme ends of the Alpine, Butte, and Colusa housing units.

Security grilles currently exist at the Control Room ends of each housing unit. No controls exist at the other ends which lead to the kitchen or the yard. To control the flow of inmates away from the non-secure kitchen doors, and to eliminate the blind spot at the other end of the housing units, we propose that electrically controlled grille gates be installed at the locations identified above.

The estimated capital cost of this recommendation is about \$25,000.

Recommendation EAST No. 10: Develop a multi-year capital improvement plan if CIM-East is to remain a Level III institution.

In consideration of the overcrowding problems at CIM-RCC and RCW, the use of East over the next three to five years is subject to question. It is conceivable that the facility may be converted to a reception center, with either full or limited processing capabilities. Such use would require some immediate improvements and modifications. On the other hand, if East remains in use as a Level III permanent housing facility, we believe a phased program should be started to accomplish certain security improvements.

Although there have been few violent incidents at East, sources of potential future security problems should be eliminated. Modifications we have identified include:

- Replacing the aluminum louvered windows
- Replacing fluorescent cell lights with recessed security lights
- Replacing electrical switches and duplex outlets with security fixtures
- Replacing outside doors with security doors and a Folger-Adams type of locking mechanism

- Installing bars on control room windows
- Removing the walls in Prison Industries for better surveillance.

Because the costs of these modifications and others will be significant, we suggest that they be implemented over a period of several years. Annual budgeting requirements can be established after a detailed definitive plan is developed and cost estimates are prepared.

#### 4. PRISON INDUSTRIES

Prison Industries at CIM-East operates in four large rooms separated by concrete walls, each with a doorway. Approximately 80 inmates work in the four rooms each weekday, with an hour break for lunch. Security deficiencies we identified in this area include lack of visibility between rooms, use of ineffective inmate "pat" searches when they leave the work area at lunch and at the end of the day, and access to the area by other inmates not part of the work force.

Recommendation EAST No. 11: Establish a random patrol by correctional officers during the work hours at Prison Industries.

The Industries work force is supervised by three civilians. Seldom is an officer present in this area. At no additional cost, we suggest that yard officers be required to randomly patrol this area as part of their general post duties.

Recommendation EAST No. 12: Conduct clothed body searches of Prison Industries inmates using portable metal detectors.

The current procedure is to conduct "pat" searches of inmates leaving the work area. These searches are ineffective. We recommend use of a portable metal detector. Costs related to this recommendation are included in Recommendation CDC No. 2.

Recommendation EAST No. 13: Install a twelve-foot fence with a truck gate around Prison Industries and Maintenance.

Both of the above areas are readily accessible by other inmates and both have considerable weapons material and other valuable items (e.g., leather). To eliminate this direct contact between working and non-working inmates, we recommend installing a fence that will separate Prison Industries and Maintenance from the Main Yard. The design should include a gate to allow trucks access to Industries and Maintenance crews.

Assuming use of inmate labor, the estimated cost of this recommendation is less than \$5,000.

5. SAFETY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Recommendation EAST No. 14: Install an effective emergency generator and an emergency lighting system.

The problem here is the same as at CIM-RCC (Recommendation RCC No. 31). The lack of an effective emergency power and emergency lighting system can result in significant security problems. The estimated cost of this recommendation is in the range of \$40,000. We believe, however, that the cost is justified for staff and inmate protection.

Recommendation EAST No. 15: Implement a food services utensil count system.

Presently, metal silverware, trays, bowls, etc., are available to inmates in cafeteria style; no count of these items is maintained, either before or after meals. This is generally inconsistent with normal security procedures for a Level III institution, and we suggest that a count system be initiated.

6. TOOL AND KEY CONTROL

Recommendation EAST No. 16: Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity.

The current maintenance activity is essentially inmate-operated. They have keys to critical tools and nearly unlimited access to a range of maintenance materials. In addition, they generally move throughout the institution unescorted.

We recommend that a tool crib operation be established whereby tools and materials are issued by a civilian to inmates based on specific work orders. The operation should include inventory control of all tools and materials, and inmate workers should be required to carry tool lists.

The construction of counters and material cribs should be accomplished with inmate labor and existing materials. Therefore, the only materials costs should be less than \$1,000. However, staffing for this recommendation will require one additional civilian position.

Recommendation EAST No. 17: Establish a procedure for destruction of broken or damaged keys.

Current procedures only require the sale of broken and damaged keys to the highest bidding salvage firm. We recommend that these keys be mutilated before they are sold to preclude copying or repair. No added costs are associated with this recommendation.

7. OTHER COMMENTS

We have recommended a new visitor processing facility but have not extended the recommendation to a new enclosed visiting facility. Essentially, from a cost effective security basis, the latter alternative was not warranted in our opinion.

Currently, contact visiting occurs outside in a patio area. A metal cover is provided for part of the area, and one side. Inmates go through the Administration Building sallyport to the visiting area, and when they return via this route they are strip-searched. The traffic through the Administration Building is not the ideal way to process inmates, but it is functional. Also, the lack of an enclosed visiting area is a problem during the inclement weather. This condition, however, is not a security issue per se.

Ideally, an alternate route and strip-search facility for inmates are desirable, and an enclosed visiting area also is warranted. These improvements may be justified in the future, particularly if East becomes a reception center.

## F. SUMMARY AND PRIORITIES

At the end of this section are two multi-page exhibits:

- Exhibit VI-4 summarizes all recommendations in sequential order (i.e., the order of report presentation). This exhibit also identifies the priority we have assigned to each recommendation, and our estimates of first-year implementation costs for capital improvements, equipment, and staffing, where such costs could be estimated reasonably.
- Exhibit VI-5 re-arrays the recommendations by order of priority.

Priorities have been suggested in four categories, as explained below:

- Priority A is the "Highest" priority and includes only nine of the 88 recommendations contained in this report
- Priority B includes items that are "Very Important" in priority, but do not have the overall significance of recommendations in group A. Sixteen recommendations are assessed as Very Important in priority.
- Priority C is the "Moderately Important" category, which includes 35 recommendations
- The "Least Important" group is Priority D, which includes 28 recommendations.

The process of slotting recommendations into priority categories was largely judgmental. The primary factors considered in this process are outlined below:

- For Priority A, we selected recommendations that addressed major security problems or key employee safety issues, and were capable of being acted upon within the next year or so. Our assessments here emphasized departmental or general security considerations that argue for prompt action regardless of the institution in which the problems were identified.



For example, the suggested installation of safety bars in multi-tiered housing units (FSP No. 15 and RCC No. 22) is a recommendation we would submit for any CDC facility with this type of design. Conversely, the recommended change in inmate movement routes (FSP No. 2) addresses an institution-specific problem, but one that we evaluate as significant in terms of its contribution to internal security at Folsom.

- For the remaining three priority categories, recommendations were evaluated primarily in relation to all other recommendations for the institution involved. We gave some consideration to recommendations made for the other institutions, but it is difficult to compare suggestions in this manner. For example, we have no trouble justifying that a canine team at Folsom is potentially more important to security than relocating the Lower Yard custody office at this prison. However, it is not so clear that the canine team at Folsom is potentially more beneficial than modifying the Gym tower at CIM-East.

In assessing whether a recommendation should be Priority B, C, or D, we generally considered factors such as costs, severity of the problem being addressed, and potential impact on the problem.

Finally, we again caution readers that the costs presented in this report, particularly for capital expenditures, are rough estimates. More detailed analysis is necessary to develop costs for budgeting purposes.

PRIORITY	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION	FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS			FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES	OTHER COMMENTS
			CAPITAL/EQUIPMENT	OPERATING	TOTAL		
<u>FOLSOM STATE PRISON RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)</u>							
B	FSP 3	Establish SHU visiting and counseling/committee areas in the north half of Dining Room #1.	\$200,000	-	\$200,000	-	Use of inmate labor may reduce costs
A	FSP 4	Construct strip search and shower facilities at the Lower and Upper Yard gates	\$200,000	-	\$200,000	-	
C	FSP 5	Employ two canine search units	\$10,000	\$76,097	\$86,097	2.0	
B	FSP 6	Institute more random and frequent search activity, and enforce documentation policies	-	-	-	-	
D	FSP 7	Enforce the policy of limiting inmate property to six cubic feet	-	-	-	-	
C	FSP 8	On a pilot basis, install remote control CCTV recording units in selected areas	\$50,000	-	\$50,000	-	
C	FSP 9	Relocate weight pile or remove lavatory roof to improve surveillance	-	-	-	-	
D	FSP 10	Escort all trucks at all times when they enter the prison	-	\$76,097	\$76,097	2.0	Staffing costs may be less (i.e., 1.0 to 1.5 positions).
C	FSP 11	Remove abandoned structures, equipment and materials	-	-	-	-	
C	FSP 12	Install high pressure sodium lights on hills and slopes, and elsewhere as current lights are replaced	\$10,000	-	\$10,000	-	Costs not estimated for replacement program.
D	FSP 13	Establish inmate picture rosters in the general housing units and an ID card rack in the Prison Industries and Culinary areas	-	\$3,000	\$3,000	-	
B	FSP 14	Relocate Central Control to a location outside the secure inner perimeter	Unknown	-	Unknown	-	Relocation costs will depend on the site selected
A	FSP 15	Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Housing Units #2 and #3	\$25,000	-	\$25,000	-	Assumes use of inmate labor
D	FSP 16	Relocate all counselors to the housing units	\$50,000	-	\$50,000	-	Assumes some use of inmate labor

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS</u>			<u>OTHER COMMENTS</u>	
			<u>CAPITAL/ EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>OPERATING</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>		
						<u>FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES</u>	
<u>GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS</u>							
A	CDC 1	Management and supervisory personnel should increase efforts to enforce departmental and institutional security policies and procedures	-	-	-	-	
B	CDC 2	Acquire additional security equipment for Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East, including megaphones, search kits, flashlights, metal detectors, fluoroscopes, protective vests, and personal duress alarms	\$45,000	-	\$45,000	-	Costs exclude vests (already budgeted) and personal alarms (cannot determine costs until suitable system is identified).
C	CDC 3	Design and implement an automated prison management information system	\$250,000	-	\$250,000	-	Assumes some of current CDC modules will be included. Additional second-year costs may be required.
C	CDC 4	Institute detailed, systematic analysis of serious incidents	\$15,000	-	\$15,000	-	
C	CDC 5	Seek changes to Title 15 that prohibit return of sentence credits forfeited for selected serious violations	-	-	-	-	
C	CDC 6	Consider establishing a special maximum security prison for the most troublesome inmates	-	-	-	-	
D	CDC 7	Provide side baton training to all officer	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	-	Some additional training costs are anticipated.
A	CDC 8	The Department of Corrections should thoroughly evaluate the potential use of more civilian (non-peace officer) classifications to perform quasi-custodial functions that do not require full correctional officer training and capabilities.	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	-	Major annual savings or cost avoidance could result, depending upon the extent of civilian positions used.
		SUBTOTAL: General Recommendations	\$310,000	-	\$310,000	-	Plus unknown costs for CDC 7.

FOLSOM STATE PRISON RECOMMENDATIONS

C	FSP 1	Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the Folsom State Prison posts we reviewed should consist of about 547 peace officer and civilian positions (including sick leave relief)	-	(\$124,408)	\$(124,408)	(2.6)	
A	FSP 2	Modify Folsom facilities to improve inmate movement and segregation, and to establish housing unit integrity.	\$150,000	\$166,272	\$316,272	4.4	Staffing costs may be slightly less, depending upon final design. Inmate labor assumed for some of the construction.

PRIORITY	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION	FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS			FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES	OTHER COMMENTS
			CAPITAL/EQUIPMENT	OPERATING	TOTAL		
<u>FOLSOM STATE PRISON RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)</u>							
D	FSP 17	Decentralize the storage of tasers so they are more immediately accessible when needed	-	-	-	-	
C	FSP 18	Use lockable garbage dumpsters	\$5,000	-	\$5,000	-	
C	FSP 19	Replace metal eating utensils with plastic utensils	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	-	Some additional annual costs will be required.
C	FSP 20	Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units (on a phased basis)	\$100,000	-	\$100,000	-	Second and third year costs may be \$100,000 or more each year.
B	FSP 21	Install expanded metal screens on the inside of cell doors in SHU II	\$135,000	-	\$135,000	-	
C	FSP 22	Prohibit general population inmates from working in security housing units	-	\$83,950	\$83,950	2.0	Staffing is for two civilian trades employees.
C	FSP 23	Eliminate contact visiting for security housing inmates	-	-	-	-	
D	FSP 24	Relocate the Lower Yard custody office to a point across from the count	\$10,000	-	\$10,000	-	Assumes use of inmate labor.
D	FSP 25	Rearrange the internal structure of Vocational Education buildings	\$30,000	-	\$30,000	-	Assumes use of inmate labor.
C	FSP 26	If the assignment of significant numbers of close custody inmates to Vocational Education results in serious incidents, construct a gunwalk along the length of the main Vocational building	\$100,000	\$41,853	\$141,853	1.1	Capital costs may be higher, depending on design and when the construction occurs. None of these costs are included in subsequent totals because they depend upon future events at FSP.
C	FSP 27	Establish centralized Tool/Material cribs in the Vocational and Industries areas	\$5,000	\$74,802	\$79,802	2.2	Civilian staffing included, and inmate labor used for construction.
C	FSP 28	Strictly enforce prison policy requiring inmate workers to carry tool lists	-	-	-	-	
D	FSP 29	Establish key exchange system for the Vocational and Prison Industries areas.	-	-	-	-	
D	FSP 30	Assign the locksmith to report administratively to the key control officer	-	-	-	-	
SUBTOTAL: Folsom Recommendations			\$980,000	\$355,810	\$1,335,810	10.0	Excludes Recommendation FSP No. 26, and unknown costs of FSP 14 and FSP 19.

PRIORITY	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION	FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS				FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES	OTHER COMMENTS
			CAPITAL/EQUIPMENT	OPERATING	TOTAL			
<u>CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL RECOMMENDATIONS</u>								
A	RCC 1	Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-RCC posts we reviewed should consist of about 205 peace officer and civilian positions (including sick leave relief)	-	\$737,609	\$737,609	19.3		
B	RCC 2	Build a new reception center in southern California	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Not applicable. Part of CDC's long-range prison construction program.
A	RCC 3	Develop and implement interim plans to relieve reception center overcrowding at CIM by some combination of the following alternatives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Conversion of CIM-East into a satellite reception center</li> <li>◦ Decreasing inmate processing time</li> <li>◦ Establish another facility for inmates who do not require intake processing</li> </ul>	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown		Costs are likely to be significant and will depend upon alternatives selected.
A	RCC 4	Substantially expand and improve operations in the Receiving and Release area	\$600,000	-	\$600,000	-		
D	RCC 5	Request committing counties to provide copies of State and FBI arrest records for incoming inmates	-	-	-	-		
D	RCC 6	Conduct orientation of new inmates within 24 hours	-	-	-	-		
B	RCC 7	Construct a second fence around the perimeter, install razor ribbon in appropriate locations, and install an electronic detection system	\$50,000	-	\$50,000	-		Assumes some use of inmate labor.
B	RCC 8	Construct a second loading dock at the east end of the Main Corridor, including a second vehicle sallyport	\$50,000	\$62,019	\$112,019	1.6		Assumes some use of inmate labor.
D	RCC 9	Construct a new tower at the southeast corner of the perimeter fence	\$25,000	\$62,019	\$87,019	1.6		
B	RCC 10	Reduce inmate traffic in the Main Corridor during peak processing times by instituting revised procedures	-	-	-	-		

PRIORITY	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION	FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS			FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES	OTHER COMMENTS
			CAPITAL/EQUIPMENT	OPERATING	TOTAL		
<u>CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL RECOMMENDATIONS</u>							
B	RCC 11	Motorize two of the Main Corridor grille gates	\$10,000	-	\$10,000	-	
D	RCC 12	Provide corridor officers with portable radios	\$5,000	-	\$5,000	-	
B	RCC 13	Examine all cell locking mechanisms and prepare a plan for replacement	Unknown	-	Unknown	-	Replacement costs will depend on the results of a full inventory of the problem.
C	RCC 14	Install a walk-through metal detector at the Main Yard entrance	\$10,000	-	\$10,000	-	
D	RCC 15	Place expanded metal screens over windows in several areas	\$5,000	-	\$5,000	-	
C	RCC 16	Relocate the high voltage power lines located next to Tower #11	\$5,000	-	\$5,000	-	
D	RCC 17	Increase the lighting in the Main Corridor	\$2,500	-	\$2,500	-	
D	RCC 18	Remove all inoperative heating units in the Main Corridor	-	-	-	-	
C	RCC 19	Purchase or fabricate lockable trash containers	\$2,500	-	\$2,500	-	
D	RCC 20	Include metal food trays, soup bowls, and plastic cups in the count of eating utensils	-	-	-	-	
A	RCC 21	Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Madrone, Sycamore, Birch, and Cypress Halls	\$25,000	-	\$25,000	-	
C	RCC 22	Install expanded metal cage around cell lockboxes on second and third tiers of Cypress Hall	\$2,500	-	\$2,500	-	
C	RCC 23	Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units (on a phased basis)	\$55,000	-	\$55,000	-	Second and third year costs may be \$55,000 or more each year.
D	RCC 24	Electrically interlock certain doors in Palm Hall (administrative segregation housing)	\$2,500	-	\$2,500	-	

PRIORITY	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION	FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS				OTHER COMMENTS
			CAPITAL/ EQUIPMENT	OPERATING	TOTAL	FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES	
<u>CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL RECOMMENDATIONS</u>							
D	RCC 25	Modify food services procedures in Palm Hall by using stacked trays or installing a small mechanical lift	Unknown	-	Unknown	-	Costs may not be significant if appropriate tray-carrying equipment can be bought or built.
D	RCC 26	Install a sallyport at the entrance to the Palm Hall exercise yards	\$5,000	-	\$5,000	-	
C	RCC 27	Modify the Control Room access door to electrically interlock with the two pedestrian sallyport gates	\$2,000	-	\$2,000	-	
C	RCC 28	Install bars over Control Room windows that face the pedestrian sallyport	\$1,000	-	\$1,000	-	
C	RCC 29	Install an effective ventilation system in the Control Room	\$30,000	-	\$30,000	-	
D	RCC 30	Monitor the shelf life of chemical agents in the Armory and replace as indicated	-	-	-	-	
C	RCC 31	Install an emergency generator and an emergency lighting system	\$40,000	-	\$40,000	-	
C	RCC 32	Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity	\$1,000	\$37,401	\$38,401	1.1	Civilian staffing included and inmate labor used for construction.
D	RCC 33	Establish a procedure for destruction of broken and worn keys	-	-	-	-	
SUBTOTAL: CIM-RCC Recommendations			\$929,000	\$899,048	\$1,828,048	23.6	Plus unknown costs for RCC 3, 13, and 25.
<u>CIM-EAST RECOMMENDATIONS</u>							
C	East 1	Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-East posts we reviewed should consist of about 182 peace officer positions (including sick leave relief)	-	(\$134,467)	(\$134,467)	(3.5)	
B	East 2	Construct a second perimeter fence with razor ribbon, and install additional perimeter lighting	\$100,000	-	\$100,000	-	Use of inmate labor may reduce the costs.
B	East 3	Construct a new visitor processing center and pedestrian sallyport at the main entrance	\$50,000	-	\$50,000	-	Assumes some use of inmate labor.
D	East 4	Install razor ribbon along the top of the vehicle sallyport	\$1,000	-	\$1,000	-	

PRIORITY	RECOMMENDATION NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION	FIRST-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS				OTHER COMMENTS
			EQUIPMENT	OPERATING	TOTAL	FULL-TIME POSITION CHANGES	
		<u>CIM-EAST RECOMMENDATIONS (continued)</u>					
D	East 5	Install additional lighting in the vehicle sallyport	\$1,000	-	\$1,000	-	
C	East 6	Modify the Gym Tower to improve visibility and effectiveness	Unknown	-	Unknown	-	Costs will depend on the design of the modification.
C	East 7	Implement a planned replacement program for certain Tower windows	-	-	-	-	
B	East 8	Relocate the inmate yard telephones from the Gym Tower area to the housing units	\$1,000	-	\$1,000	-	
B	East 9	Install security grilles and gates at extreme ends of Alpine, Butte, and Colusa housing units	\$25,000	-	\$25,000	-	
C	East 10	Develop a multi-year capital improvement plan if CIM-East is to remain a Level III institution	Unknown	-	Unknown	-	Costs will depend upon the plan that is developed and the number of years for implementation.
D	East 11	Establish a random patrol by correctional officers during the work hours at Prison Industries	-	-	-	-	
B	East 12	Conduct clothed body search of Prison Industry inmates using portable metal detectors	-	-	-	-	
C	East 13	Install a twelve-foot fence with a truck gate around Prison Industries and Maintenance	\$5,000	-	\$5,000	-	Assumes use of inmate labor.
C	East 14	Install an emergency generator and emergency lighting system	\$40,000	-	\$40,000	-	
C	East 15	Implement a food services utensil count system	-	-	-	-	
D	East 16	Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity	\$1,000	\$37,401	\$38,401	1.1	Assumes use of inmate labor.
D	East 17	Establish a procedure for destruction of broken or damaged keys	-	-	-	-	
		SUBTOTAL: CIM-East Recommendations	\$224,000	(\$97,066)	\$126,934	(2.4)	
		TOTAL: All Recommendations With Cost Estimates	\$2,443,000	\$1,157,792	\$3,600,792	31.2	Excludes Recommendation FSP No. 26 and all recommendations with unknown costs.



PRIORITY GROUPING OF RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>TOTAL FIRST-YEAR COSTS<sup>a/</sup></u>
<u>A. HIGHEST PRIORITY</u>		
CDC 1	Management and supervisory personnel should increase efforts to enforce departmental and institutional security policies and procedures	
CDC 8	The Department of Corrections should thoroughly evaluate the potential use of more civilian (non-peace officer) classifications to perform quasi-custodial functions that do not require full correctional officer training and capabilities	Unknown
FSP 2	Modify Folsom facilities to improve inmate movement and segregation, and to establish housing unit integrity	\$ 316,272
FSP 4	Construct strip search and shower facilities at the Lower and Upper Yard gates	200,000
FSP 15	Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Housing Units #2 and #3	25,000
RCC 1	Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-RCC posts we reviewed should consist of about 205 peace officer and civilian positions (including sick leave relief)	737,609
RCC 3	Develop and implement interim plans to relieve reception center overcrowding at CIM by some combination of the following alternatives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>° Conversion of CIM-East into a satellite reception center</li> <li>° Decreasing inmate processing time</li> <li>° Establish another facility for inmates who do not require intake processing</li> </ul>	Unknown
RCC 4	Substantially expand and improve operations in the Receiving and Release area	600,000
RCC 21	Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Madrone, Sycamore, Birch, and Cypress Halls	25,000
	<b>SUBTOTAL: Priority A Recommendations</b>	<b>\$1,903 881</b>

B. VERY IMPORTANT PRIORITY

CDC 2	Acquire additional security equipment for Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East, including: megaphones, search kits, flashlights, metal detectors, fluoroscopes, protective vests, and personal duress alarms	\$ 45,000
FSP 3	Establish SHU visiting and counseling/committee areas in the north half of Dining Room #1	200,000
FSP 6	Institute more random and frequent search activity, and enforce documentation policies	-
FSP 14	Relocate Central Control to a location outside the secure inner perimeter	Unknown
FSP 21	Install expanded metal screens on the inside of cell doors in SHU II	135,000
RCC 2	Build a new reception center in southern California	N/A
RCC 7	Construct a second fence around the perimeter, install razor ribbon in appropriate locations, and install an electronic detection system	50,000
RCC 8	Construct a second loading dock at the east end of the Main Corridor, including a second vehicle sallyport	112,019
RCC 10	Reduce inmate traffic in the Main Corridor during peak processing times by instituting revised procedures	-
RCC 11	Motorize two of the Main Corridor grille gates	10,000
RCC 13	Examine all cell locking mechanisms and prepare a plan for replacement	Unknown

<sup>a/</sup> Excludes Priority C Recommendation FSP No. 26, and all recommendations where the costs are unknown.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>TOTAL FIRST-YEAR COSTS<sup>a/</sup></u>
<b>B. <u>VERY IMPORTANT PRIORITY</u> (continued)</b>		
East 2	Construct a second perimeter fence with razor ribbon, and install additional perimeter lighting	\$100,000
East 3	Construct a new visitor processing center and pedestrian sallyport at the Main Entrance	50,000
East 8	Relocate the inmate yard telephones from the Gym Tower area to the housing units	1,000
East 9	Install security grilles and gates at extreme ends of Alpine, Butte, and Colusa housing units	25,000
East 12	Conduct clothed body search of Prison Industry inmates using portable metal detectors	-
SUBTOTAL: Priority B Recommendations		\$728,019
<b>C. <u>MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY</u></b>		
CDC 3	Design and implement an automated prison management information system	\$250,000
CDC 4	Institute detailed, systematic analysis of serious incidents	15,000
CDC 5	Seek changes to Title 15 that prohibit return of sentence credits forfeited for selected serious violations	-
CDC 6	Consider establishing a special maximum security prison for the most troublesome inmates	-
FSP 1	Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the Folsom State Prison posts we reviewed should consist of about 547 peace officer and civilian positions ( <u>including</u> sick leave relief)	(124,408)
FSP 5	Employ two canine search units	86,097
FSP 8	On a pilot basis, install remote control CCTV recording units in selected areas	50,000
FSP 9	Relocate weight pile or remove lavatory roof to improve surveillance	-
FSP 11	Remove abandoned structures, equipment and materials	-
FSP 12	Install high pressure sodium lights on hills and slopes, and elsewhere as current lights are replaced	10,000
FSP 18	Use lockable garbage dumpsters	5,000
FSP 19	Replace metal eating utensils with plastic utensils	Unknown
FSP 20	Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units (on a phased basis)	100,000
FSP 22	Prohibit general population inmates from working in security housing units	83,950
FSP 23	Eliminate contact visiting for security housing inmates	-
FSP 26	If the assignment of significant numbers of close custody inmates to Vocational Education results in serious incidents, construct a gunwalk along the length of the main vocational building	141,853
FSP 27	Establish centralized tool/material cribs in the Vocational and Industries areas	79,802
FSP 28	Strictly enforce prison policy requiring inmate workers to carry tool lists	-
RCC 14	Install a walk-through metal detector at the Main Yard entrance	10,000
RCC 16	Relocate the high voltage power lines located next to Tower #11	5,000

<sup>a/</sup> Excludes Priority C Recommendation FSP No. 26, and all recommendations where the costs are unknown.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>TOTAL FIRST-YEAR COSTS<sup>a/</sup></u>
C. <u>MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY</u> (continued)		
RCC 19	Purchase or fabricate lockable trash containers	\$ 2,500
RCC 22	Install expanded metal cage around cell lockboxes on second and third tiers of Cypress Hall	2,500
RCC 23	Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units (on a phased basis)	55,000
RCC 27	Modify the Control Room access door to electrically interlock with the two pedestrian sallyport gates	2,000
RCC 28	Install bars over Control Room windows that face the pedestrian sallyport	1,000
RCC 29	Install an effective ventilation system in the Control Room	30,000
RCC 31	Install an emergency generator and an emergency lighting system	40,000
RCC 32	Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity	38,401
East 1	Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-East posts we reviewed should consist of about 182 peace officer positions ( <u>including</u> sick leave relief)	(134,467)
East 6	Modify the Gym Tower to improve visibility and effectiveness	Unknown
East 7	Implement a planned replacement program for certain Tower windows	-
East 10	Develop a multi-year capital improvement plan if CIM-East is to remain a Level III institution	Unknown
East 13	Install a twelve-foot fence with a truck gate around Prison Industries and Maintenance	5,000
East 14	Install an emergency generator and emergency lighting system	40,000
East 15	Implement a food services utensil count system	<u>-</u>
	SUBTOTAL: Priority C Recommendations	\$652,375

D. <u>LEAST IMPORTANT PRIORITY</u>		
CDC 7	Provide side baton training to all officers	Unknown
FSP 7	Enforce the policy of limiting inmate property to six cubic feet	-
FSP 10	Escort all trucks at all times when they enter the prison	\$ 76,097
FSP 13	Establish inmate picture rosters in the general housing units and an ID card rack in the Prison Industries and Culinary areas	3,000
FSP 16	Relocate all counselors to the housing units	50,000
FSP 17	Decentralize the storage of tasers so they are more immediately accessible when needed	-
FSP 24	Relocate the Lower Yard custody office to a point across from the count gate	10,000
FSP 25	Rearrange the internal structure of Vocational Education buildings	30,000
FSP 29	Establish key exchange system for the Vocational and Prison Industries areas	-
FSP 30	Assign the locksmith to report administratively to the key control officer	-
RCC 5	Request committing counties to provide copies of State and FBI arrest records for incoming inmates	-

<sup>a/</sup> Excludes Priority C Recommendation FSP No. 26, and all recommendations where the costs are unknown.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>TOTAL FIRST YEAR COSTS</u>
D. <u>LEAST IMPORTANT PRIORITY</u> (continued)		
RCC 7	Conduct orientation of new inmates within 24 hours	-
RCC 10	Construct a new tower at the southeast corner of the perimeter fence	\$ 82,510
RCC 13	Provide corridor officers with portable radios	5,000
RCC 16	Place expanded metal screens over windows in several areas	5,000
RCC 18	Increase the lighting in the Main Corridor	2,500
RCC 19	Remove all inoperative heating units in the Main Corridor	-
RCC 21	Include metal food trays, soup bowls, and plastic cups in the count of eating utensils	-
RCC 25	Electrically interlock certain doors in Palm Hall (administrative segregation housing)	2,500
RCC 26	Modify food services procedures in Palm Hall by using stacked trays or installing a small mechanical lift	Unknown
RCC 27	Install a sallyport at the entrance to the Palm Hall exercise yards	5,000
RCC 28	Modify the Control Room access door to electrically interlock with the two pedestrian sallyport gates	2,000
RCC 31	Monitor the shelf life of chemical agents in the Armory and replace as indicated	-
RCC 34	Establish a procedure for destruction of broken and worn keys	-
East 4	Install razor ribbon along the top of the vehicle sallyport	1,000
East 5	Install additional lighting in the vehicle sallyport	1,000
East 8	Install security screens on two windows in the Control Tower	-
East 12	Establish a random patrol by correctional officers during the work hours at Prison Industries	-
East 17	Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity	36,086
East 18	Establish a procedure for destruction of broken or damaged keys	-
SUBTOTAL: Priority D Recommendations		\$297,483
TOTAL ALL RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ESTIMATES		\$2,972,517 <sup>a/</sup>

<sup>a/</sup> Excludes Priority C Recommendation FSP No. 26.

# Memorandum

Date : March 27, 1986

To : Mr. Thomas W. Hayes, Auditor General  
Office of the Auditor General  
660 J Street, Suite 300  
Sacramento, California 95814


From : **Department of Corrections**

Subject: REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF SECURITY MEASURES AT TWO CALIFORNIA PRISONS

This is in response to your letter dated March 21, 1986 in which you transmitted the draft report entitled "A Report on an Audit of Security Measures at Two California Prisons." Departmental, Folsom Prison and the California Institution for Men staff have reviewed and responded to each recommendation.

The attached document reflects the position of the California Department of Corrections relative to the audit findings. As outlined in the Introduction, chapters one through four contained data on methodology, assumptions, background, description of current operations and analyses; therefore, we did not provide comments on these chapters. Chapters five and six contained 88 recommendations addressing security staffing and measures. A response is provided for each recommendation.

If there are any questions regarding this response, please contact Mr. R. R. Bayquen, Deputy Director, Administrative Services at (916) 323-4185.



DANIEL J. MCCARTHY  
Director of Corrections

Attachment

RESPONSE TO:

REPORT BY THE  
OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

A REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF  
SECURITY MEASURES AT TWO CALIFORNIA PRISONS

PREPARED BY: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  
MARCH 1986

## INTRODUCTION

The audit report prepared by Arthur Young and Company is divided into six chapters with appendices, and represents the culmination of several months of dedicated study. The first two chapters describe methodology, assumptions, background data and a detailed description of current operations at the facilities audited. Chapter three provided an in-depth analysis of prison security incidents and chapter four covered the audit and evaluation of security measures outlined in the 88 recommendations contained in chapters five and six. The California Department of Corrections did not, therefore, deem it necessary to comment on chapters one through four.

Our detailed responses will address issues and recommendations identified in chapters five and six and the appendices. The Department recognizes that the procedural and operational safeguards in any system must be constantly monitored and adjustments made. The actions taken by the Department to date, and documented in the attached, do not represent the end product, but rather our efforts to correct identified deficiencies in our system and effect better controls. A number of the changes recommended have already been implemented in part, or in total, and others are under study by departmental staff. It is also acknowledged that many of the suggested solutions to problems were identified by CDC staff.

Several factors must be considered in committing the Department's current or potential resources, as follows:

1. The Department continues to face severe overcrowding in all 12 of its existing institutions and the prison population continues to increase at an alarming rate.
2. Recent court decisions have placed restrictions on the assignment and placement of prisoners within the Department, thus limiting the number of available beds.
3. In order to keep pace with the growth attributed to overcrowding, the Department has had to recruit, hire and train a large number of staff within an abbreviated time frame. This has resulted in a decrease in the median years of correctional experience department-wide.
4. Implementation of some of these recommendations will require the cooperation and/or approval of other governmental jurisdictions and the State Legislature.

The CDC has over the years provided a high level of service to the citizens of California by carrying out its mission in a safe humane manner. It will continue to provide this high level of service as long as is humanly possible through the constant reassessment of its operational policies, procedures and priorities. This can only be accomplished through the dedication of its 16,000 plus employees and their ability to cope with the myriad of obstacles with which the Department is faced, foremost overcrowding. In recognition of the need to

provide staff with the necessary tools to enhance their job performance, the Department has 1) endeavored to expand the Basic Academy for incoming officers from six to eight weeks and 2) identified a Management Development Program for managers which commences with a pilot program in April 1986.

Correcting the many deficiencies in the CDC system, i.e., overcrowding, violence, etc., and overcoming the grave concerns which directly impact the Department is the shared responsibility of the courts, the legislature, departmental employees and the citizens of the State of California. The Department is committed to a responsible course of action to better carry out its mission to protect society, while providing safe detention facilities for convicted felons. Despite the apparent deficiencies identified in the audit, it should be noted that CDC and its staff continue to do an admirable job under difficult circumstances.



V. SECURITY STAFFING ANALYSIS

B. FOLSOM STATE PRISON

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS

Recommendation FSP No. 1: Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the Folsom State Prison posts we reviewed should consist of about 546.7 positions (including sick leave relief).

a. Management

Recommendation: In FY 1986/87, Folsom is planning to implement the unit management concept for each of the five housing units. This will add three program administrators to current staffing. Were it not for this plan, we would suggest additional management-level staffing. The current management group in the Custody Division is very "thin," i.e., three positions to manage a complement of nearly 550 personnel. If the unit management approach is not approved, then we believe at least one and probably two additional captains should be added to current staffing.

Response: The unit management concept (unitization) is scheduled for implementation July 1, 1986. A six-month progress report will be completed following activation of this program.

b. Reclassification of Officer Positions to Civilian Positions

Recommendation: An examination of the duties of the following four posts concluded that there is no reason to staff them with correctional officers:

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

- Associate Warden's Assistant
- Captain's Assistant
- Personnel Officer
- One of the two officer posts that process visitors (retain the other post as a correctional officer, and the civilian can assist this other officer).

Response: A State Personnel Board audit of Correctional Officer positions was conducted in 1981. Revised allocation guidelines for the Correctional Officer class were established.

The guidelines, as they related to the positions identified above, are as follows:

- III. Under certain circumstances, a position responsible for providing staff assistance to a custodial supervisor in an office setting may be classified as Correctional Officer, as outlined below.
  - a. The work requires a thorough knowledge of custodial policies, procedures, and of inmates for successful job performance; and
  - b. The position is physically located in a security area, such as the Captain's Office; and
  - c. the employee serves as a staff assistant to a custodial supervisor; and
  - d. The duties of the position include face-to-face contact with inmates or custodial personnel to receive and give information relating to custodial matters and requires the exercise of custodial skills in maintaining security and control.

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

Illustrative examples of positions which would meet this guide if all four conditions are present (A-D) are the Captain's clerk and the Correctional Administrator's clerk. Positions which are predominantly clerical and which do not have primary emphasis on custodial responsibilities should be allocated to an appropriate clerical class.

Based on the above guidelines, the Associate Warden's Assistant and the Captain's Assistant positions are clearly classified appropriately.

The Personnel Officer position also meets the above criteria. The officer in this position must frequently make decisions regarding assignment of correctional officers to security posts. This requires an intimate knowledge of the duties and assignment areas at Folsom State Prison, as well as the capabilities and experience level of permanent intermittent and vacation relief pool officers.

Visiting process officers are utilized for a variety of duties including visitor escorts and searches. Furthermore, these officers have developed correctional awareness that is essential to observing people's actions/reactions and identifying the possibility of introduction of contraband or other violations of the law or Director's Rules. The SPB audit and ongoing internal audits by CDC personnel analysts identify these positions as appropriately classified.

It should be noted that under Alternate Range 40 criteria clerical, trade and subprofessional staff who supervise inmates receive an

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

increase of 10% to the base salary range. This offsets some of the apparent cost savings when reclassifying a correctional officer position.

c. Elimination of Certain Posts

Recommendation: Our review of security requirements throughout the prison leads us to recommend that the following five posts be eliminated:

- Dining Room #1 gun officer, on both the 1st and 2nd shifts
- One of the three dayshift officers assigned to the Administration Building
- One of the three laundry officers
- The 3rd shift officer in Tower #5.

Response:

- The Dining Room #1 gun officer position serves as the protection of the entrance/exit of SHU II. There are numerous mainline inmates assigned to the area of Dining Room #1 in the preparation of SHU II food and bagged lunches. The activity in Dining Room #1 will increase when the vegetable preparation, sandwich preparation, and pot washing operations are relocated in this area. Additionally, a significant number of Close A and B inmates are assigned in this area.

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

- ° One of the three Correctional Officer positions assigned to the Administration Building has been reclassified to an OA-II position.
- ° One of the Laundry Officer positions will be redirected to a more critical area.
- ° Third Watch Tower #5 staffing will be redirected.

Perimeter security at FSP is a series of concentric security perimeters established by individual buildings, inner towers, and outer walled posts and corner towers.

Ideally, all perimeters need to be staffed on a 24-hour basis. However, balancing risk levels and multiple security issues with available resources must be done.

d. Elimination of Relief for Certain Posts

Recommendation: There are a number of posts assigned varying types of relief that, in our estimation, are not required.

Response: Position justification for these assignments included relief monies as a result of the identified need to provide coverage. All appropriations are used by the post assignment process in accordance with State guidelines. The functions of all the positions cited in this section must be accomplished whenever the position is vacant. The consequence to eliminating relief would be overtime by other employees

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

assigned in these areas to complete the essential duties while other tasks are postponed or never accomplished. It is recognized that all these positions, with the exception of the Mail Room Sergeant, could be vacant for one or two days without significant impact. However, it could not exceed this time period.

e. Additional Posts

Recommendation: There are several areas where additional staffing is warranted, given current operating methods.

Response: A minimum of one additional Correctional Officer position is needed in each of the upper and lower yards. The necessary staff will be assigned through redirection or the formal budget process.

f. Additional Relief for the S & I Team

Recommendation: Folsom has received temporary authorization for a Search and Investigation (S & I) team consisting of one sergeant and five officers. We support this addition and recommend that the positions be authorized officially in the FY 1986/87 budget.

Response: The S & I Team was established through a special two year funding to determine the impact of such a team. Preliminary results have been impressive and the need for additional positions is recognized. Future evaluations and requests for positions will consider this recommendation.

V. SECURITY STAFFING ANALYSIS

C. CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS

Recommendation RC-Central No. 1: Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-RCC Posts we reviewed should consist of about 205.2 positions (including sick leave relief).

a. Management

Recommendation: Currently, three lieutenant positions are authorized (excluding gang investigations, which we did not review). Two lieutenants work on the second shift and one is on the third shift. On the first shift, there is only one lieutenant for the entire CIM complex (not part of RCC's staffing). It is our opinion that another lieutenant's position should be authorized for the first shift with primary responsibility for both CIM-RCC and CIM-E. This span of control for one lieutenant is significant when considering the total number of inmates involved, the geographical dispersion of facilities, and the early morning (0300 hours) preparations for moving inmates out of RCC and RCW.

This position will be required seven days a week and needs all relief allocations. This will result in the addition of 1.63 lieutenant positions.

Response: An additional lieutenant position is needed on the first watch. However, the primary responsibility for this position should be

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

Reception Center Central and Reception Center West, as they have similar functions. This staffing request will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

b. Reclassification of Officer Positions to Civilian Positions

Recommendation: A review of the duties and responsibilities of the following three posts indicates that they probably could be staffed with civilians:

- Visiting (Front Entrance)
- Property
- Control Room, data input.

Response: These correctional officer positions meet the criteria identified by the State Personnel Board audit conducted in 1981.

The visiting process officer supervises a very critical area involving the public, security of Reception Center Central and control in reference to the introduction of dangerous contraband or drugs. The duties of this position also include visitor escort and searches.

The functions of the property room officer include overseeing the distribution of property, secure and safe handling of contraband items, property disposition, inventory and packaging of property, mailing and postage for packages, as well as the responsibility, accountability, and liability for all property matters pertaining to or involving Reception Center Central. This responsibility plus the high volume of



2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

daily contacts with inmates and security issues, justifies a correctional officer classification.

The control room officer, must perform custodial duties during peak activity periods. This position is also required to assist in issuing weapons and non-lethal devices from the armory located directly under the control room and may be used for additional coverage during emergency situations.

c. Additional Posts

Recommendation: There are a number of areas/activities where additional staffing is merited, considering current operations and inmate population. These areas are discussed below. However, we emphasize that if the population ever is decreased to a level approximating design capacity, most of these additional positions would not be needed.

(1) General Population Housing

° Sergeants

Recommendation: Presently there are four sergeants assigned to the Second Shift, i.e., control, R&R, Watch and Housing. The sergeants for Control and R&R are fully consumed with their assigned activities and have no time available for other duties.

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

At current staffing levels this means that the other two sergeants (Watch and Housing) are responsible for supervising about 31 officers dispersed throughout the facility and in the towers. In addition to the dispersion factor, there are other conditions that exacerbate the current span of control.

Response: An additional housing sergeant is needed on Second Watch for the reasons listed in the audit report. This staffing request will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

° Correctional Officers

Recommendation: The number of correctional officer positions varies among the primary housing units as well as among shifts. This occurs in spite of the relative consistency in the number of inmates housed in each unit...Based on our analysis of workload and safety considerations, we recommend that one officer be added to each of the shifts in Sycamore and Cypress Halls...The above recommendations for general population housing will result in the addition of 9.78 correctional officer positions.

Response: Current workload justifies the additional correctional officer positions in Sycamore and Cypress Halls on all three watches. These positions would be assigned to duties similar to those detailed in the audit report. This staffing request will be

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

(2) Administrative Segregation Housing Officer

Recommendation: Activities in the administrative segregation housing in Palm Hall and Cypress Hall (one tier) are controlled tightly and, therefore, staffing is intensive. Movement of inmates is frequent and typically requires two officers...We suggest that one officer be added to the second shift administrative segregation staff, which is when peak activity occurs. With RDO and all of the relief allowances, this recommendation will result in the addition of 1.63 correctional officers.

Response: An additional Second Watch correctional officer position in the administrative segregation unit seems justified. A request for an additional officer to assist in the feeding and also the removal of inmates from the tier for interviews, medical appointments and shower releases will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

(3) Search and Escort Officer

Recommendation: An additional second shift S & E officer is needed to assist officers in controlling inmates moving throughout the facility. One of the existing S & E officers is essentially assigned to a fixed post to operate the corridor grille gate to

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

the PWC/Gym housing areas, and to provide access to the orientation room, Room 1 and the law library. Also, the second shift is the peak inmate movement, and the time when incidents are most likely to occur.

We believe another S & E officer is required to control inmate movement more adequately. This recommendation, with full relief, will total 1.63 correctional officer positions.

Response: With the overcrowding it has become necessary to utilize the gym, orientation room, and Room 1 (multi-purpose classroom) as housing units. The gymnasium is separated from the main corridor by a grille gate. To allow inmate movement into any of these areas for processing, a corridor position has become basically stationary. A request for an additional S & E position on Second Watch to control inmate movement in the corridor will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

(4) Receiving and Release Officers

Recommendation: We believe there is a need for at least one more officer in R&R, and probably two. One position is needed to assist the sergeant in screening incoming inmates for housing assignments. This job should be done more thoroughly than time currently permits. Another position is needed simply to observe

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

all activities when large groups of inmates are present, and to assist other personnel in processing and escorting inmates. Currently, no one is providing general surveillance when peak activities occur. The addition of two officers, with relief for vacation and sick leave, amounts to 2.33 positions.

Response: The need for these additional positions is recognized. This staffing request will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

d. Additional Relief for Certain Posts

Recommendation: There are a number of posts that currently do not have certain factors allocated. The net result of this recommendation is the addition of .63 correctional officers.

Response: The additional relief for two correctional officer positions, one in Receiving and Release and one in Administrative Segregation, appears to be justified. This would allow for continuous coverage in these areas. Committing counties are assigned a particular weekday(s) for intake of inmates (i.e., Orange County commitments are received on Mondays). Intake from that county must be rescheduled when a holiday occurs, thus causing additional crowded processing on another day. If R&R positions were funded for holiday relief, these conditions would be alleviated. Holiday relief would be needed for the R&R sergeant position also. This staffing request will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

It should be noted that the current study of the reception center overcrowding concerns may address all or part of the above recommended additional positions. A full review of these proposals will be completed in conjunction with Reception Center Central Recommendations #2 and #3.

## V. SECURITY STAFFING ANALYSIS

### D. CIM-EAST

#### 2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS

Recommendation EAST No. 1: Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staff for the CIM-East posts we reviewed should consist of about 181.8 positions (including sick leave relief).

- a. Recommendation: There are several posts that we believe are not warranted on a full-time basis.

(1) Sergeants

Recommendation: The current Receiving and Release Sergeant supervises two officers and some inmate workers. The Visiting Sergeant supervises about three officers. We believe these two supervising functions can be combined, especially if full relief is provided for the remaining position (as recommended later).

Response: The number of officers supervised is not a criteria to justify a sergeant's position. In fact, SPB Correctional Sergeant specifications state "may be in charge of custodial functions in limited but difficult and responsible areas of activities." Further, "...the Correctional Sergeant is not required to supervise..." Each of these sergeants performs duties, in addition to supervision, in areas that are critical to the management of a prison. Visiting and personal property are issues of major importance to inmates.

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

Redirection of duties may result in the Visiting Sergeant becoming responsible for monitoring inmate assignments. This would further justify not combining the R&R and Visiting Sergeant positions.

Recommendation: The requirement for a Culinary Sergeant is questionable. This position supervises only four officers, two in the East Dining Hall and two in the West Dining Hall. We recommend that this position be eliminated and that culinary supervision be assigned to Housing Sergeants.

Response: There are no objections in redirecting this position to Third Watch Program. By so doing, each Housing Sergeant would be responsible for supervision of the culinary functions and supervision of staff in their respective units.

Redirecting the Culinary Sergeant position to Third Watch Program and recognizing the critical functions and volume of work performed by the Receiving and Release and the Visiting Sergeant will result in no change in the number of sergeant positions, instead of the recommended loss of .71 position.

(2) Correctional Officers

Recommendation: When considering the number of positions and the scheduling of correctional officers for Search and Escort (S&E) and yard assignments, the functions appear overstaffed on the 3rd shift. This is a period when all work crews are finished, and



2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

there is virtually no yard activity after dinner and the count immediately following at 1800 hours.

Currently on the Third Watch, the following S&E and yard assignments are in effect:

- Yard                      One officer
- Yard Patrol              Three officers
- Search & Escort        Three officers

It is our opinion that at least two of these seven positions could be eliminated without affecting institution security.

This recommendation will result in a reduction of 3.26 officer positions, as full relief is included.

Response: The position title "yard" or "S&E" does not fully describe the multitude of functions performed by those positions. The following data reflects the duties of these positions.

- 8 hours nightly or 25% of four positions (2 hours each officer): Evening meal coverage.
- 9 hours or 55% of two positions (4 1/2 hours each officer) Monday, Tuesday, and Friday: Process and search inmates for contact and phone visits; monitor Administration Building traffic.
- 4 hours or 50% of one position: Processing and housing new arrivals, transfers and bed moves.
- 8 hours or 50% of two positions (4 hours each officer): Conduct perimeter, window and fence checks; Administration Building, chapel, industry and education/library security checks.

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

- 8 hours or 25% of 4 positions (2 hours each officer) Sunday, Monday, Holiday: movie coverage and any other nights when special events are planned.
- 4 hours or 25% of 2 positions (2 hours each officer): Transportation to and from RC-Central (higher custody cases) and/or CIM-Hospital.
- 4 hours or 50% of one position Wednesday, Thursday and when needed on Saturday, Sunday and Holidays: Process approved guests at the Entrance Gate for inmate sponsored events (Alcoholics Anonymous, Chapel Services, college, etc.).
- 8 hours or 25% of four positions (2 hours each officer): Monitor controlled yard movement to and from chapel, gymnasium, education, inmate telephones, disciplinary hearings and classification.
- 4 hours or 50% of 2 positions (2 hours each officer): Conduct random searches of common areas and provide back-up for housing unit officers; provide inside and outside perimeter coverage during fog periods; and when requested, assist other facilities in search activities.

The three yard officers hours of work are from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. These three positions are not available on Third Watch for a combined total of 6 man hours (10:00 p.m. to 12:00 p.m.). Shift overlap has been necessary to maximize yard and culinary coverage from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.

It is true Third Watch is a period when most program/work activities involving the occupation of inmates ceases and inmates have more leisure time. Activity rooms are crowded, increasing opportunity for discord necessitating staff's intervention.

These positions are vital to the safe and secure operation of CIM-East. Although most work projects are complete and the yard

2. RECOMMENDED STAFFING UNDER CURRENT OPERATING METHODS, cont'd.

period is short (Pacific Standard time only), there are numerous activities occurring. The above information justifies these positions.

c. Additional Relief for Certain Posts

A review of the suggested additional relief allocations will be completed. If necessary, a staffing request will be submitted and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

## VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY MEASURES

### B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 1. ENFORCEMENT OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Recommendation CDC No. 1: Management and supervisory personnel should increase efforts to enforce departmental and institutional security policies and procedures.

Response: The administration of the California Department of Corrections has as one of its goals the effective management and operation of the existing 12 institutions and 29 camp facilities that come under its jurisdiction. Several units within the department's Central Office (headquarters) conduct periodic on-site reviews of institution programs. These reviews include security issues, work incentive, medical, education, fiscal court compliance, and case records. The conclusions of these reviews are to acknowledge the problem areas and develop corrective action plans.

Folsom Prison is one of California's oldest prisons. The type of inmates housed at Folsom include habitual criminals, those serving long term sentences, hard-to-manage persons, and inmates who present a risk to the safety of others. The physical plant condition (layout and age), overcrowding and budgetary pressures, combined with judicial intervention, all contribute to the challenges routinely addressed by the management at this prison.

Folsom is in the process of implementing a unit management concept July 1, 1986. This reorganization will provide more direct second and

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

third level supervision in the housing units. Unitization will also serve to merge the classification and custodial divisions on the worksite to provide better service to the inmate population.

The California Institution for Men (CIM) was established in 1941 and is the State's largest prison geographically (2,500 acres). Several components were added over the years resulting in a four-facility complex. The two reception centers process inmates committed to CDC from the eleven Southern California counties--an average of 2,000 per year. This accounts for nearly two-thirds of all inmates incarcerated in the California prison system. CIM-Minimum is a Level I facility providing educational training, work assignments and reentry services. CIM-East is designated as a Level III facility offering educational programs and Prison Industry Authority employment, as well as routine work assignments. CIM-East further functions as an overflow unit for the reception centers. The management of these multi-faceted operations is a challenging endeavor.

As noted in the auditor's report, severe overcrowding and/or additional workload greatly contribute to inconsistent application of procedures and staff-designed shortcuts.

Administrators of the Department of Corrections' Central Office and all Wardens and Superintendents are taking steps to improve communications and reemphasize the importance of consistent application of the

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

Director's Rules and Regulations, manual guidelines, and institution operational procedures/directives.

2. SECURITY EQUIPMENT

Recommendation CDC No. 2: Acquire additional security equipment for Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East.

Response: Folsom Prison and the California Institution for Men have addressed the individual equipment needs noted by the auditors in the sections specific to their institutions. Items such as megaphones, search equipment, portable metal detectors and fluoroscopes are locally authorized purchases. Furthermore, flashlights are the personal responsibility of staff. All institutions maintain a number of flashlights and batteries for use in case of an emergency or temporary checkout (i.e., an unscheduled overtime shift, breakage or left equipment home).

Departmental equipment issues are addressed below.

- ° Walk-through metal detectors: The Departmental Technology Transfer Committee is researching state-of-the-art equipment. The sensitivity and inconsistent detection are items being reviewed in this study.
- ° Safety Vests: A vendor has been identified and protective vests have been ordered. It is anticipated that delivery to all lock-up units will be accomplished by May 30, 1986 (Phase I). A six-month

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

evaluation will be conducted in conjunction with the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) to identify any problems associated with the implementation of protective vests in the lockup units prior to Phase II enactment. The department has been working in concert with CCPOA on this project from the onset.

- ° Personal Duress Alarms: The Departmental Technology Transfer Committee has been actively pursuing the development of a state-of-the-art personal alarm system that would meet the criteria established by members of the committee. A proposed system will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

5. AUTOMATION NEEDS

Recommendation CDC No. 3: Design and implement an automated prison management information system.

Response: Significant improvements in the management of institution information systems are being implemented by CDC. Augmentations to the distributed system include expanded bed roster, inmate work assignment roster, increased inmate data base, and a work incentive time collection system. These systems should be operational at most institutions within the next six to eight months.

A more immediate response to the institutions' need to better manage information will be the distribution of two personal computers to each

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

institution. Institutions will be able to develop a wide range of inmate, personnel and fiscal applications for their own use. A Central Office-based coordinator will ensure that these systems are properly documented, have the correct security safeguards and, where appropriate, are shared with other institutions to hasten overall systems development. Equipment is scheduled for delivery to the institutions within two to three months. Cost for this project is \$275,000.

Finally, the department, with assistance from the Department of General Services, has implemented a detailed department-wide information systems development project. New information systems will be proposed for the Fiscal Year 1986/87 budget with implementation of approved systems scheduled to begin July 1, 1986. The department has a \$29,000 contract with General Services for this effort.

6. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY INCIDENTS

Recommendation CDC No. 4: Institute detailed, systematic analysis of serious incidents.

Response: In September 1985 an analysis of violent incidents at Folsom Prison was conducted as a pilot project for the task force on prison violence. The project will be expanded and does include automated data collection.

The final report on the project included a profile and analysis of violent incidents. The data items included location, day, time, type



B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

of weapon, race, age, sentence, and gang affiliation of both suspects and victim.

The necessary microcomputers are now being purchased. The data can then be analyzed by the institution and Central Office, providing a useful management tool.

7. INMATE DISCIPLINE

Recommendation CDC No. 5: Seek changes to Title 15 that prohibit return of sentence credits forfeited for selected serious violations.

Response: In 1985 the department proposed revisions to Penal Code Section 2933 to significantly alter present credit restoration provisions. The proposed changes were introduced by Senator Presley. SB 1246 has passed the Senate and is currently in the Assembly Committee.

The proposal included the elimination of all Division "A" offenses from the restoration process. These are felony offenses which present a serious security and/or management threat to staff and inmates alike. Also contained in the proposal is a 50% across the board reduction of the maximum allowable restoration of the original penalty for Division "B" through "F" offenses.

Further the Task Force on Violence recommended a review of departmental policies that provide for liberal restoration of credits.

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION, cont'd.

The audit stated "the practice is to restore the 180 days of credit lost for stabbings and other offenses, usually within a year or so...". In actuality, the inmate must remain disciplinary free for one year to be eligible for a 25% restoration of the 180 days lost. He/she must continue this disciplinary free behavior for another three years before the full (100%) 180 days of credit loss would be restored.

8. SEGREGATION OF KEY MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES

Recommendation CDC No. 6: Consider establishing a special maximum security prison for the most troublesome inmates.

Response: The department has explored several alternatives for segregating violence prone inmates. The current plan provides for gang members who perpetuate violence at San Quentin or Folsom Prisons to be transferred to a specialized housing unit at the Southern Maximum Security Complex at Tehachapi.

The departmental Task Force on Violence, Special Housing and Gang Management has addressed several issues regarding violence prone inmates. The recommendations and findings outlined in this report will be used to develop management goals, procedures and practices.

9. SIDE BATON TRAINING

Recommendation CDC No. 7: Provide side baton training to all officers.

Response: Departmental policy, as outlined in the Departmental Administrative Manual, Chapter 4800, authorizes the use of the side

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

handle baton and eliminates the use of the straight baton effective June 30, 1987. Batons are authorized for routine issue to officers assigned to special housing units, security squads, Special Emergency Response Teams (SERT) and the correctional division of Patton State Hospital; and may be authorized by the Warden/Superintendent for routine issue to officers assigned to transportation, search and escort, escape pursuit details and other assignments deemed necessary.

The existing policy provides a specific time frame for phasing out the use of the straight baton, allows time for the training of specified personnel, and provides that only those departmental peace officers qualified shall be permitted to possess or use departmental weapons in their regularly assigned duties. Requalification is required annually.

The initial qualification course for the side handle baton is 16 hours of training, with a 4-hour course required annually for requalification. Training costs will vary depending upon the number of personnel requiring initial qualification and subsequent requalification training. The cost to provide the initial 16-hour qualifications training for all custodial staff is estimated at \$3.1 million. This figure is based on current staffing levels and the median overtime wage.

The Departmental Training Section is in the process of developing two training plans to implement department-wide side handle baton qualification training. The basic Correctional Officer Academy in Galt will develop class outlines to conduct training at the entry level, thus

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

providing the institutions with correctional officers who are certified in the use of this non-lethal weapon.

Additionally, a training for trainers course will be provided for designated staff from each institution. These staff members will be certified side handle baton instructors at the completion of this course. They will then conduct training for custodial personnel at their institution. Those staff members who are authorized routine issue of the side handle baton will be trained first. Other staff will be provided this training based on available training funds.

10. USE OF CIVILIAN (NON-PEACE OFFICER) CLASSIFICATIONS

Recommendation CDC No. 8: The Department of Corrections should thoroughly evaluate the potential use of more civilian (non-peace officer) classifications to perform quasi custodial functions that do not require full correctional officer training and capabilities.

Response: The Department of Corrections underwent a thorough review of correctional officer positions conducted by the State Personnel Board. As a result of this audit, specific guidelines for allocating positions to the correctional officer class series were established. The department utilizes these guidelines to establish new positions and review the duties of existing positions.

An excerpt from these guidelines is provided below.

III

Under certain circumstances, a position responsible for providing staff assistance to a custodial supervisor in

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

an office setting may be classified as Correctional Officer, as outlined below.

- A. The work requires a thorough knowledge of custodial policies, procedures, and of inmates for successful job performance; and
- B. The position is physically located in a security area, such as the Captain's Office; and
- C. The employee serves as a staff assistant to a custodial supervisor; and
- D. The duties of the position include face-to-face contact with inmates or custodial personnel to receive and give information relating to custodial matters and requires the exercise of custodial skills in maintaining security and control.

Illustrative examples of positions which would meet this guide if all four conditions are present (A-D) are the Captain's clerk and the Correctional Administrator's clerk. Positions which are predominantly clerical and which do not have primary emphasis on custodial responsibilities should be allocated to an appropriate clerical class.

IV

Positions which have mixed job assignments, including an occupational specialty as well as duties of a custodial nature, such as protection of property and persons, direction of inmate work crews, responsibility for inmate surveillance, etc., may be allocated to the Correctional Officer class or an occupational specialty class. The following factors define when the allocation should be to the Correctional Officer class series:

- A. The critical skills required to perform the job successfully are custodial. Types of decisions made, frequency of decisions, and the extent of training required of incumbents will be used to measure the presence of this critical skill. Generally, skills of a custodial nature which can be learned on the job in several weeks' time will not be considered critical custodial skills. On the other hand, custodial skills which are learned

B. GENERAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, cont'd.

only through the Correctional Officer Academy, and continued in-service training programs and on-the-job training for uniformed staff, will be considered as illustrative of critical custodial skills; and

- B. The predominant time of the incumbent is spent on custodial duties as opposed to specialized occupational duties; and
- C. The specialized occupational skills are readily learned on the job in a few weeks.
- D. The following factors define when the allocation of a position should be to a nonuniformed occupational class. The critical knowledges and abilities required to perform the job successfully are identified as belonging to a recognized occupational specialty. Existence of a civil service class, the existence of duties of a custodial nature which can be learned in a relatively short time on the job, the availability of assistance from custodial personnel, and the type and frequency of decisions made. All these factors will be used to measure the presence of special occupational knowledges and abilities needed.

Based on the above guidelines, the positions cited by the audit are appropriately classified. The primary function of these correctional officers is the safety and security of the institution, in addition to the daily workload. CDC will continue to review correctional officer positions to insure compliance with these guidelines.

It should also be noted that under Alternate Range Criteria 40 designated clerical, trade and subprofessional staff who supervise inmates receive an increase of 10% to the base salary range. This offsets some of the apparent cost savings when reclassifying a correctional officer position.

## VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY MEASURES

### C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON

#### 1. OVERALL INMATE MOVEMENT AND SEGREGATION

Recommendation FSP No. 2: Modify Folsom facilities to improve movement and segregation, and to establish housing unit integrity.

Response: Establishing housing unit integrity through segregation and control of inmate movement is a valid concept supported by established and accepted security standards. Plant modifications and increased security measures at Folsom Prison are needed.

The proposed modifications address these issues, however, overall they are not viewed as workable based on the following items.

1. This recommendation will conflict with the Toussaint approved remodeling of the main kitchen. Any major reconstruction in this area would create a lengthy disruption of inmate services (exercise) for SHU I inmates. This would impact the Toussaint permanent injunction.
2. There would be negative impact on the feeding operation by eliminating one feeding line and increasing feeding time. The removal of the connecting hallway from #2 Dining Room to the SHU I corridor would severely complicate the logistics of transporting food during the feeding process. The food would have to be moved outdoors from the kitchen to #2 Dining Room.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

3. Modification and establishment of an exterior corridor would increase the introduction of contraband into the SHU I exercise yards. A solid wall corridor, 30' high, would need to be built to discourage general population inmates from communicating and introducing contraband to SHU inmates.
4. Tower #17 would have to be repositioned to the north wall of the corridor. This would either create additional blind spots in the yard or the yard would have to be further reduced in size.
5. Additional positions would be necessary to staff the corridor gun positions.
6. All movement in the corridor would have to be halted for SHU escorts resulting in a congregation of general population inmates at either end of the corridor.
7. Construction of this project would eliminate the Main Yard handball courts and handicap already severely inadequate recreational facilities available to the general population inmates.
8. Cost factors presented do not appear realistic considering the magnitude of construction of additional towers, relocation of towers, corridor construction, and relocation of existing activities in the areas of construction.



C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Recommendation FSP No. 3: Establish Security Housing Unit visiting and counseling/committee areas in the north half of Dining Room #1.

Response:

1. The primary objection to this recommendation is that during the refurbishing of the kitchen/culinary area certain functions will need to be relocated in one dining room. Presently, plans and monies have been approved for major reconstruction of the kitchen/culinary; activities such as sandwich preparation, vegetable preparation, pot washing, and a storeroom will be relocated in the one dining room area.

Anticipated start time of this project is March 1987. However, emergency legislation has been proposed to move the start date from March 1987 to July 1986. The time line for completion of this project is March 1988.

2. It would require major reconstruction of a road to accommodate vehicular traffic to provide access for the visitors, especially the handicapped and aged.
3. Folsom has plans to relocate visiting to the present Education Building. If this is accomplished, SHU escorts would not interfere with building activities as it would not be necessary to escort inmates through the housing units.
4. With the new maximum security prisons being built, it is likely that one building (SHU II) could be deactivated as a Security

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Housing Unit and revert to a general population housing unit. If this is done, #1 Dining Room will be needed as a feeding area.

Additionally, three alternate recommendations were proposed. Each recommendation will be addressed separately.

1. Construct a new, separate Security Housing Unit visiting and counseling building just north of building #3.

Response: A proposal has been submitted to build a dining room for building #3 in this same area. Once again, this would require construction of a visitor roadway. Additionally, the major cost of construction capital outlay expense does not compare to the need for the location of the visiting room and the security needs. If the existing visiting facilities are relocated to the current education building, the logistics problem of visiting will be greatly reduced if not eliminated.

2. Remove a significant number of first tier cells in Security Housing Unit II (east end) and convert the space to visiting and counseling use.

Response: Security Housing Unit cells are currently at a premium within the department. Any removal of SHU cells would additionally tax our already overcrowded prisons.

It would require the escorting of visitors into the security area which could lead to introduction of dangerous contraband and/or narcotics into the unit and institution. Additionally, the safety

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

and security of the visitors as well as the institution would be a primary concern during a disturbance within the prison.

Any architectural changes in cells in one building would probably require structural changes to increase the supports in an already old and aging building.

3. Add to the east end of SHU II for visiting and counseling.

Response: Once again, the safety and security of visitors and the institution would be a major concern, plus the problem of visitor accessibility to this visiting area.

2. SEARCH MEASURES

Recommendation FSP No. 4: Construct strip-search and shower facilities at the lower and upper yard gates.

Response: These projects were identified during an internal security audit of this institution last year. Costs were determined and plans were submitted. These projects are currently in the budget process at this time for review and prioritization during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget. These projects are of the highest priority of those pending at this institution. These worksites have been identified as being the major sources of the most sophisticated inmate manufactured weapons being used within the security area. The timely completion of these projects would serve two needs. They would restrict the flow of sophisticated weapons and weapon stock from these

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

work areas into the inner security perimeter as well as supply shower facilities for inmate workers. The present shower facilities at this prison are not sufficient for the inmate population resulting from overcrowding.

This project has been recommended for special legislation to provide funding for current year completion, as it is vital to the security of Folsom Prison.

Recommendation FSP No. 5: Employ two canine search units.

Response: Canine search units may be an effective tool for the control of contraband. There is a pilot canine unit being used at CTF at this time. An assessment of the effectiveness of this unit as it would apply to Folsom Prison will be completed in six months. Staffing levels at CTF are one Correctional Sergeant and one Correctional Officer for each team. If the program is to be implemented at Folsom as a result of this study, a proposal will be submitted and prioritized during the development of the Governor's Budget.

Recommendation FSP No. 6: Institute more random and frequent search activity and enforce documentation policies.

Response: Increased emphasis has been and will continue to be placed on search requirements. Folsom has activated a Search and Investigation (S&I) team consisting of one Correctional Sergeant and five Correctional Officers. Preliminary results indicate that this team is a viable factor in addressing security issues. Overcrowding

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

has caused feeding and showering time periods to extend well into the evening hours, thus precluding Third Watch officers from performing routine and necessary searches. The effectiveness of the S&I searches will be reviewed during FY 86/87 to determine justification for any further staffing increases.

When Folsom Prison reorganizes to the unitization method of management (targeted date of 7/1/86), the units will be charged with developing and maintaining a system of searching that will include complete documentation and accountability. However, the workload as mentioned above will still exist.

Recommendation FSP No. 7: Enforce the policy of limiting inmate property to six cubic feet.

Response: Current litigation prevents CDC from enforcing the procedures outlined in the Departmental Administrative Manual, Chapter 4800, Inmate Property. A Correctional Lieutenant has been assigned to develop an action plan to reduce excessive inmate property. Additional cell lockers will be needed to meet the concerns of the Fire Marshal. Correctional Industries has been contacted and cost estimations for materials and labor are being compiled. Receiving and Release will adopt procedures to dispose of excess property in accordance with CDC regulations. When the litigation issue is settled, the resulting procedures will be implemented.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

3. SURVEILLANCE MEASURES

Recommendation FSP No. 8: On a pilot basis, install remote control CCTV recording units in selected areas.

Response: Installation of a remote control surveillance system may result in reduced violence in specific areas and an increase of cases accepted for prosecution. An initial assessment identified the weight pile (a concern in FSP Recommendation #9), SHU yards, and housing unit stairways as possible areas for a pilot program. A review of available surveillance systems will be completed by March 1987. Budget augmentation would be required to implement this system.

Recommendation FSP No. 9: Relocate weight pile or remove lavatory roof to improve surveillance.

Response: Relocation of the weight pile would increase congestion in other yard areas and eliminate existing services. The roof over the shower area will be removed to enhance tower coverage in that area. A tower will be constructed on the roof of the existing laundry facilities building, thus providing additional supervision of the weight pile as well as other yard areas. This is included in the Fiscal Year 87/88 major capital outlay project to relocate the education facilities.

Recommendation FSP No. 10: Escort all trucks at all times when they enter the prison.

Response: A budget proposal has been submitted for the FY 86/87 to relocate the institutional garage outside of the security area. This

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

will reduce vehicle traffic into the institution by approximately 70%.

Presently, more detailed searches of vehicles are being conducted at the inner perimeter entrance/exit (West Gate). All outside vendor vehicles are provided with escort while inside the perimeter. Folsom Prison vehicles are driven by staff while inside the inner perimeter. All vehicles are under constant observation by tower officers.

Recommendation FSP No. 11: Remove abandoned structures, equipment and materials.

Response: The institutional property officer is presently completing an inventory of all equipment at Folsom State Prison. This task is time consuming in that the property officer positions were deleted in the early 1970s and were not reestablished until recently. The inventory, when completed, will designate equipment accountability and responsibility. Each division will be instructed to remove equipment no longer in use. Identified abandoned materials are currently being removed using inmate day labor.

Removal of abandoned structures does not present a major security problem or warrant a moderately important priority when compared to other security needs. The structures are not presently serving any purpose; however, it is difficult to anticipate long range plans for those areas. Furthermore, the structures are not in an area of high incidents or inmate assignments. If removal is necessary for future

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

utilization of these areas, costs relating to demolition of these buildings would be included in the capital outlay project.

Recommendation FSP No. 12: Install high pressure sodium lights on hills and slopes, and elsewhere as current lights are replaced.

Response: The Office of State Architect (OSA) conducted a study in 1985 of the lighting at Folsom State Prison. A five-year plan was developed to improve all interior and exterior lighting at this institution. An appropriation of \$116,700 was identified to replace existing perimeter and fence mercury vapor fixtures with high pressure sodium (HPS) lights. Phase one is scheduled for FY 86/87.

Recommendation FSP No. 13: Establish inmate picture rosters in the general housing units and I.D. card rack in the Prison Industries and culinary areas.

Response: Maintaining a pictured roster board in general housing units under the existing organizational structure is not feasible. This issue will be considered during the pre-implementation planning stage of unitization.

The present system of controlling inmates in the culinary and industries areas includes the use of card files and gate photos, respectively. Additionally, inmates must carry their identification card at all times in accordance with Director's Rule 3019.



C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Recommendation FSP No. 14: Relocate central control to a location outside the secure inner perimeter.

Response: A Project Planning Guide (PPG) will be prepared to construct a new Control Center near the West Gate. This project will provide for a secure Control Center removed from the inner perimeter as well as an effective sally port at the West Gate. Related to this proposal is the relocation of the emergency equipment and telephone relays in this area. This proposal will be submitted and prioritized for consideration as a revision to Folsom's five-year plan.

Recommendation FSP No. 15: Install safety bars above the railing on the upper tiers of housing units #2 and #3.

Response: Installation of guard rails would improve the safety of these areas. A minor capital outlay project will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the five-year plan. A preliminary cost estimate is \$70,000.

Recommendation FSP No. 16: Relocate all counselors to the housing units.

Response: The organizational structure of Folsom is being converted to the unitization concept (target date of 7/1/86). This reorganization will include the construction of administrative offices in or near the general population housing units, thus relocating the correctional counselors' offices.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Recommendation FSP No. 17: Decentralize the storage of tasers so they are more immediately accessible when needed.

Response: Requests for additional tasers are being submitted in the equipment budget request for FY 86/87. Tasers will be deployed to each housing unit with the implementation of unitization, thus providing ready access. Authorization for their use will remain at the Correctional Lieutenant level per departmental policy. Further, under the unitization concept, a Correctional Lieutenant will be assigned to each housing unit during the times of peak inmate movement; therefore, he/she will be immediately available to authorize taser use.

Recommendation FSP No. 18: Use lockable garbage dumpsters.

Response: Contraband being exchanged during the process of moving garbage is more likely being done by the interface of inmates involved in the process. Staff at Folsom Prison are being more diligent in searching inmates, materials, and vehicles moving in to and out of security areas in an effort to reduce this problem. The most effective means of addressing this issue is through procurement of individual dumpsters for each area combined with a fully automated garbage collection/compacting vehicle. The purchase of such a vehicle will require a cost study. If the study proves economical, this proposal will be submitted and prioritized for consideration as a revision to Folsom's five-year plan.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Recommendation FSP No. 19: Replace metal eating utensils with plastic utensils.

Response: The Food Manager will conduct a survey to determine workable procedures utilized by other institutions and submit a report by April 21, 1986 to the Captain. This report will address such issues as cost effectiveness and weapons designed from plastic utensils. Weapons fashioned from metal utensils have not been a problem at Folsom Prison.

Recommendation FSP No. 20: Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units.

Response: Folsom Prison has 2,060 mainline beds that would require conversion to solid pan bottom units. At a cost of \$200 a unit, this would require an expenditure of \$412,000.

These beds would be manufactured by Prison Industries. Delivery would be approximately seven months from date ordered with an approximate installation time of 18 months.

When compared with other security issues and projects, this recommendation does not seem cost effective and warrants a low priority rating.

1. SECURITY HOUSING UNITS

Recommendation FSP No. 21: Install expanded metal screens on the inside of cell doors in Security Housing Unit II.

Response: This recommendation will not be implemented at Folsom Prison for the following reasons.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

1. Folsom Prison has not experienced a high rate of spearing incidents. In fact, this type of assault is very low and most assaults on staff are without a weapon.
2. The Southern Maximum Security Complex at Tehachapi will have a Security Housing Unit. A similar unit may be established at New Folsom. With the opening of these units, the need for SHU beds will be reduced. It is likely that SHU II would be deactivated and returned to a general population housing unit.

Due to the cost factor, coupled with the low rate of weapons assaults on staff, this project is deemed unnecessary.

Recommendation FSP No. 22: Prohibit general population inmates from working in security housing units.

Response: SHU II has six major construction projects which require intensive inmate labor to complete. The Maintenance Supervisor anticipates at least three months before these projects will be completed. Completion of these projects is imperative to insure compliance with the Toussaint Permanent Injunction and First and Second Reports from the Monitor. Maintenance will review the need for inmate labor in the SHUs when these projects are finalized.

Recommendation FSP No. 23: Eliminate contact visiting for Security Housing Unit inmates.

Response: Currently SHU inmates are placed on non-contact visiting status based on individual case factors. This is due primarily to the

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

limited facilities available (14 non-contact visiting spaces). This area must also accommodate general population inmates who are on restricted visiting for rule violations.

Folsom staff will review the San Quentin Prison procedure which requires all Maximum A custody inmates to visit on non-contact visiting status. An analysis will be conducted to determine if this procedure could be implemented at Folsom without a serious reduction in the length of time visiting would be available.

A project has been developed to utilize the existing education building for visiting once the education services are relocated. This would increase available visiting space.

6. VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AREA

Recommendation FSP No. 24: Relocate the lower yard custody office to a point across from the count gate.

Response: The relocation of the lower yard custody office is a valid recommendation. The proposed site will improve supervision capabilities. A Project Planning Guide (PPG) will be submitted and prioritized for consideration as a revision to Folsom State Prison's five-year plan.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Recommendation FSP No. 25: Rearrange the internal structure of Vocational Education buildings.

Response: The internal structure of this building is being remodeled to accommodate centralized issue of tools and supplies. During the remodeling phase, expansion of glass and/or wire mesh partitions to increase visibility will be incorporated wherever possible. However, this project will not remodel the building to the extent addressed in this recommendation. Further changes will be reviewed in conjunction with other proposed projects in this area.

Recommendation FSP No. 26: If the assignment of significant numbers of close custody inmates to Vocational Education results in serious incidents, construct a gunwalk along the length of the main vocational building.

Response: A preliminary evaluation into the feasibility of increasing security measures needed to allow close custody inmates in the lower yard has been conducted. It has been determined that placing close custody inmates in the lower yard could be a workable situation. However, in order to accomplish this task, major plant modifications and increased staffing levels are necessary. Budget change proposals for additional positions and major capital outlay requests for construction are being prepared by Folsom. The proposals will be reviewed and prioritized for possible inclusion in the 1987/88 Governor's Budget and Folsom's five-year plan, respectively.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

If the above proposal is approved security measures and positions will be in place prior to close custody inmate assignments. Refurbishing and activation of towers #23, #24, and #7 would best serve overall security in the lower yard.

7. TOOL CONTROL

Recommendation FSP No. 27: Establish centralized tool/materials cribs in the vocational and industries area.

Recommendation FSP No. 28: Strictly enforce prison policy requiring inmate workers to carry tool lists.

Response: A Tool Reorganization Team is scheduled to evaluate and resolve discrepancies identified by an internal audit completed in February 1986. Division heads have been directed to provide a response to this team addressing the issues on a short and long term basis. A Tool Control Committee comprised of representatives from all major assignment areas is currently holding monthly meetings. Agenda items will include control of personal tools, recordkeeping, inmate worker tool lists, policy enforcement, etc. A status report is to be submitted for the Warden's review by October 1, 1986 or one month following the completion and activation of the reorganization plans to accommodate a centralized receiving, distribution, inventory and accounting system. The lower yard project is scheduled to be completed by September 1, 1986.

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

Operating centralized cribs in both the vocational and industries shop areas for the control of sensitive tools will require two additional employees. This staffing request will be considered and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

8. KEY CONTROL

Recommendation FSP No. 29: Establish key exchange system for the vocational and Prison Industries areas.

Recommendation FSP No. 30: Assign the locksmith to report administratively to the key control officer.

Response: The entire key control process is being revised. A Key Control Correctional Officer position has been activated and will be working in concert with the locksmith. This officer is currently conducting an area by area update. Additionally, revised work order procedures have been implemented and will improve recordkeeping. An analysis of key control procedures will include the following:

1. Procedure and policy enforcement
2. Preventive maintenance
3. Recordkeeping
4. Work order processing
5. Key exchange systems in all work areas
6. Workload and overtime issues.

Preliminary review indicates that security needs as well as equipment maintenance can be met and maintained by increasing administrative and supervisory control, procedure modifications and practice compliance.



C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

The locksmith shop will be relocated to provide a work area conducive with the tasks to be accomplished. A PPG will be submitted and prioritized for consideration as a revision to Folsom's five-year plan.

Revised organizational plans will identify the locksmith and key control officer administratively reporting to the Armory Sergeant.

9. OTHER COMMENTS

a. Emergency Communications

A new intercommunication system is needed. A full review of the existing communication system and identification of a suitable replacement system will be developed. Portable radios were issued to the institution on 1/29/86. The department is currently conducting a comprehensive audit of existing radio equipment that will result in a redistribution of equipment based on established procedures.

The Departmental Technology Transfer Committee is reviewing state-of-the-art personal alarm equipment for possible implementation on a department-wide basis. A proposal will be submitted and prioritized for consideration in the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

b. SHU II Exercise Yards

The development of additional exercise yards for Security Housing Unit II would increase management options. However, it is not

C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO FOLSOM STATE PRISON, cont'd.

viewed as necessary in that Toussaint requirements are being met plus additional staffing and other major costs associated with this proposal are not viewed as cost effective.

c. Portable Metal Detectors

An evaluation team is currently conducting a detailed review of metal detectors. The results of this study will be available in July 1986. Purchase of additional metal detectors has been postponed pending results of the study.

Repair service for metal detector units is available and will be utilized. A formalized preventive maintenance and testing schedule will be developed. Training for operators will also be accomplished.

- d. The #5 Building gunwalk and #2 Dining Room gun post (South end of dining room) are separate positions. Access to the dining room post is through #5 Building gunwalk and restroom facilities for both posts are on the gunwalk. The coverage for each position is as follows:

°#5 Building Gunwalk: One Correctional Officer, 24-hour coverage, 7 days, with full relief.

°#2 Dining Room Gun Post: One Correctional Officer, 16-hour coverage, 0500-2100, with full relief.

Both positions are separate functions and are absolutely essential for the security of these areas.

VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY MEASURES

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL

1. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA RECEPTION CENTER NEEDS

Recommendation RCC No. 2: Build a new reception center in Southern California.

Response: Senate Bill 904, introduced by Senator Presley would authorize the Department of Corrections to construct a 1,700 bed work-based or medical prison or reception center, or combination thereof, in Los Angeles County. This bill has passed the Senate and is currently in the Assembly. This legislation was introduced in March 1985.

Recommendation RCC No. 3: Develop and implement interim plans to relieve reception center overcrowding at CIM by some combination of the following alternatives.

Response: The California Department of Corrections is currently studying a number of alternatives aimed at reducing the overcrowding situation in the reception centers (California Institution for Men and California Medical Facility). Converting CIM-East to a reception center, decreasing the processing time, and separate housing/processing area(s) for parole violators returned to custody, designated "enroute" cases and higher custody inmates, as suggested in this audit, are some of the alternatives being considered. Review and decision processes are expected to be accomplished within 30 days.

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

Recommendation RCC No. 4: Substantially expand and improve operations in the Receiving and Release area.

Response: Funding has been approved to expand R&R by moving the rear wall back eleven feet. Further expansion and modernization will be necessary to completely improve processing. This proposal will be submitted and prioritized for consideration as a revision to CIM's five-year plan.

Recommendation RCC No. 5: Request committing counties to provide copies of State and FBI arrest records for incoming inmates.

Response: The State and Federal arrest records of incoming inmates could be helpful during the initial processing phase. Penal Code Section 1203(c) provides for the committing county to submit a probation officer's report to the Department of Corrections. Sometimes these reports are not submitted or are very sketchy. An abstract of judgement or minute order must accompany the inmate. A study will be conducted to determine the need for additional documents.

Recommendation RCC No. 6: Conduct orientation of new inmates within 24 hours.

Response: It is not practical at this time to provide orientation on a daily basis. The current population level, volume of movement throughout the building, the time frames required to serve meals, and numerous bed moves restricts the availability of staff to supervise and/or provide orientation, as well as the absence of a suitable meeting area. When the Reception Center population is reduced, this

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

recommendation will be reviewed. The orientation program is currently being conducted in the clinical area on Saturday mornings to accommodate arrivals during the previous work week. All new arrivals receive a full orientation within five days after arrival.

3. PERIMETER SECURITY

Recommendation RCC No. 7: Construct a second fence around the perimeter, install razor ribbon in appropriate locations, and install an electronic detection system.

Response: The construction of a second perimeter fence, as described in the recommendation would enhance security. If a second fence is installed and a tower is constructed at the southeast corner (RCC No. 9) the necessity for an electronic detection system is questionable. A minor capital outlay request will be prepared and prioritized for inclusion in CIM's five-year plan.

Recommendation RCC No. 8: Construct a second loading dock at the east end of the Main Corridor, including a second vehicle sally port.

Response: The creation of an additional ingress and egress point at the east end of the corridor could jeopardize the security of the building. It is generally felt that the more entrances/exits that exist in a correctional institution contribute to problems associated with exchange of contraband, control and/or security in the movement of inmates. The same desired result could be achieved by expanding and providing correctional officer staffing to the current loading dock entrance gate area adjacent to Receiving and Release. A major capital

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

outlay request will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.

Recommendation RCC No. 9: Construct a new tower at the southeast corner of the perimeter fence.

Response: Construction of a tower at the southeast corner, along with the installation of the second fence recommended, would enhance the security of RCC. Appropriate funding proposals will be developed and prioritized during the development of the 1987/88 Governor's Budget.

4. INMATE MOVEMENT AND SEGREGATION

Recommendation RCC No. 10: Reduce inmate traffic in the main corridor during peak processing times by instituting revised procedures.

Response: Various alternatives to reduce inmate traffic are being explored. The overcrowded conditions plus the numerous processing activities contribute to this congestion. The specific suggestions provided with this recommendation are addressed below.

°Change canteen days to Saturday and Sunday so the canteen line will occur only during non-processing times.

Response: The canteen manager must operate the canteen at RCC and East. In order to provide this service to general population inmates under the work incentive program, the canteen must be available on Saturdays and Sundays. This results in the practice of the canteen being open one weekend day at each facility.

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

°Dispense controlled medications in the housing units to eliminate the twice-a-day "pill line" by the medical.

Response: Dispensing medication in the housing units would require new or redirected medical staff to RCC. This will be studied by RCC staff in cooperation with the medical staff. The study will be completed by April 10, 1986.

°Schedule exercise for Madrone and Sycamore Hall inmates in the southwest and northwest yards that are currently used only for weekend visiting by the Permanent Work Crew (PWC) inmates. If desired, one housing unit officer and one S&E officer could be assigned to each yard to supplement the gun coverage of Towers No. 10 and No. 14.

Response: There are several security concerns that prevent the use of the southwest and northwest yards for exercise by inmates housed in Madrone and Sycamore Halls. The close proximity of the northwest yard to the CIM-Minimum main gate and the footpath used by visitors enroute to the RCC non-contact visiting area would make the introduction of contraband an ongoing problem. Additionally, these yards are not double fenced. Furthermore, the need to utilize a housing unit and/or S&E officers would redirect staff from areas already requiring their attention, i.e., housing unit searches and corridor coverage.

°Schedule clinical interviews and sick call to minimize the number of inmates moving and waiting in the main corridor. Because inmates essentially move unescorted, most of the waiting time should be in the housing units.

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

Response: Clinical interviews are scheduled with ducats and sick call is a controlled release (one unit at a time). If dispensing medication in the housing units becomes a practice, the medical employee present could conduct a "pre-sick call" interview. The medical employee would determine the need for examination and/or treatment in the clinic, thus reducing inmate traffic in the main corridor.

°Review PWC schedules in an effort to reduce the current high volume of movement in and out of the PWC dormitory area.

Response: There are approximately sixty PWC inmates housed in RCC. Any restrictions on their movement would not significantly impact the volume of movement in RCC. Additionally, the existing restrictions necessary for a Level III/IV facility already affect PWC inmates who may otherwise be housed in a lower level institution.

Recommendation RCC No. 11: Motorize two of the main corridor grille gates.

Response: It is planned to motorize these corridor grille gates. Material will be ordered by June 1, 1986 and completion of project will be accomplished by June 30, 1987.



D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

Recommendation RCC No. 12: Provide corridor officers with portable radios.

Response: The department is currently conducting a comprehensive audit of existing radio equipment. This will result in a redistribution of equipment based on established procedures.

5. SAFETY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Recommendation RCC No. 13: Examine all cell locking mechanisms and prepare a plan for replacement.

Response: The entire locking system in Birch Hall is inadequate, obsolete, and beyond repair. A funding request has been submitted that would provide for replacement of the entire system. This project is considered a high priority because numerous incidents have occurred where inmates have breached the locking system to the cell, thus being able to enter and exit at will. This housing unit is located on the southeast corner of the institution where there is no perimeter tower. The locking systems in the other housing units are repairable. All locks will be inspected by September 1, 1986; repairs or replacements will be accomplished as needed.

Recommendation RCC No. 14: Install a walk-through metal detector at the main yard entrance.

Response: Metal detection devices are being reviewed by the Departmental Technology Transfer Committee. CIM will reprioritize and

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

substitute the purchase of two additional metal detectors (one for RCC and one for East) from the 86/87 equipment budget of \$528,000.

Recommendation RCC No. 15: Place expanded metal screens over windows in several areas.

Response: Expanded metal screens covering windows would not improve or reduce window breakage or exchange of contraband and personal items. Additionally, cleaning would be difficult if not impossible with the accumulation of dirt, spider webs, and similar items between the screen and window. This situation has evolved since it became necessary to house inmates in the dayrooms. Currently this does not create a major problem. Furthermore, with the departmental plans to relieve reception center overcrowding coupled with the opening of new institutions, the beds in the dayrooms will be eliminated.

Recommendation RCC No. 16: Relocate the high voltage power lines located next to Tower #11.

Response: The power lines in question pass the tower at a distance nearly ten feet away from the tower. There is little likelihood that they would come in contact with the tower. This is not a high priority project when compared to other security needs.

Recommendation RCC No. 17: Increase the lighting in the main corridor.

Response: Maintenance will develop a work plan to upgrade the lighting in the corridor by March 1987.

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

Recommendation RCC No. 18: Remove inoperative heating units in the main corridor.

Response: The CIM maintenance department has as of this date removed all of these heaters.

Recommendation RCC No. 19: Purchase or fabricate lockable trash containers.

Response: Post orders will be revised to indicate that all trash containers will be escorted while being moved in the corridor. This will reduce the possibility of contraband items being obtained by inmates.

Recommendation RCC No. 20: Include metal food trays, soup bowls, and plastic cups in the count of eating utensils.

Response: There has not been a significant number of incidents to indicate that weapons fashioned from these utensils have been a problem or cause for concern. A minimum of two additional staff members would be needed to insure inmates obtained and returned each utensil. Control of these items in Palm Hall, an administrative segregation unit, is done because inmates are fed in their cells and are issued all items. This allows the officers to account for these utensils.

6. GENERAL HOUSING UNITS

Recommendation RCC No. 21: Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Madrone, Sycamore, Birch, and Cypress Halls.

Response: Installation of safety bars would increase the safety level for staff as well as inmates in the units, although there have been

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

very few situations in the past that could have been prevented by the additional railing. This is considered a low priority compared to other security needs. A minor capital outlay project will be submitted and prioritized for consideration as a revision to CIM's five-year plan.

Recommendation RCC No 22: Install expanded metal cage around cell lockboxes on second and third tiers of Cypress Hall.

Response: Expanded metal cages have been installed as outlined in the recommendation.

Recommendation RCC No. 23: Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units.

Response: RCC has 458 beds that would require conversion to solid pan bottom units. At a cost of \$200 a unit, this would require an expenditure of \$91,600.

These beds would be manufactured by Prison Industries. Delivery would be approximately seven months from date ordered with an approximate installation time of 18 months.

When compared with other security issues and projects, this recommendation does not seem cost-effective and warrants a low priority rating.

7. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION UNITS

Recommendation RCC No. 24: Electrically interlock certain doors in Palm Hall (administrative segregation housing).

Response: Interlocking the interior and exterior doors of the sally port entrance to Palm Hall and causing them to be operated by the cage

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

officer is not a workable situation. The unit officer who unlocks the inner door has the ability to observe anyone standing to the outside of the door. The cage officer would not have this ability.

The kitchen door leads to the main corridor. The outer corridor door is approximately 35-40 feet from the cage officer's position and is behind a solid wall. This area is completely out of the view of the cage officer; therefore, this position should not have the responsibility or ability to open a security door when the activity cannot be observed.

RCC has changed the procedures for delivery carts. The food and other delivery carts enter through the kitchen door. The only occasion when doors will be opened is to allow rapid entrance by responding staff during an emergency situation.

Recommendation RCC No. 25: Modify food services procedures in Palm Hall by using stacked trays or installing a small mechanical lift.

Response: The use of plastic-type insulated stackable trays is being tested. These trays would enable staff to carry several trays at a time, plus keep the food hot. Purchase orders will be completed upon completion of the test period.

Recommendation RCC No. 26: Install a sally port at the entrance to the Palm Hall exercise yards.

Established procedures provide the necessary security measures.

Inmates are given an unclothed body search prior to leaving the unit.

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

The yard officer is provided coverage by the tower officer while he/she is removing mechanical restraints (handcuffs) and opening the yard gates.

8. CONTROL ROOM AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Recommendation RCC No. 27: Modify the Control Room access door to electrically interlock with the two pedestrian sally port gates.

Response: An interlocking system for the control room door and sally-port gates will be purchased. This system will be installed by February 1987.

Recommendation RCC No. 28: Install bars over Control Room windows that face the pedestrian sally port.

Response: Installing bars over the control room windows facing the pedestrian sallyport would provide an increase in the security of this sensitive area. The bars will be fabricated in the CIM maintenance department and installed by October 1986.

Recommendation RCC No. 29: Install an effective ventilation system in the Control Room.

Response: A minor capital outlay project will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.

Recommendation RCC No. 30: Monitor the shelf life of chemical agents in the armory and replace as indicated.

Response: A proposed revision of the Departmental Administrative Manual, Chapter 4800, includes provisions for the removal and

D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-RECEPTION CENTER CENTRAL, cont'd.

destruction of outdated, damaged or contaminated chemical agents. The chemical agents mentioned in the Auditor General's report have been removed from the RCC Armory.

Recommendation RCC No. 31: Install an emergency generator and an emergency lighting system.

Response: A statewide emergency power study is currently in progress. A PPG (Project Planning Guide) will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan unless emergency funds are provided earlier.

9. TOOL AND KEY CONTROL

Recommendation RCC No. 32: Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity.

Response: The CIM maintenance department has proposed a reorganization of its staff. When approved, approximately six positions will be assigned to Reception Center Central. This will greatly improve responsibility and accountability for tool control and material handling.

Recommendation RCC No. 33: Establish a procedure for destruction of broken and worn keys.

Response: All broken or damaged keys are destroyed by the CIM locksmith prior to the salvaging process. Folger-Adams keys must be returned to the company; therefore, they are not destroyed in any manner.

## VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY MEASURES

### E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST

#### 1. PERIMETER SECURITY

Recommendation EAST No. 2: Construct a second perimeter fence with razor ribbon, and install additional perimeter lighting.

Response: This project is included in the current five-year plan in Fiscal Year 1989/90. Razor wire is included in the project plans. Sensors are currently available on the existing fence. The available fence detection devices should be adequate to provide early warning before the second fence is breached. Cost of the project was estimated at \$209,414.

A PPG (Project Planning Guide) will be submitted to augment existing perimeter lighting. Current lighting would not be adequate since existing fence would shadow the second fence and diminish optimum visibility. Plans for this project will be submitted and prioritized by June 1986 for inclusion in the CIM five-year plan. Total cost for the second fence and improved lighting (high pressure sodium fixtures similar to CIM-Minimum) will be approximately \$250,000.

Recommendation EAST No. 3: Construct a new visitor processing center and pedestrian sally port at the main entrance.

Response: Plans to increase the size and capacity of the current gatehouse at CIM-East were submitted in late 1985 and are included under minor capital outlay for Fiscal Year 1987/88. The center will include



E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

a visitors search area, two restrooms that would accommodate the handicapped and an enclosed (safety glass) officers' station, with entry via one security electrical door into an enclosed fenced sallyport area.

The pedestrian sallyport plans have been approved for construction now. Material for the project has been ordered and partially received. Construction will begin 4/1/86.

Recommendation EAST No. 4: Install razor ribbon along the top of the vehicle sallyport.

Response: A work order has been submitted requesting that razor ribbon be installed on top of the sally port as well as the fence leading from the sally port east towards the visiting grounds. Installation is scheduled to begin 4/21/86.

Recommendation EAST No. 5: Install additional lighting in the vehicle sally port.

Response: A work order has been submitted requesting that lighting in the sally port be improved by either increasing the number of lights or changing the type of lights to provide more illumination. This project is scheduled to begin 7/7/86.

2. TOWERS

Recommendation EAST No. 6: Modify the Gym Tower to improve visibility and effectiveness.

Response: A proposal will be submitted with plans to change the angle of the windows on the tower on three sides to increase visibility

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

directly below the tower without opening the window. Raising the tower would only improve visibility in the main yard, but would deprive or diminish the Tower Officer visibility inside the gymnasium. The proposal will include installation of a door leading from the tower to a caged platform into the gymnasium thus providing greater visibility and gun coverage into the gym, while insuring security for this armed post. The PPG will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.

Recommendation EAST No. 7: Implement a planned replacement program for certain tower windows.

Response: A survey of the CIM-East towers reveals that some of the window panes have been damaged by sand storms and replacement seems advisable. Other armed perimeter posts manned 24 hours per day within the CIM Complex (19 towers) may have similar needs. CIM maintenance department will develop a planned replacement program by February 1987.

CIM-East submitted a work order to replace the damaged windows in Towers 1, 2, 3, and 4. Work on this project is scheduled to begin 5/12/86 with a completion date of 5/30/86.

Recommendation EAST No. 8: Relocate the inmate yard telephones from the Gym Tower area to the housing units.

Response: In mid-1985, CIM Business Services and the telephone company, at the request of CIM-East Administration, conducted a survey of inmate telephones with a dual purpose in mind.

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

1. Increase the number of inmate telephones to meet the needs of a much larger population.
2. Relocate the telephones from the present location on the gym wall to inside each housing unit.

The telephone company conducted a walk-through and identified an area in each of the units where inmate telephones could be located.

Monitoring devices would be placed in each of the officer's stations.

This project would increase the number of inmate telephones from 4 to 8 and would distribute responsibility for monitoring among the 8 housing units rather than the single post currently monitoring this activity.

Business Services indicated that the phones will be moved in the units following renovation of the CIM Complex telephone system, which has a completion date of late April/May 1986.

3. GENERAL HOUSING UNITS

Recommendation EAST No. 9: Install security grilles and gates at extreme ends of the Alpine, Butte, and Colusa housing units.

Response: A proposal will be submitted with a detailed plan to construct and weld a security grille with a gate manually operated by utilizing a Folger-Adams key at the extreme ends of Alpine Upper and Lower, Butte Upper and Lower, and Colusa Upper and Lower. This project, when completed, will be similar to the grill gates that are currently in place in Del Norte. The Project Planning Guide will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

Recommendation EAST No. 10: Develop a multi-year capital improvement plan if CIM-East is to remain a Level III institution.

Response: CIM-East staff and management continue to identify capital improvement projects for inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.

The current five-year plan identifies the following projects for CIM-East:

Install 2nd Perimeter Fence....	Major Capital Outlay FY 1989/90
Expand Entry Gate House.....	Minor Capital Outlay FY 1987/88
Expand Visiting Area.....	Minor Capital Outlay FY 1989/90
Public Address System.....	Minor Capital Outlay FY 1989/90
Renovate Gun Towers.....	Special Repair..... FY 1989/90

Specific Recommendations:

°Replacing the aluminum louvered windows.

Response: The original manufacturer of the aluminum louvered windows is no longer in business and replacement parts for the existing windows are not available. Other manufacturers were contacted to repair or replace the existing windows. A Project Planning Guide will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.

°Replacing fluorescent cell lights with recessed security lights.

Response: The maintenance electrical department has been given the responsibility to identify secure lights to replace the fluorescent lights currently in place. The CIM-East Captain and

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

the electrical department are considering various models at the present time. Business Services is requesting funds for the purchase of these lights from the current budget year. Once a model has been selected, the lights will be purchased with CIM special repair funds.

°Replacing electrical switches and duplex outlets with security fixtures.

Response: There are no current plans of replacing light switches or duplex outlets with security switches. However, stainless steel plate covers have been ordered and will be installed with security screws.

°Replacing outside doors with security doors and a Folger-Adams type of locking mechanism.

Response: A study of keys and locking mechanisms at CIM-East has been completed. The manufacturer of the current locking devices (tumblers) is no longer in business. The locks are being changed as the need for replacement occurs. A proposal was submitted to Business Services to replace all current obsolete locking devices, to complement a more stringent key control plan. The locksmith has obtained bids and has been given tentative approval to proceed with this new key control plan at CIM-East.

The plan would also include replacing the current unit doors at CIM-East with steel doors equipped with Folger-Adams type locking mechanisms.

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

°Installing bars on control room windows.

Response: Placing bars on control room windows is not practical in a Level III facility where the expectations are that living unit staff be visible to deter misconduct, perform searches, conduct security inspections, supervise inmate workers and meet the housekeeping needs of inmates.

°Removing the walls in Prison Industries for better surveillance.

Response: The walls separate the 85 men assigned in this area and provide for less congestion with better noise control than an open area. Conversely, three supervisors can supervise all work areas at the same time. Effective 3/1/86, yard officers were assigned the responsibility to walk through Correctional Industries as often as possible during their tour of duty to provide additional surveillance.

4. PRISON INDUSTRIES

Recommendation EAST No. 11: Establish a random patrol by correctional officers during the work hours at Prison Industries.

Recommendation EAST No. 12: Conduct clothed body searches of Prison Industries inmates using portable metal detectors.

Response #11 and #12: Officers' post orders have been changed to reflect responsibility for random patrol in industries during the day. Yard officers are dispatched to Prison Industries twice daily to assist

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

in the searches of inmates as they depart their work area. Included with the clothed body search, a hand held metal detector is being utilized to detect any metal/weapons. CIM will reprioritize and substitute the purchase of two additional metal detectors (one for East and one for RCC) from the 86/87 equipment budget of \$528,000.

Recommendation EAST No. 13: Install a twelve-foot fence with a truck gate around Prison Industries and Maintenance.

Response: An approval has been given to construct a 12 foot high, 298 foot long chain link fence, with razor wire, to enclose the entire front area of the Prison Industries and maintenance shop. There would be two gates, one gate for pedestrian movement and one double-wide gate for vehicular traffic. The construction is scheduled to begin in September 1986 and will be performed by the CIM maintenance department, with an inmate work force.

5. SAFETY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

Recommendation EAST No. 14: Install an emergency generator and an emergency lighting system.

Response: A statewide emergency power study is currently in progress. A PPG (Project Planning Guide) will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan unless emergency funds are provided earlier.

E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

Recommendation EAST No. 15: Implement a food services utensil count system.

Response: Past incidents do not indicate that weapons fashioned from forks and spoons have been a problem or cause for concern in this Level III facility. A minimum of two additional staff members would be needed to insure inmates obtained and returned each utensil.

6. TOOL AND KEY CONTROL

Recommendation EAST No. 16: Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity.

Response: The CIM maintenance department has proposed a reorganization of its staff. When approved, the plan would assign six maintenance staff to CIM-East and would greatly improve responsibility and accountability for tool control and material handling.

Recommendation EAST No. 17: Establish a procedure for destruction of broken or damaged keys.

Response: The institutional locksmith has been instructed to destroy all keys prior to resale for salvage, except Folger-Adams keys which must be returned to the factory. We are currently in compliance with this process.

7. OTHER COMMENTS

Plans for construction of an inside visiting area and office space for staff including a sally port for the processing and unclothed body



E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO CIM-EAST, cont'd.

searches of inmates, is included in the CIM Complex five-year plan. The cost estimates of building an indoor visiting area between Del Norte and the Administration Building is \$170,711. This project funding and construction is planned for Fiscal Year 1988/89.

PRIORITY GROUPING OF RECOMMENDATIONS

A. HIGHEST PRIORITY

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
CDC 1	<p>Management and supervisory personnel should increase efforts to enforce departmental and institutional security policies and procedures.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Effective management and operation of the existing institutions and camp facilities are high priority goals of the California Department of Corrections.</p>
CDC 8	<p>The Department of Corrections should thoroughly evaluate the potential use of more civilian (non-peace officer) classifications to perform quasi-custodial functions that do not require full correctional officer training and capabilities.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The SPB conducted an audit in 1981 of correctional officer positions. The guidelines developed have been used by this department to conduct internal audits. The majority of positions cited in this audit meet the established guidelines.</p>
FSP 2	<p>Modify Folsom facilities to improve inmate movement and segregation, and to establish housing unit integrity.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The recommended facility modifications are not viewed as workable. However, the need to establish unit integrity and control inmate movement is valid.</p>
FSP 4	<p>Construct strip search and shower facilities at the Lower and Upper Yard gates.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This project is currently in the planning and funding stages.</p>
FSP 15	<p>Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Housing Units #2 and #3.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A minor capital outlay project will be completed and prioritized for possible inclusion in the five-year plan.</p>
RCC 1	<p>Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-RCC posts we reviewed should consist of about 205 peace officer and civilian positions (<u>including sick leave relief</u>).</p>

A. HIGHEST PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
	<p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Substantial funding is involved in this recommendation and it will require in-depth review by the Department of Corrections. A detailed response is provided in the narrative response.</p>
RCC 3	<p>Develop and implement interim plans to relieve reception center overcrowding at CIM by some combination of the following alternatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>°Conversion of CIM-East into a satellite reception center.</li><li>°Decreasing inmate processing time.</li><li>°Establish another facility for inmates who do not require intake processing.</li></ul> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This item is currently under study at the departmental level and certain alternatives designed to accomplish this need will be implemented in the very near future.</p>
RCC 4	<p>Substantially expand and improve operations in the Receiving and Release area.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> We agree with this recommendation and its high priority placement. It would however, be a major capital outlay expenditure, and will be reviewed for prioritization along with other major capital outlay projects.</p>
RCC 21	<p>Install safety bars above the railings on the upper tiers of Madrone, Sycamore, Birch, and Cypress Halls.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This would be a desirable thing to do, but it is not viewed as a "highest priority". A proposal will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.</p>

B. VERY IMPORTANT PRIORITY

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
CDC 2	<p>Acquire additional security equipment for Folsom, CIM-RCC, and CIM-East, including: megaphones, search kits, flashlights, metal detectors, fluoroscopes, protective vests, and personal duress alarms.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Many of these equipment items are being purchased at the local level. State-of-the-art metal detector equipment and personal alarm devices are being studied. Protective vests are in the final planning and purchase stages.</p>
FSP 3	<p>Establish SHU visiting and counseling/committee areas in the north half of Dining Room #1.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This recommendation is in conflict with other reconstruction projects.</p>
FSP 6	<p>Institute more random and frequent search activity, and enforce documentation policies.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A Search and Investigations Team has been activated. Numerous and random searches are being conducted. Log books will be established.</p>
FSP 14	<p>Relocate Central Control to a location outside the secure inner perimeter.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A Project Planning Guide to relocate the Control Center to the West Gate area will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in Folsom's five-year plan.</p>
FSP 21	<p>Install expanded metal screens on the inside of cell doors in SHU II.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Folsom Prison has not had a major problem with spearing incidents and most staff assaults in the SHU II are physical altercations and not weapons related. This project is, therefore, rated as a least important priority.</p>
RCC 2	<p>Build a new reception center in southern California.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Senate Bill 904, introduced by Senator Presley in March 1985, addresses this issue. The bill has passed the Senate and is currently in the Assembly.</p>

B. VERY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
RCC 7	<p>Construct a second fence around the perimeter, install razor ribbon in appropriate locations, and install an electronic detection system.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This item will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in CIM's minor capital outlay five-year plan.</p>
RCC 8	<p>Construct a second loading dock at the east end of the Main Corridor, including a second vehicle sally port.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Expansion of the existing loading dock is the preferred method of separating institution vehicular traffic. A major capital outlay project will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in CIM's five-year plan.</p>
RCC 10	<p>Reduce inmate traffic in the Main Corridor during peak processing times by instituting revised procedures.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Inmate traffic in the main corridor is congested. Alternatives are being explored and will be implemented, i.e., dispensing medication in the housing unit.</p>
RCC 11	<p>Motorize two of the Main Corridor grille gates.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The majority of the equipment necessary to accomplish this recommendation has been procured. The estimated completion date is June 30, 1987.</p>
RCC 13	<p>Examine all cell locking mechanisms and prepare a plan for replacement.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A funding proposal that would provide for replacement of the entire Birch Hall locking system has been submitted and will be prioritized for possible inclusion in CIM's five-year plan. All of the other systems will be inspected by 9/1/86.</p>
East 2	<p>Construct a second perimeter fence with razor ribbon, and install additional perimeter lighting.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This project is included in the current CIM major capital outlay five-year plan.</p>
East 3	<p>Construct a new visitor processing center and pedestrian sally port at the Main Entrance.</p>

B. VERY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
	<u>RESPONSE:</u> This project is included in the current CIM minor capital outlay five-year plan.
East 8	Relocate the inmate yard telephones from the Gym Tower area to the housing units.
	<u>RESPONSE:</u> Project scheduled to begin following renovation of CIM telephone system currently in progress.
East 9	Install security grilles and gates at extreme ends of Alpine, Butte, and Colusa housing units.
	<u>RESPONSE:</u> Project planning guide with drawing specification will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.
East 12	Conduct clothed body search of Prison Industry inmates using portable metal detectors.
	<u>RESPONSE:</u> Currently in compliance. Yard officer post orders have been changed to reflect added responsibilities.

C. MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
CDC 3	<p>Design and implement an automated prison management information system.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A management informations system is being developed. New information systems will be proposed for the FY 86/87 budget with implementation scheduled to begin July 1, 1986. This is a very important priority.</p>
CDC 4	<p>Institute detailed, systematic analysis of serious incidents.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> An analysis of violent incidents at Folsom Prison was conducted as a pilot project. The project will be expanded and does include automated data collection.</p>
CDC 5	<p>Seek changes to Title 15 that prohibit return of sentence credits forfeited for selected serious violations.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> In 1985 the department proposed revisions to Penal Code Section 2933 to significantly alter present restoration provisions. This bill was introduced by Senator Presley. It has passed the Senate and is currently in the Assembly Public Safety Committee.</p>
CDC 6	<p>Consider establishing a special maximum security prison for the most troublesome inmates.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> CDC has developed a proposal to address this issue. The plan provides for the transfer of gang leaders who perpetuate violence at San Quentin or Folsom, to a special unit at the Southern Maximum Security Center in Tehachapi.</p>
FSP 1	<p>Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the Folsom State Prison posts we reviewed should consist of about 547 peace officer and civilian positions (<u>including</u> sick leave relief).</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A detailed response is provided in the narrative response.</p>
FSP 5	<p>Employ two canine search units.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A study of the existing program at CTF will be conducted to determine feasibility of implementing the program at Folsom.</p>

C. MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
FSP 8	<p>On a pilot basis, install remote control CCTV recording units in selected areas.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A review of available surveillance systems will be completed by March 1987. Budget augmentation would be necessary to implement this system.</p>
FSP 9	<p>Relocate weight pile or remove lavatory roof to improve surveillance.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The roof over the shower area will be removed. Other proposed facility modifications will include construction of a tower on the roof of the existing laundry building, thus providing additional surveillance.</p>
FSP 11	<p>Remove abandoned structures, equipment and materials.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The removal of structures no longer in use is costly. This recommendation is rated as a least important priority. Equipment and materials are being removed.</p>
FSP 12	<p>Install high pressure sodium lights on hills and slopes, and elsewhere as current lights are replaced.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A five-year plan has been developed to improve all interior and exterior lighting. Phase I is scheduled for FY 86/87.</p>
FSP 18	<p>Use lockable garbage dumpsters.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This is not a workable solution. Other options are being explored. This is rated as a least important priority.</p>
FSP 19	<p>Replace metal eating utensils with plastic utensils.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The Food Manager is conducting a cost analysis of using plastic utensils. This is rated as a least important priority.</p>
FSP 20	<p>Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units (on a phased basis).</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This is a major capital outlay project and is viewed as a least important priority.</p>



C. MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
FSP 22	<p>Prohibit general population inmates from working in security housing units.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Once major construction projects are completed, inmate labor in the SHUs will be reduced to a minimum. This should be rated as a very important priority as it will increase security in this maximum housing unit.</p>
FSP 23	<p>Eliminate contact visiting for security housing inmates.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> An analysis of the potential impact will be completed. This would increase the security of the visiting area.</p>
FSP 26	<p>If the assignment of significant numbers of close custody inmates to Vocational Education results in serious incidents, construct a gunwalk along the length of the main vocational building.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Activation of existing towers is the preferred method to increase security in the lower yard. This recommendation is rated as a least important priority.</p>
FSP 27	<p>Establish centralized tool/material cribs in the Vocational and Industries areas.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This recommendation will be reviewed as part of the tool control revision process.</p>
FSP 28	<p>Strictly enforce prison policy requiring inmate workers to carry tool lists.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Same as above.</p>
RCC 14	<p>Install a walk-through metal detector at the Main Yard entrance.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A metal detector will be purchased from the FY 86/87 equipment budget.</p>
RCC 16	<p>Relocate the high voltage power lines located next to Tower #11.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This is viewed as a least important priority. The power lines do not appear to present a safety risk. Additionally, this project does not seem cost efficient when compared to other priorities.</p>

C. MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
RCC 19	<p>Purchase or fabricate lockable trash containers.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Post orders of designated S &amp; E positions will provide for the escort of all trash carts in the security area of RC Central. This change will be effective immediately.</p>
RCC 22	<p>Install expanded metal cage around cell lockboxes on second and third tiers of Cypress Hall.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This recommendation has been accomplished. The metal cages are currently in use.</p>
RCC 23	<p>Replace spring bottom bunks with solid pan bottom units (on a phased basis).</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The cost of this proposal, when compared with other security needs, is not justified.</p>
RCC 27	<p>Modify the Control Room access door to electrically interlock with the two pedestrian sally port gates.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This system will be installed by February 1987.</p>
RCC 28	<p>Install bars over Control Room windows that face the pedestrian sally port.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> These bars will be fabricated and installed by October of 1986.</p>
RCC 29	<p>Install an effective ventilation system in the Control Room.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A proposal will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.</p>
RCC 31	<p>Install an emergency generator and an emergency lighting system.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> - A departmental committee is reviewing emergency power needs at all institutions. This is viewed as a <u>highest priority</u> item. A PPG will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan, unless emergency funds are provided earlier.</p>

C. MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
RCC 32	<p>Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> The maintenance department is currently in the process of being reorganized. This reorganization will result in the assignment of approximately six maintenance positions to RC Central; the additional staffing will resolve this problem.</p>
East 1	<p>Under current operating methods and inmate populations, full-time authorized security staffing for the CIM-East posts we reviewed should consist of about 182 peace officer positions (<u>including</u> sick leave relief).</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Strongly disagree with the reduction of any staff. Redirection of positions is possible. Impact of redirection to be evaluated.</p>
East 6	<p>Modify the Gym Tower to improve visibility and effectiveness.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A Project Planning Guide and drawing with proposed modifications will be submitted in June 1986 and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.</p>
East 7	<p>Implement a planned replacement program for certain Tower windows.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> CIM maintenance will develop a window replacement schedule for identified towers at all CIM facilities.</p>
East 10	<p>Develop a multi-year capital improvement plan if CIM-East is to remain a Level III institution.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Development of multi-year plan for capital improvement has already been initiated. Projects have been included in the CIM major and minor five-year plans.</p>
East 13	<p>Install a twelve-foot fence with a truck gate around Prison Industries and Maintenance.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A project planning guide with drawing has been submitted to maintenance. Work is scheduled to begin 9/8/86; estimated completion date is 9/30/86.</p>
East 14	<p>Install an emergency generator and emergency lighting system.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This recommendation should be moved to the highest priority group. CIM-East has no emergency power source or back-up</p>

C. MODERATELY IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

NUMBER

RECOMMENDATION

system. In the event of a power failure, the facility or affected areas will be in total darkness and on manual cell open/close operation. The potential for serious problems are present. The fact that we have been fortunate over the years, does not preclude taking some corrective actions as soon as possible to provide back-up illumination (battery pack) until full power is restored.

East 15

Implement a food services utensil count system.

RESPONSE: Counting all utensils is unnecessary. Weapons fashioned from kitchen items have not been a problem. The intent of the kitchen utensil/tool control is to account for large serving pieces, i.e., ladles, spatulas and the like.

D. LEAST IMPORTANT PRIORITY

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
CDC 7	<p>Provide side baton training to all officers.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Training is provided for staff who are authorized to use the side handle baton. Qualification training is a 16-hour course with an annual 4-hour course required for requalification. The cost to provide the initial qualifications training for all custodial staff (lieutenant, sergeants and correctional officers) is estimated at \$3.1 million. This figure is based on current staffing and the median overtime wage. The Departmental Training Section is preparing plans to implement this training.</p>
FSP 7	<p>Enforce the policy of limiting inmate property to six cubic feet.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Current litigation prevents CDC from enforcing this policy. Steps are being taken to address Fire Marshal's concerns.</p>
FSP 10	<p>Escort all trucks at all times when they enter the prison.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Detailed searches are being conducted. Vehicles are under constant observation by tower officers.</p>
FSP 13	<p>Establish inmate picture rosters in the general housing units and an ID card rack in the Prison Industries and Culinary areas.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Housing unit picture boards will be considered during implementation of unit concept. Identification card racks are not needed in Culinary or Industries. Picture identification systems are in existence in both areas.</p>
FSP 16	<p>Relocate all counselors to the housing units.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> This will be accomplished during implementation of the unit concept. Target date: July 1, 1986.</p>
FSP 17	<p>Decentralize the storage of tasers so they are more immediately accessible when needed.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> Same as above.</p>
FSP 24	<p>Relocate the Lower Yard custody office to a point across from the count gate.</p> <p><u>RESPONSE:</u> A Project Planning Guide will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the five-year plan.</p>

D. LEAST IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
FSP 25	Rearrange the internal structure of Vocational Education buildings.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> Plans have been approved to remodel some areas in the Vocational Education buildings.
FSP 29	Establish key exchange system for the Vocational and Prison Industries areas.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> Key control procedures are currently being reviewed. Numerous security improvements will be implemented.
FSP 30	Assign the locksmith to report administratively to the key control officer.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> The locksmith will report administratively to the Armory Sergeant.
RCC 5	Request committing counties to provide copies of State and FBI arrest records for incoming inmates.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> CDC will review documents necessary to process inmates. This will require coordination with each County Chief Deputy Probation Officer.
RCC 6	Conduct orientation of new inmates within 24 hours.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> Population pressures on RC Central do not permit daily orientation sessions. Inmates are provided with orientation reading material and formal orientation is conducted each Saturday.
RCC 9	Construct a new tower at the northeast corner of the perimeter fence.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> This should be a highest priority item. A proposal will be submitted and prioritized for possible inclusion in the CIM five-year plan.
RCC 12	Provide corridor officers with portable radios.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> A proposal has been submitted for portable radios. The department is currently conducting a comprehensive audit of existing radios.

D. LEAST IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
RCC 15	Place expanded metal screens over windows in several areas. <u>RESPONSE:</u> This is not viewed as a workable solution. The windows that provide access to the recreation yard will be secured.
RCC 17	Increase the lighting in the Main Corridor. <u>RESPONSE:</u> A schedule will be developed to upgrade lighting by March of 1987.
RCC 18	Remove all inoperative heating units in the Main Corridor. <u>RESPONSE:</u> This has been done.
RCC 20	Include metal food trays, soup bowls, and plastic cups in the count of eating utensils. <u>RESPONSE:</u> Control of these items is not a problem. Kitchen utensils which need to be accounted for include ladles, serving spoons and similar equipment.
RCC 24	Electrically interlock certain doors in Palm Hall (administrative segregation housing). <u>RESPONSE:</u> This should not be done. Established practice provides for needed security.
RCC 25	Modify food services procedures in Palm Hall by using stacked trays or installing a small mechanical lift. <u>RESPONSE:</u> Testing of plastic insulated, stackable food trays is being conducted. A workable product will be purchased.
RCC 26	Install a sally port at the entrance to the Palm Hall exercise yards. <u>RESPONSE:</u> Established procedures do not present a security problem. A sally port is not needed.
RCC 30	Monitor the shelf life of chemical agents in the Armory and replace as indicated. <u>RESPONSE:</u> This has been accomplished.

D. LEAST IMPORTANT PRIORITY, continued

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>RECOMMENDATION</u>
RCC 33	Establish a procedure for destruction of broken and worn keys.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> The locksmith destroys keys prior to the salvaging process, with the exception of Folger-Adams keys which must be returned to the company.
East 4	Install razor ribbon along the top of the vehicle sally port.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> A work order has been submitted. Installation scheduled to begin 7/7/86; estimated completion date is 7/31/86.
East 5	Install additional lighting in the vehicle sally port.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> A work order has been submitted. Installation scheduled to begin 7/7/86; estimated completion date is 7/31/86.
East 11	Establish a random patrol by correctional officers during the work hours at Prison Industries.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> Currently in compliance.
East 16	Establish a tool crib for the facility maintenance activity.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> A procedure will be established upon the reorganization of maintenance staff.
East 17	Establish a procedure for destruction of broken or damaged keys.  <u>RESPONSE:</u> The locksmith is currently destroying keys prior to the salvaging process.



cc: Members of the Legislature  
Office of the Governor  
Office of the Lieutenant Governor  
State Controller  
Legislative Analyst  
Assembly Office of Research  
Senate Office of Research  
Assembly Majority/Minority Consultants  
Senate Majority/Minority Consultants  
Capitol Press Corps